

IAFF 2190.80/PSC 2994.81
WAR (WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?)

Elliott School of International Affairs
Department of Political Science
The George Washington University

Fall 2019
Time: MW, 12:45 – 2:00pm
Room: Monroe 353
Office Hours: Tues., 1:00 – 3:00pm

Professor: Alexander B. Downes
Office: 1957 E St. NW, #605B
Phone: (202) 734-0026
Email: downes@gwu.edu

COURSE DESCRIPTION

“War! What is it good for? Absolutely nothing!”

-- Edwin Starr (1970)

“War is nothing but the continuation of politics with the admixture of other means.”

-- Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (1832)

It is widely believed that war—in line with the popular anti-war anthem quoted above—is simply pointless mass slaughter that entails “the destruction of innocent lives” and puts “tears in thousands of mothers’ eyes.” “War,” according to a common bumper sticker, “is not the answer.” It is certainly true that war has been both frequent and destructive. According to one (incomplete) estimate, 3,708 wars were fought between the years 1400 and 2000, an average of over six per year. More than 100 million people perished in twentieth century wars alone, including 11-13 million in World War I and 50-56 million in World War II. Nor are soldiers the only ones who suffer in wartime: on average civilians comprise about half of all wartime deaths.

In contrast, the foremost theorist of war, Carl von Clausewitz, avers that far from being senseless violence, war is eminently political; in fact, it makes no sense to understand war outside of politics. Wars are fought for political purposes—to conquer territory, add particular populations, create new states (e.g., Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century), coerce other states to change policies, or overthrow hostile governments—and the political objective should guide a war’s conduct. Even mass violence against civilians in war has been argued to have a political purpose: to coerce an adversary’s surrender or eliminate unwanted populations from a state’s territory.

While appreciating the enormous human suffering brought about by war, in this class we will explore the use of war for political purposes among states. We will seek answers to questions such as: what do states seek when they wage war? What forms do wars take and how are they conducted? How has the conduct of war changed and developed over time? What is the relationship between war and society? Has “war made the state and the state made war?” How does technological change affect the conduct of war and vice-versa? Why are some states successful at waging war whereas others fail? What is the role of air power and naval power in war?

WHAT WILL YOU LEARN?

The principal *substantive* objective of this course is to expand your knowledge and understanding of the purpose and conduct of modern war, but along the way you will build skills that should serve you well throughout your educational career and beyond. At the conclusion of this course, students should be able to:

- Diagnose the extent to which states have used war to pursue obtainable political goals
- Analyze and assess the effectiveness of different strategic choices (e.g., with ground forces, air power, naval forces, nuclear weapons) in pursuit of political objectives in war
- Explain how societal and technological change affect the conduct of war and vice-versa

- Dissect, compare, and apply theories of war and military effectiveness to historical, contemporary, and future cases
- Empathize with the battlefield experience of combatants and the experience of civilians in war
- Critically evaluate social science theories and research
- Effectively communicate ideas, arguments, and evidence verbally and in writing

HOW WILL I ASSESS YOUR LEARNING?

How will I know you're learning? The course has a number of assignments that help me assess the degree to which you are internalizing the material. Details on the major assignments will be posted on Blackboard under the "Assignments" link.

- **Class Participation:** Learning is not a spectator sport! In this course we will engage in discussion as a class as well as small-group debates and activities. In order to get the most out of these discussions, it is imperative that you not only attend class but read the assigned material before class, distill its main points, reflect on it, and come prepared to talk about it. Speaking in front of a large group of your peers (and me) is nerve-racking, but I encourage you to take a risk, go out on a limb, and raise your hand. It gets easier. For those of you who are uncomfortable talking in this setting, there will be ample opportunities to participate in smaller groups.
- **Quizzes:** This course relies on your participation to succeed. To be able to participate, you must not only do the assigned readings before class but absorb and engage with them critically. Bi-weekly reading quizzes will facilitate participation and help you identify the key points and arguments from books and articles. There will be a total of 6 quizzes during the course of the semester; your grade will be calculated after dropping your lowest score. No make-up quizzes will be given except for documented health reasons.
- **Argument Mapping Exercise:** Reading and understanding social science and historical texts is an acquired skill. To assist you in getting the most out of the readings, early in the semester I will ask you to read an article, identify its critical elements (question, argument, competing explanations, key pieces of evidence) and either make two critiques of it or raise two questions about it.
- **Take-Home Midterm Exam:** At the conclusion of Part II of the course, I will distribute 2-3 essay questions drawn from the material covered up to that point. You will select and answer 1 of these questions in an essay of no more than 7 double-spaced pages each. These questions will require you to make intensive use of the readings and will assess your ability to explain important themes or trends in the theory and development of war over time. You will have one week to complete the exam.
- **The Human Impact of War:** Watch one of the recommended war movies from the list provided on Blackboard. Reflect on the experience of one of the combatants *or* civilians (such as a family member of a combatant or a civilian caught up in the fighting) depicted in the film. Write a brief paper (3 pages double-spaced) about how the experience of war affected that person. What happened to them and how did they react to it? Do you think it changed them as a person? How do you think you would react if placed in the same situation? How might war change you?
- **Military Campaign Analysis Group Project:** In this semester-long group project, working in teams of four you will select an operation or campaign from a list provided by me, assess the balance of forces between the two sides, describe their plans/strategies and how they used their forces, and use theories of military effectiveness to explain the outcome and the relative combat effectiveness of the belligerents. The project consists of four parts: (1) a group net assessment paper, (2) a group annotated bibliography, (3) a group in-class presentation, and (4) an individual reflection paper. A detailed description of this project is posted in the Assignments folder on Blackboard.

WHAT WE'LL BE READING

1. Books

We will read large parts of the following books, which are available for purchase (or in some cases rental) through The George Washington University Bookstore; they may also be purchased from many online outlets. A copy of each has been placed on 2-hour reserve at Gelman Library. Books indicated by an asterisk (*) are available online through the GW Library.

Larry H. Addington, *The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).*

Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).*

Jasen J. Castillo, *Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2014).*

Alexander B. Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008).*

Michael Howard, *War in European History*, updated ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).*

Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (London: Routledge, 1991).

Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2015).*

The following book is **strongly recommended**. The required chapters will be available on Blackboard, but it is a foundational text in the study of modern war that you may wish to purchase.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).*

2. Articles and Book Chapters

All of the journal articles and book chapters listed below in the required reading are available online through Blackboard on Electronic Reserves. To access them, click on "Blackboard" from the "My GW" page (<https://my.gwu.edu>), log in, go to the page for this class, and click on "Electronic Reserves." There are folders for each lecture; inside the folders, readings are listed by the author's last name and title of the article/chapter.

COURSE CALENDAR**Part I. The Theory of War**

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|--------------------|--------------------------------|---------|
| 1. August 26 (M) | Course Introduction | |
| 2. August 28 (W) | Clausewitz I: War and Policy | |
| 3. September 2 (M) | No Class: Labor Day | |
| 4. September 4 (W) | Clausewitz II: Violence in War | |
| 5. September 9 (M) | Alternatives to Clausewitz | Quiz #1 |

Part II. The Changing Nature of Land Warfare

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|----------------------|--|------------------|
| 6. September 11 (W) | Warfare under the Old Regime | |
| 7. September 16 (M) | French Rev./Nationalism/Napoleon | Argument Map Due |
| 8. September 18 (W) | Developments in the 19 th Century | |
| 9. September 23 (M) | Conduct of World War I | Quiz #2 |
| 10. September 25 (W) | Machine Warfare & Combined Arms | |
| 11. September 30 (M) | Conduct of World War II | |
| 12. October 2 (W) | Cold War Conventional Balance in Europe | |

Part III. Effectiveness in Land Warfare

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|--------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| 13. October 7 (M) | The Modern System | |
| 14. October 9 (W) | Theories of Skill | Midterm Exam Due |
| 15. October 14 (M) | Theories of Will | Quiz #3 |
| 16. October 16 (W) | Battle of France | |
| 17. October 21 (M) | Fall Break: No Class | |
| 18. October 23 (W) | Vietnam War | Net Assessment Due |
| 19. October 28 (M) | Iran-Iraq War | Quiz #4 |

Part IV. Air Power

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|---------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|
| 20. October 30 (W) | Theories of Strategic Bombing | |
| 21. November 4 (M) | Germany & Japan | |
| 22. November 6 (W) | Korea & Vietnam | |
| 23. November 11 (M) | Persian Gulf War | Human Impact Due |
| 24. November 13 (W) | Contemporary Conflicts & Drones | Quiz #5 |
| 25. November 18 (M) | Student Presentations | Bibliographies Due |
| 26. November 20 (W) | Student Presentations | |

Part V. Naval Power

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|---------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 27. November 25 (M) | Mahan & Command of the Sea | |
| 28. November 27 (W) | No Class: Thanksgiving | |
| 29. December 2 (M) | Blockade | Campaign Paper Due |
| 30. December 4 (W) | Aircraft Carriers & Carrier Warfare | Quiz #6 |
| 31. December 9 (M) | Air-Sea Battle/U.S.-China Scenario | |
| 32. December 11 (W) | Make-Up Day (if necessary) | |

DETAILED COURSE SCHEDULE**1. Course Introduction August 26**Guiding Questions

- What do you think about when you think about war? Is war good for absolutely nothing?

Readings (all are visuals)

- “Population Control, Marauder Style,” *New York Times*, November 5, 2011.
- “Global Deaths in Conflicts since 1400,” *Our World in Data*
- “Years in which European Countries Took Part in an International War (1500-2000),” *Our World in Data*

2. Clausewitz I: War and Policy August 28Guiding Questions

- What is the relationship between war and politics?
- In wartime, should the politicians fall silent and leave the conduct of war to the military professionals?

Readings

- Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 186-213.
- *On War*, Book 1, Chapters 1-2 (75-99); Book 8, Chapters 1-6 (577-610).

3. No Class: Labor Day September 2**4. Clausewitz II: Violence in War September 4**Guiding Questions

- What is the role of chance and probability in war?
- What is “absolute war”? What is “real war”? What are the differences between them?

Readings

- *On War*, Book 1, Chapters 3-8 (100-123); Book 3, Chapters 1, 8-9 (177-82, 194-201); Book 4, Chapters 3-4, 11 (227-35, 258-62); Book 6, Chapter 1 (357-59).

5. Alternatives to Clausewitz: Sun Tzu, Schelling, and Jomini September 9
*Quiz #1*Guiding Questions

- Can you win wars without actually fighting?
- Is there a simple recipe in war that invariably produces victory?
- What is the difference between brute force and coercion? How can you get an adversary to do what you want through the threat or infliction of pain?

Readings

- Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 57-110.
- Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale Univ. Press, 1966), 1-35, 35-43.
- John Shy, “Jomini,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, skim 143-64; read 164-85.

Part II. The Changing Nature of Land Warfare**6. Warfare under the Old Regime** **September 11**Guiding Questions

- What was the relationship between war and society under European absolute monarchies?
- Why were the battlefield tactics of old regime armies so primitive?

Readings

- Addington, *Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century*, 1-7.
- Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, Chapters 2-3 (8-37).
- Howard, *War in European History*, Chapter 4 (54-74).

7. The French Revolution, Nationalism, and Napoleon **September 16**
*Argument Mapping Exercise Due*Guiding Questions

- What in the heck happened in France in 1793 and after that has affected warfare ever since?

Readings

- Addington, *Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century*, 19-42.
- Howard, *War in European History*, Chapter 5 (75-93).
- Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, Chapter 4 (38-59).
- Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (Autumn 1993): 80-124.

8. Developments in the 19th Century **September 18**Guiding Questions

- What kinds of technological developments were making it increasingly difficult to survive in the open on the battlefield?
- Why was Gen. Longstreet so opposed to the Confederate Army's attack on the third day at Gettysburg?

Readings

- Addington, *Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century*, 43-54, 102-113.
- Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, Chapter 8 (108-129).
- Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1957), Chapters 1-2 (7-58).
- Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels* (New York: David McKay, 1974), 284-300, 312-29.

9. Conduct of World War I **September 23***Quiz #2*Guiding Questions

- Is there any political objective that could justify paying the astounding cost of World War I?
- Why didn't World War I end after the failure of the initial offensives?
- Why did the war take the form that it did on the Western Front?

Readings

- Addington, *Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century*, 134-71.
- Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, Chapter 9 (130-49).
- Howard, *War in European History*, Chapter 6 (94-115).
- Jonathan M. House, *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), Chapter 2 (31-63).

Recommended Reading

- Michael Howard, *The First World War: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

10. Machine Warfare and Combined Arms**September 25**Guiding Questions

- Did the invention of the tank revolutionize warfare?
- Did the invention of aircraft revolutionize warfare?
- Did the biggest innovators in military technology and doctrine reap the biggest rewards in battle?

Readings

- Addington, *Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century*, 172-94.
- Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, Chapter 10 (150-68).
- House, *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century*, Chapter 3 (64-104).

11. Conduct of World War II**September 30***Group Net Assessment Due*Guiding Questions

- When do you think the conflict that became known as World War II actually started?
- Why in the world didn't Winston Churchill negotiate a settlement with Adolf Hitler after Britain's defeat in the Battle of France?
- Why did the German blitzkrieg work so well in France but fail in the Soviet Union?

Readings

- Addington, *Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century*, 195-265.
- Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, Chapter 11 (169-87).
- House, *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century*, Chapter 4 (107-135).

12. The Cold War Conventional Balance in Europe**October 2***Take-Home Midterm Distributed*Guiding Questions

- What were NATO's prospects for defeating a Warsaw Pact conventional invasion of Western Europe in the late Cold War?
- NATO's policy in the event of war with the Warsaw Pact was to use nuclear weapons. If you were president, would you have authorized the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a Pact attack?

Readings

- John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," *International Security* 7, no. 1 (Summer 1982): 3-39.
- Barry R. Posen, "Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment," *International Security* 9, no. 3 (Winter 1984/85): 47-88.

Part III. Effectiveness in Land Warfare**13. The Modern System of Force Employment****October 7**Guiding Questions

- What are the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war?
- What is the modern system of force employment and why is it the key to effectiveness in modern battle?
- If the modern system is so crucial, why doesn't everybody use it?

Readings

- Allen R. Millett and Williamson Murray, *Military Effectiveness*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Chapter 1 (1-30).
- Biddle, *Military Power*, Chapters 1-3 (1-51).

14. Theories of Skill: Regime Type and Civil-Military Relations**October 9***Take-Home Midterm Due*Guiding Questions

- Are democracies just the best thing ever?
- Wait a second! Wasn't Nazi Germany a personalist dictatorship? And wasn't it also one of the most formidable fighting machines of all time? What's up with that?
- What are the conditions under which personalist dictatorships might prioritize combat effectiveness?

Readings

- Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), Chapters 2-3 (read 10-38 and 58-76; skim 38-57 and 76-83 if you're interested in statistics; notes to both chapters are included with Chapter 3).
- Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 19, no. 2 (June 1996): 171-212.
- Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army*, Chapter 1 (12-40).

15. Theories of Will: Small Unit and National Cohesion**October 14***Quiz #3*Guiding Questions

- The theory of small unit cohesion is one of the most influential statements of all time on the sources of military cohesion. Are there any reasons to doubt its conclusions?
- Are some societies more cohesive than others?

Readings

- Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948): 280-315.
- Alexander B. Downes, "Would Transgender Troops Harm Military Effectiveness? Here's What the Research Says," *The Washington Post Monkey Cage*, August 1, 2017.
- Castillo, *Endurance and War*, Chapters 1-2 (1-43).

16. The Battle of France**October 16**Guiding Questions

- During World War I, the French Army held out for four years despite suffering enormous casualties (27 percent of the French male population between the ages of 18 and 27 died in the war). In World War II, the French Army collapsed in a few short weeks while suffering relatively light casualties (but 2 million troops taken prisoner). Why?

Readings

- John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), Chapter 4 (98-133).
- Don W. Alexander, "Repercussions of the Breda Variant," *French Historical Studies* 8, no. 3 (Spring 1974): 459-488.
- Castillo, *Endurance and War*, Chapter 4 (44-93).

17. No Class: Fall Break**October 21**

18. The Vietnam War**October 23***Group Net Assessment Due*Guiding Questions

- In a conversation after the war was over, U.S. Col. Harry Summers said to a North Vietnamese officer, Col. Tu, “You know, you never defeated us on the battlefield.” Col. Tu replied, “That may be so. But it is also irrelevant.” How is it possible to win a war without winning any battles?
- Why did North and South Vietnam produce such differently skilled armies when they shared so many factors in common?

Readings

- Talmadge, *Dictator’s Army*, Chapters 2-3 (41-138).
- Castillo, *Endurance and War*, Chapters 6-7 (164-215).

19. The Iran-Iraq War**October 28***Quiz #4*Guiding Questions

- What on Earth happened to the Iraqi Army in 1988 to transform it from the gang that couldn’t shoot straight into a force capable of implementing double envelopments? And then what happened by 1991 to turn it back into the gang that couldn’t shoot straight?
- Why did tens of thousands of unarmed Iranian conscripts walk through minefields and launch human wave attacks against Iraqi lines?

Readings

- Talmadge, *Dictator’s Army*, Chapters 4-5 (139-232).

Part IV. Air Power**20. Theories of Strategic Bombing****October 30**Guiding Questions

- Think back to Schelling’s distinction between brute force and coercion. Does airpower allow states to win wars solely through coercion?

Readings

- Pape, *Bombing to Win*, Chapters 1-3 (1-86).
- Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War*, Chapter 1, esp. 29-39.

21. The Bombing of Germany and Japan**November 4**Guiding Questions

- Forget about the atomic bombs for a minute. Great Britain and the United States, both democracies, incinerated hundreds of thousands of German and Japanese civilians, respectively. How were these campaigns justified militarily? Can they be justified morally?

Readings

- Pape, *Bombing to Win*, Chapters 4 and 8 (87-136, 254-313).
- Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War*, Chapter 4 (115-55).

22. The Bombing of Korea and Vietnam**November 6**Guiding Questions

- Are there some wars that just can’t be won with airpower?

Readings

- Pape, *Bombing to Win*, Chapters 5-6 (137-210).
- Phil Haun and Colin Jackson, “Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War,” *International Security* 40, no. 3 (Winter 2015/16): 139-78.

Recommended Reading

- Alexander B. Downes, “Creating a *Cordon Sanitaire*: U.S. Strategic Bombing and Civilians in Korea,” in *The Civilianization of War and the Unpredictable Civil-Military Divide, 1914-2014*, ed. Andrew Barros and Martin Thomas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 196-220.

23. Bombing in the Persian Gulf War**November 11***Human Impact of War Paper Due*Guiding Questions

- Why can't the U.S. Air Force give up on punishment strategies?
- To what extent is the United States morally responsible for the deaths of Iraqi civilians as a consequence of the secondary health effects of the air campaign?
- Can you win wars by killing leaders?

Readings

- Pape, *Bombing to Win*, Chapter 7 (211-53).
- Biddle, *Military Power*, Chapter 7 (132-49).
- Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War*, 215-32.

24. Airpower/Drones in Contemporary Conflicts**November 13***Quiz #5*Guiding Questions

- Does the United States still need an army? Can't we just send aircraft—now without risking even a single life—to win wars?
- What are the consequences of wars that are potentially “bloodless” for one side?
- Do airstrikes reduce insurgent attacks or not?

Readings

- Robert A. Pape, “The True Worth of Air Power,” *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 116-30.
- Jason Lyall, “Bombing to Lose? Airpower, Civilian Casualties, and the Dynamics of Violence in Counterinsurgency Wars,” unpublished ms., Yale University, September 2017.
- Patrick B. Johnston and Anoop K. Sarbahi, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 2 (June 2016): 203-19.

25. Student Presentations**November 18***Group Annotated Bibliographies Due***26. Student Presentations****November 20****Part V. Naval Power****27. Mahan and Command of the Sea****November 25**Guiding Questions

- What do navies do in war?
- Why does sea control matter?

Readings

- Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 444-77.
- Ian Speller, “Concepts of Naval Warfare” and “The Evolution of Naval Warfare,” in *Understanding Modern Warfare*, ed. David Jordan, James D. Kiras, David J. Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck and C. Dale Walton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 159-201.

28. No Class: Happy Thanksgiving!**November 27****29. Blockade****December 2***Individual Paper from Campaign Analysis Due*Guiding Questions

- Can you win wars by starving people?
- Through what kind of magical thinking did the Germans come to believe that unrestricted submarine warfare would knock Britain out of World War I?

Readings

- Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Commerce Destroying and Blockade,” in *Mahan on Naval Warfare*, ed. Allan Westcott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1942), 91-99.
- John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 87-96.
- Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War*, Chapter 4 (83-114).
- C. Paul Vincent, *The Politics of Hunger* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1985), Chapter 2 (27-59).

30. Aircraft Carriers and Carrier Warfare**December 4***Quiz #6*Guiding Questions

- How did the invention of aircraft carriers change naval warfare before and during World War II?
- Are aircraft carriers still useful in war, or are they giant sitting ducks for ballistic missiles and/or small nuclear weapons?

Readings

- Geoffrey Till, “Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American, and Japanese Case Studies,” in *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, ed. Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millet, 191-226 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

31. Air-Sea Battle and the U.S.-China Scenario**December 9**Guiding Questions

- How is the United States planning to wage a potential war against China?
- Does the way the United States plans to fight China make a nuclear exchange more likely?

Readings

- Department of Defense, *Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial Challenges* (Washington, D.C., 2013).
- Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States,” *International Security* 41, no 4 (Spring 2017): 50-92.

32. Make-Up Day (if necessary)**December 11**

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EVALUATION PROCEDURES

It is unfortunate but true that I must assign a single letter grade that captures your entire performance in this class. My goal is to be as transparent as possible in explaining how I evaluate your performance on the different course assessments. Rubrics with details on the evaluation of each assignment will be posted along with the assignment on Blackboard. Below I summarize how I weight the different assessments.

Assignment	Percentage of Course Grade
Class Participation	15%
Quizzes	15%
Argument Mapping Exercise	5%
Take-Home Midterm Exam	20%
Human Impact of War Paper	10%
Military Campaign Analysis Group Project	35%

CLASS POLICIES

- **Attendance and Reading:** Students are expected to attend every class session, do all of the assigned reading before class, and come prepared to discuss it. Exceptions will of course be made for religious holidays (see “religious observances” below).
- **Papers:** All papers for this course are expected to be double-spaced, written in 12-point font, have margins of at least 1 inch on all sides, and be stapled. Double-sided printing is encouraged.
- **Late Papers:** Late papers will be accepted up to 24 hours after the deadline, but one letter grade will be deducted. Papers that are more than 24 hours late will not be accepted and will be assigned a grade of zero. Exceptions will be made only in cases of incapacitating illness or extraordinary personal or family emergency; if you find yourself in such a situation, consult the instructor as soon as possible to discuss an extension. You may also wish to consult GW’s Counseling and Psychological Services (see below under “Mental Health”) or the CARE Network (<https://students.gwu.edu/care>).
- **Blackboard:** Blackboard will be used for posting course files and assignments and for communicating with the class. You are already enrolled for this course on Blackboard if you have completed registration for the course. It is your responsibility to periodically check the course site (log in at <http://blackboard.gwu.edu/> using your gwu.edu address) for updates to the syllabus/readings. The Official Blackboard Help Site, FAQs, and a variety of short video tutorials are available from Blackboard. Also, when logged in to Blackboard, check out the Student Guides section for links to helpful documentation. Additionally, students can contact the GW Division of IT at (202) 994-4948 for Blackboard assistance.
- **Electronic Devices:** Students will need an electronic device of some kind (laptop, tablet, or cell phone) to participate in certain class activities. When not needed for those activities, I encourage you to put them away. There is plenty of scientific evidence, for example, that students who take notes by hand perform better on exams than those who use computers, and also that laptops in the classroom distract *other* students and worsen *their* performance. How you choose to take notes, however, is ultimately up to you. In any event, all cell phones should be silenced before class starts. If your cell phone rings or I see you texting during class, an arbitrary and slightly embarrassing punishment will be imposed to encourage mindfulness about your device.
- **Grade Appeals:** Grades in this course are not negotiable, but if you believe an error has been made in the grading of your assignment, you may appeal. Appeals must be made to the instructor *in writing* within one week of the date you receive your graded assignment. Appeals may result in a higher grade, no change, or a lower grade.

- **Plagiarism, Cheating, and Academic Integrity:** According to the university's Code of Academic Integrity, "Academic dishonesty is defined as cheating of any kind, including misrepresenting one's own work, taking credit for the work of others without crediting them and without appropriate authorization, and the fabrication of information." The rest of the code is available at <https://studentconduct.gwu.edu/>. In general, I expect that you will not lie, cheat, steal, or otherwise conduct yourselves dishonorably, and will do something if you observe others engaging in such conduct. All work you submit for this course must be your own. **I will not tolerate any form of academic dishonesty.** Suspected cases will be referred to the Office of Academic Integrity. If you have questions about what constitutes proper use of published or unpublished sources, please ask the instructor.
- **Ideological Perspectives:** I do not care *what* you think, I care *that* you think. My mission is to get you to think critically about important issues regarding the conduct of war, not convince you that my view is right. There is no "approved solution" or "right" or "wrong" view in this class, only better or worse arguments. Good arguments require sound logic, solid evidence, and a consideration of alternative explanations.
- **Civility:** I expect students in this class to treat each other with respect. That means, among other things, allowing others to speak no matter how much you disagree with what they are saying and refraining from interrupting.

UNIVERSITY POLICIES, RESOURCES, AND SERVICES

- **Religious Observances:** In accordance with University policy, students should notify faculty during the first week of the semester of their intention to be absent from class on their day(s) of religious observance. For details and policy, see: students.gwu.edu/accommodations-religious-holidays.
- **Workload Expectation Statement:** In this 3 credit undergraduate course students are expected to work for 450 minutes per week (this includes 150 minutes of time spend in class per week); totaling to 112.5 hours of work over the duration of this 15-week semester.
- **Exams:** Students must take the final exam at the time and date assigned by the Academic Scheduling Office. Students who have three final exams on one day may petition for one of them to be rescheduled. See here: <https://provost.gwu.edu/administration-final-examinations-during-examination-period>.
- **Sharing of Course Content:** Unauthorized downloading, distributing, or sharing of any part of a recorded lecture or course materials, as well as using provided information for purposes other than the student's own learning may be deemed a violation of GW's Student Conduct Code.
- **Use of Student Work:** The professor will use academic work that you complete during this semester for educational purposes in this course during this semester. Your registration and continued enrollment constitute your consent.
- **Disabilities:** Any student who may need an accommodation based on the potential impact of a disability should contact the Disability Support Services office at (202) 994-8250 in Rome Hall, Suite 102, to establish eligibility and to coordinate reasonable accommodations. For additional information please refer to: <https://disabilitysupport.gwu.edu/>.
- **Mental Health:** The University's Counseling and Psychological Services (202-994-5300) offers 24/7 assistance and referral to address students' personal, social, career, and study skills problems. Services for students include: crisis and emergency mental health consultations confidential assessment, counseling services (individual and small group), and referrals. For additional information see: <https://healthcenter.gwu.edu/counseling-and-psychological-services>. If any student's ability to perform in this class becomes affected by a mental health issue, he or she is encouraged to reach out to the instructor, who can make accommodations with regard to assignments and help connect students to university resources.

- **Emergency Preparedness and Response Procedures:** The University has asked all faculty to inform students of these procedures, prepared by the GW Office of Public Safety and Emergency Management in collaboration with the Office of the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs. To report an emergency or suspicious activity, call the University Police Department at 202-994-6111 (Foggy Bottom) or 202-242-6111 (Mount Vernon).
- **Shelter in Place, General Guidance:** Although it is unlikely that we will ever need to shelter in place, it is helpful to know what to do just in case. No matter where you are, the basic steps of shelter in place will generally remain the same.
 - If you are inside, stay where you are unless the building you are in is affected. If it is affected, you should evacuate. If you are outdoors, proceed into the closest building or follow instructions from emergency personnel on the scene.
 - Locate an interior room to shelter inside. If possible, it should be above ground level and have the fewest number of windows. If sheltering in a room with windows, move away from the windows. If there is a large group of people inside a particular building, several rooms may be necessary.
 - Shut and lock all windows (for a tighter seal) and close exterior doors.
 - Turn off air conditioners, heaters, and fans. Close vents to ventilation systems as you are able. (University staff will turn off ventilation systems as quickly as possible).
 - Make a list of the people with you and ask someone to call the list in to UPD so they know where you are sheltering and who is with you. If only students are present, one of the students should call in the list.
 - Await further instructions. If possible, visit GW Campus Advisories for incident updates (<http://CampusAdvisories.gwu.edu>) or call the GW Information Line 202-994-5050.
 - Make yourself comfortable and look after one other. You will get word as soon as it is safe to come out.
- **Evacuation:** An evacuation will be considered if the building we are in is affected or we must move to a location of greater safety. We will always evacuate if the fire alarm sounds. In the event of an evacuation, please gather your personal belongings quickly (purse, keys, GWorld card, etc.) and proceed to the nearest exit. Every classroom has a map at the door designating both the shortest egress and an alternate egress. Anyone who is physically unable to walk down the stairs should wait in the stairwell, behind the closed doors. Firemen will check the stairwells upon entering the building. Once you have evacuated the building, proceed to our primary rendezvous location: Kogan Plaza in front of Gelman Library. In the event that this location is unavailable, we will meet in University Yard adjacent to the Law School. From our rendezvous location, we will await instructions to re-enter the School.
- **Alert DC:** Alert DC provides free notification by e-mail or text message during an emergency. Visit GW Campus Advisories for a link and instructions on how to sign up for alerts pertaining to GW. If you receive an Alert DC notification during class, you are encouraged to share the information immediately.
- **GW Alert:** GW Alert provides popup notification to desktop and laptop computers during an emergency. In the event that we receive an alert to the computer in our classroom, we will follow the instructions given. You are also encouraged to download this application to your personal computer. Visit GW Campus Advisories to learn how.
- **Additional Information:** Additional information about emergency preparedness and response at GW or the University's operating status can be found on GW Campus Advisories (<http://CampusAdvisories.gwu.edu>) or by calling the GW Information Line at 202-994-5050.