Supplemental Materials for *International Security* Correspondence with Ruolin Su[1]

Alexander B. Downes
The George Washington University

Lindsey A. O'Rourke
Boston College

January 29, 2018

Owing to strict space limitations, we were unable to include all of our arguments and sources for our rejoinder to Ruolin Su's letter to the editors of *International Security* concerning our article "You Can't Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations."[2] This memorandum contains the materials we would have included with additional space. It addresses Su's criticisms of our empirical work, and is thus limited to cases of overt leadership regime change (one of six types of regime change discussed in the article), which is the target of Su's critiques.

Propensity for Militarized Interstate Disputes across Dyads

Su contends that our study may suffer from selection bias because the interstate dyads in our statistical analysis may not have had the same propensity for conflict. Specifically, she asserts that dyads in which foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) occurs may be more likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) than dyads where no FIRC occurs. "In the extreme," Su writes, "the result could be comparisons of, for example, the likelihood of a MID between the

[1] Ruolin Su and Alexander B. Downes and Lindsey A. O'Rourke, "Correspondence: Reconsidering the Outcomes of Foreign-Imposed Regime Change," *International Security*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Winter 2017/18), pp. 172−177.
[2] Su and Downes and O'Rourke, "Correspondence." For the initial article, see Alexander B. Downes and Lindsey A. O'Rourke, "You Can't Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations," *International Security*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Fall 2016), pp. 43−89.

United States and Mexico to one between the United States and Australia."[3] Our statistical analysis, therefore—which compares states that experienced FIRC to those that did not—may be biased in favor of finding conflict in dyads in which FIRC occurs.

HOW WE ADDRESSED THE POSSIBILITY OF SELECTION BIAS

We were well aware of the potential for selection bias and took multiple steps to address that concern, which are described in the "Research Design"[4] and "Robustness Tests"[5] sections of our article, and laid out in detail (in more than 200 pages) in its online appendix.[6] Su's letter does not mention any of these methods.[7]

In our published response,[8] we pointed out two of the ways that we addressed the possibility of selection bias. First, we conducted multiple robustness checks "using genetic matching to check whether interveners select targets for different types of FIRC with which they are already likely or unlikely to fight."[9] One of the variables we matched on was the length of time since the last MID between two states in a dyad. In other words, the control cases in our

---

[3] Su, "Correspondence," p. 173.
[4] Downes and O'Rourke, "You Can't Always Get What You Want," pp. 64−68.
[5] Ibid. pp. 73−74.
[6] Alexander B. Downes and Lindsey A. O'Rourke, "You Can't Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations—Supplemental Materials," November 11, 2016, available at doi:10.7910/DVN/7Y4TD8.
[7] Other reviewers, by contrast, have specifically evaluated these methods. Barry Hashimoto, for instance, characterizes our methodology as "an extensive analysis at high standard." He writes, "The findings are clearly presented. A thorough discussion of robustness checks is included in supplementary material online. In that document the authors explore the consequences of reasonable departures from their research design. Independent and dependent variables are recoded, tests for cross-sectional dyadic dependence are run, and alternative estimators are deployed to counter some of the potential biases of endogeneity and model-dependence." Barry Hashimoto, "Review of 'You Can't Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations'," Article Review 81, *H-Diplo | ISSF*, June 14, 2017, available at: https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-AR81.pdf.
[8] Su and Downes and O'Rourke, "Correspondence," p. 175.
[9] Downes and O'Rourke, "You Can't Always Get What You Want," pp. 73−74.

matched sample had roughly the same propensity to experience a MID as did the treated cases, thereby negating Su's concern. Second, we reestimated "the models with fixed effects to examine the effect of FIRC within dyads that experienced FIRC as opposed to between dyads that did and did not experience FIRC."[10] Because this method analyzes variation only within dyads, it would not suffer from any biases caused by differences in MID propensity across dyads as Su asserts. As we noted in the article, our findings are quite stable.[11]

Space limitations in our response, however, precluded us from mentioning three additional ways that we addressed this concern. First, we used politically relevant dyads in our analysis—pairs of states "that were either territorially contiguous or that contained a major power"—thereby eliminating hundreds of thousands of dyads in which the propensity for either FIRC or militarized conflict was extremely low, or even zero.[12] Thus, although the United States-Australia dyad referenced by Su is included, Australia-Uruguay is not.[13] Needless to say, great powers are capable of intervening outside of their immediate neighborhoods whereas minor powers usually are not, and thus this way of structuring the analysis seems reasonable.[14] Second, we controlled for the geographic distance between two states in a dyad, which is one of the most

---

[10] Ibid. p. 173.
[11] Ibid. pp. 73−74.
[12] Ibid. p. 64. The relevant comparison set for our analysis should be cases where the dependent variable could have possibly occurred. Militarized disputes between Liberia and Bolivia in the nineteenth century, for example, were so unlikely as to be practically impossible, and thus should be excluded. Disputes between neighboring countries, however, or between great powers and minor powers are obviously possible and thus merit inclusion. See James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, "The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 4 (November 2004), pp. 653−669.
[13] It is striking how few FIRCs are dropped from our analysis because of the choice to use politically relevant dyads. Only the 1960 FIRC by Belgium against the DRC is excluded entirely. Also omitted is the participation of Nigeria and Ghana in restoring Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to power in Sierra Leone in 1998.
[14] Indeed, the United States has attempted regime changes around the world, including many in countries (e.g., Japan, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, North Korea, China, Indonesia, and Cambodia) as far away as Australia.

powerful predictors of conflict. Given that FIRCs are more likely to occur between neighboring states, controlling for geography deals with much of Su's complaint. Third, we also controlled for other factors that influence the propensity for conflict between states in a dyad, including shared alliance ties and political affinity (e.g., *s* scores). These additional control variables are described in the article[15] and full replication materials are available in the online appendix.[16]

SU'S FLAWED ALTERNATIVE MODEL

To deal with the possibility that dyads that experience a FIRC are more predisposed to interstate conflict than non-FIRC dyads, Su proposes that we restrict the analysis to "only states that experienced a MID."[17] As we noted in our published response, this suggestion seems out of place with regard to a study in which the unit of analysis is the directed dyad. We think it is more probable that Su meant that we should restrict the analysis only to those *dyads*—as opposed to *states*—that experienced a MID at some point in their joint history. Nevertheless, we replicated Su's procedure, first identifying all states in our dataset that never participated in a MID as either an initiator or a target, and then dropping all dyads that contained any of those states on either side. Table S1 lists the 39 states that are eliminated from the dataset as a result of this procedure.[18] Most of these countries, it should be evident, are either microstates or fairly marginal members of the international system.[19] Dropping these states removes three cases of FIRC: two instances of restoration FIRC (Austria-Parma, 1831; and Prussia-Baden, 1849) and one case of leadership FIRC (France-Modena, 1859). Models 1 and 2 in Table S2 replicate the

[15] Downes and O'Rourke, "You Can't Always Get What You Want," pp. 67−68.
[16] Downes and O'Rourke, "You Can't Always Get What You Want, Supplementary Materials," pp. 2−14.
[17] Su, "Correspondence," p. 173.
[18] Tables and figures appear at the end of this document.
[19] In fact, 23 of them (59 percent) are islands.

two main models for overt FIRC from our article, which included these 39 countries, and compares them to the results, shown in models 3 and 4, obtained when dyads including these states are deleted from the dataset (the same control variables from our article are included in the models but results are omitted). The results barely change. Figure S1 graphs the marginal effects and 95 percent confidence intervals for the results from models 3 and 4 as we did in the article. Clearly, including states that never participated in a MID does not bias our analysis. If this is the procedure Su used in her letter, excluding these countries has little impact on our results. Therefore, it must be the case that the other alteration she makes to our analysis—dropping the 1928 FIRC by Japan against China, an event we turn to shortly—is the key change that modifies our findings.

If, by contrast, Su meant to say that all *dyads* that never experienced a MID should be excluded, it would be problematic for different reasons. As we stated in our published response, this recommendation drops *a lot* of cases. Table S3 lists all 196 directed dyads in which one or the other state in the dyad carried out an overt FIRC against the other and whether either of the two states ever initiated a MID against the other in their joint history (column 4). As summarized in column 3 of Table S4, in 79 of these state pairs (40 percent), State A never initiated a MID against State B at any point. It is, of course, highly questionable to argue that because two states experienced a MID in 1980 the dyad had an elevated chance of FIRC in, say, 1920. To obtain a better estimate of whether dyads that experience militarized conflicts are also more likely to experience FIRCs, we examine whether cases of FIRC were *preceded* by one or more MIDs. The fifth column of Table S3 lists whether State A in a dyad initiated a MID against State B prior to FIRC. As shown in column 4 of Table S4, in 113 of the 196 FIRC dyads—58 percent—the state

listed first had not initiated a militarized conflict against the other before FIRC occurred.[20] In sum, dropping all dyads in which State A never initiated a conflict against State B—at any point in their history, or prior to regime change—would eliminate forty to sixty percent of the (overt) regime changes in our data. Dropping so many cases of what one is trying to study the effects of seems likely to create more problems than it solves.

There is another significant methodological problem with Su's proposed model. Methodologists have long counseled that selecting cases on the dependent variable is generally unwise because it can bias the estimation of causal effects.[21] Su is concerned that by including peaceful dyads, our estimate of leadership FIRC is biased upward because dyads that experience this type of FIRC are (for some unspecified reason) systematically inclined toward conflict.[22] She contends that by excluding dyads that never experience conflict, this bias is reduced. In so recommending, Su is engaged in what King, Keohane, and Verba call "truncation" of the dependent variable, "that is, we limit our observations to less than the full range of variation on

[20] Furthermore, many of those dyads that had suffered prior MIDs experienced them in the distant past (see column 6 of Table S3), meaning that the dyadic propensity for conflict had probably returned to a very low level. Britain and Iran, for example, had fought before the former's 1941 invasion and regime change against the latter, but the conflict in question—the Anglo-Persian War—occurred in 1856.

[21] Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 128−137; Barbara Geddes, "How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics," *Political Analysis*, Vol. 2 (1990), pp. 131−150.

[22] Su's criticism and model also ignores that we predicted that different types of FIRC would have different effects on a dyad's subsequent propensity for conflict. Specifically, we argued that "leadership FIRCs increase conflict between the intervening and target state; restoration FIRCs decrease conflict; and institutional FIRCs have a mixed effect." Downes and O'Rourke, "You Can't Always Get What You Want," pp. 57-58. Since the hypothesized effects for leadership and restoration FIRCs pointed in opposite directions, any selection bias that favored one type of FIRC would hurt the other. Thus, it was crucial that we analyzed the entire sample of FIRCs against all interstate dyads (and deal with the potential for selection bias in other ways), rather than truncating the sample as Su recommends.

the dependent variable that exists in the real world."[23] The result of selecting on the dependent variable is well known: estimates of causal effects are biased towards zero.

Indeed, we observe this downward bias (albeit minor in magnitude) in our replication of Su's procedure in Table S2. The coefficient for leadership FIRC in model 4 is slightly smaller than in model 2. Evidence of reduction of causal effects, by contrast, is less evident for restoration FIRC. The elimination of peaceful dyads would seemingly also cause us to underestimate the negative effect of restoration FIRC on conflict, which supports our prediction that dyads that experience this type of FIRC will be more peaceful. Instead, the coefficient for restoration FIRC becomes slightly more negative from model 2 to model 4.[24] Taken together, this procedure thus appears to bias the analysis against our argument that leadership FIRCs increase the likelihood of interstate conflict, while simultaneously biasing the analysis in favor of our argument that restoration FIRCs decrease the likelihood of interstate conflict.

In sum, for several reasons we find that Su's methodological criticisms of our quantitative analysis of the effects of FIRC on militarized conflict have little merit. First, we checked for precisely the kind of bias she highlights in our article. Second, although we disagree with her recommendation to drop states that never experience MIDs—and find it an inadvisable example of selecting on the dependent variable—replicating her procedure does not significantly affect our results. Given this finding, the importance of the Japan-China case grows because recoding this case must be the source of the difference in our results. Third, dropping dyads that never experienced intra-dyad MIDs would eliminate 40 to 60 percent of the FIRCs in our dataset,

[23] King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, p. 130.
[24] It would be difficult to sort out the reason for this without careful examination of the roughly 15,000 cases omitted from the analysis.

decreasing the statistical significance of our findings while introducing new biases into the analysis.

Chang Tso-lin and the 1928 FIRC by Japan against China

Su's other major empirical criticism of our article is that an influential case of leadership FIRC—Japan's assassination of Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin) in 1928—is not a FIRC because Chang was a Manchurian warlord rather than the leader of China, and the killing was not directed by the Japanese government. The veracity of this point takes on added importance because we have shown that excluding states that never participated in a MID does not produce the results Su reports in her letter. Therefore, removing the case of Chang's assassination, which was followed by multiple armed conflicts between Japan and China, must account for the difference between her results and our own. We address the two claims in turn.

CHANG TSO-LIN: MANCHURIAN WARLORD *AND* LEADER OF CHINA

We do not dispute that Chang Tso-lin was a Manchurian warlord. In fact, he was *the* Manchurian warlord. By 1916, Chang had been named civil and military governor of Fengtian province (now known as Liaoning) by the authorities in Beijing. Chang quickly assumed control over the neighboring provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin, such that within a year or two he controlled all of Manchuria outside those areas held by Japan. As Yoshihisa Matsusaka notes, "Chang Tso-lin's official title in 1920 was 'inspector-general of the Three Eastern Provinces,' a position that made him, in effect, an autonomous ruler in the region."[25] As another writer concludes, "Chang's personal control of the Northeast was complete…. His domain in Manchuria was, for all

[25] Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932* (Harvard University Press, Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), p. 258.

practical purposes, an autonomous state."[26] Chang thus became one of the most powerful men in all of China during the Warlord Era (1916-28).

Chang, however, was not content to rule Manchuria only; he had ambitions south of the Great Wall as well. At this time, North China was divided into three political-military factions: Chang's own Fengtian clique, based in Manchuria; the Anhui clique, led by Duan Qirui (Tuan Ch'i-jui); and the Zhili clique, whose leaders included Feng Guozhang (Feng Yü-hsiang), Cao Kun (Ts'ao K'un), and Wu Peifu (Wu P'ei-fu). These factions fought for control of the central government in Beijing, forming and re-forming alliances in the process. In 1920, for example, Chang joined with the Zhili clique to oust Duan Qirui as head of the Beijing regime. The Japanese, who supported Chang's rule in Manchuria, discouraged his adventures in China. As James Sheridan puts it, "Japan would not help Chang pursue his ambitions in the central government; they wanted Chang to stay at home and attend to the peace and order of Manchuria, not become involved in matters that might produce war and disorder and thus threaten Japanese interests."[27] Chang was undeterred by Japanese opposition and continued to intrigue in Chinese politics. His alliance with the Zhili clique, however, as with many during the Warlord Era, was short-lived, as Chang's forces fought those of Wu Peifu in the First Zhili-Fengtian War in 1922. Chang lost this war badly, and he retreated with his troops to Manchuria where he declared the region's independence. Chang licked his wounds over the next two years, rearmed and reorganized his forces, and was soon back inside the Great Wall in 1924, again fighting Wu Peifu and the Zhili clique for supremacy. This time the Fengtian troops were victorious when one

[26] Howard L. Boorman, ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, Vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 117.
[27] James E. Sheridan, "The Warlord Era: Politics and Militarism under the Peking Government, 1916−28," in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 12, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 305.

of Wu's subordinates, Feng Guozhang, defected, seized Beijing, and ousted the government of Cao Kun.[28] Wu and the Zhili faction were defeated, and Duan Qurui was recalled to office. A further clash between Chang and Feng was brewing, however, and erupted in late 1925. Chang, now allied with his former adversary Wu Peifu, routed Feng's armies in early 1926 and the two of them became the de facto power brokers in Beijing.

For several weeks after Chang and Wu dispensed with Duan Qurui on April 20, 1926, "no national government existed in Peking" while the two warlords debated who should rule the country.[29] Eventually in mid-1926 they inaugurated a series of regencies that nominally governed for about a year until Chang stepped forward and seized power. As Sheridan puts it, "In these circumstances, it was to everyone's relief that the man with real power finally stepped forward to assume formal responsibility for the government. Chang Tso-lin, on 17 June 1927 proclaimed himself grand marshal, or generalissimo, and organized a military government. Although a cabinet was created, including a prime minister, in essence the government was staffed with Chang's subordinates, and he ruled as a military dictator."[30]

It is not disputed that Chang Tso-lin became the leader of the internationally recognized government of China in June 1927.[31] On this point the general and country-specific sources are

[28] It turned out that Feng had been bribed by the Japanese to switch sides, both to preserve Chang Tso-lin and return Duan Qirui to power.
[29] Sheridan, "The Warlord Era," p. 316.
[30] Sheridan, "The Warlord Era," p. 317. For a similar description of Chang's ascension to power, see Andrew J. Nathan, "A Constitutional Republic: The Peking Government, 1916−1928," in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 12, pp. 282−283.
[31] It might even be possible to code Chang Tso-lin as the *effective* leader of China from December 1926. On December 1, Chang accepted the title of commander-in-chief of the combined and reorganized Northern armies, now known as the Ankuochün, or "Pacify the Country Army." On December 27, Chang "made his ceremonial entry into Peking, over roads sprinkled with yellow earth in the manner of the Ch'ing emperors." Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911−1928* (Stanford University Press, 1977), p. 209. See also

unanimous. Both of the leading historical encyclopedias of heads of state—Ross and Spuler's *Rulers and Governments of the World*, and Lentz's *Encyclopedia of Heads of States and Governments*—agree that Chang assumed the leadership of China in mid-June, as do the two leading online compilations of state leaders.[32] Gavan McCormack, author of one of the few English language accounts of Chang Tso-lin's career, similarly dates his rise to dictatorial power in Beijing to June 18.[33] Contemporary media sources also confirm his position.[34]

Although it is clear that Chang Tso-lin attained the position of head of the Chinese government in Beijing, one might object that this government was merely one of a number of competing governments in China at the time and thus it is a mistake to regard Chang as a real head of state. This objection is difficult to sustain. It is true that China was territorially fragmented among numerous warlords during this period, yet multiple sources confirm that the regime in Beijing was regarded as the legitimate government of the country. According to Andrew Nathan, for example, "The death of Yuan Chih-k'ai in June 1916 ushered in the era of the warlords and yet throughout the ensuing decade or more of militarism, the Peking government remained the symbol of China's national sovereignty and hoped-for unity. In the

---

Mayumi Itoh, *The Making of China's War with Japan: Zhou Enlai and Zhang Xueliang* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 56.

[32] Martha Ross and Bertold Spuler, *Rulers and Governments of the World,* Vol. 2: *1492 to 1929* (London: Bowker, 1977), p. 129; Harris M. Lentz III, *Encyclopedia of Heads of State and Governments 1900 through 1945* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1999), pp. 84−85; Ben M. Cahoon, *WorldStatesmen.org*, http://www.worldstatesmen.org/; and B. Schemmel, *Rulers*, http://rulers.org/.

[33] McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, pp. 212, 234. See also Ronald Suleski, *Civil Government in Warlord China: Tradition, Modernization and Manchuria* (Peter Lang, New York: 2002), p. 177.

[34] Frederick Moore, "Chang Tso-lin Made Dictator in Move to Beat Back South," *New York Times*, June 18, 1927; and "Chang Tso-lin's New Position," *Advocate of Peace through Justice*, Vol. 89, No. 8 (August 1927), p. 473.

absence of a dynasty, a dominant personality or a ruling party, the government at Peking still represented the idea of the state."[35] Nathan continues:

> To the end of its life, the Peking government held a claim to legitimacy which made it important even in a nation increasingly dominated by contending warlords…. A second reason for Peking's importance was foreign recognition. Against all evidence of fragmentation, the foreign powers insisted that there was only one China and—as late as 1928—that its capital was Peking…. A third source of Peking's influence was financial. Taxes played but a small role in Peking's finances…. Far more significant was the financial consequence of foreign recognition: the ability to borrow.[36]

Jonathan Fenby, although he agrees that civilian government in Beijing was weak during the Warlord Era and plagued by frequent leadership turnover, maintains that the government there "retained an importance since the customs revenue went to the administration there that was also recognized by the foreign powers as the government of China."[37] Other studies note that Chiang Kai-shek "overthrew the internationally recognized government in Beijing" when he entered the city with his victorious Nationalist armies in June 1928.[38]

WAS CHANG TSO-LIN THE LEADER OF CHINA WHEN HE WAS ASSASSINATED?

A second objection to our coding is that although Chang Tso-lin may at one point have been head of the internationally recognized Chinese government, he no longer held this position by the time he was killed on June 4, 1928. This is what the wording of Su's letter implies when she writes that "*when he was killed*, Chang was not a state leader, but a Manchurian warlord."[39]

---

[35] Nathan, "A Constitutional Republic," p. 256.
[36] Ibid., p. 257.
[37] Jonathan Fenby, *Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present* (New York: HarperCollins 2008), p. 145.
[38] S.C.M. Paine, *The Wars for Asia, 1911−1949* (Cambridge UP, 2012), p. 19.
[39] Su, "Correspondence," p. 173 (emphasis added).

The single source that Su relies on in her letter, however, says nothing about Chang's status: the article describes Chang only as "Marshal" and never clarifies his official position, remarking only as follows: "Marshal Chang Tso-lin, facing defeat in China, grudgingly followed the advice [of the Japanese government] to withdraw to Manchuria and was enroute to his headquarters in Mukden when he was assassinated."[40] It is thus unclear on what evidence Su bases her assertion that Chang was not the leader of China when he died.

The crucial point that needs to be established is whether Chang Tso-lin officially abdicated power when he departed Beijing for Mukden on June 3, and thus whether he remained leader of China when his train was blown up the following day. It is surprisingly hard to obtain a clear answer to this question. Most sources simply note that Chang fled Beijing without mentioning anything about his official status. A good example is provided by James Sheridan, who writes that "Chang's troops were finally defeated, and he fled from Peking in June 1928."[41] The handful of sources that are more specific disagree. According to a *New York Times* article published on June 4, for example, "The five-barred emblem of the North China Republic was pulled down when Chang Tso-lin gave up his two years' dictatorship and left for Mukden early this morning."[42] Some scholarly accounts also imply that Chang formally gave up power before

---

[40] Paul S. Dull, "The Assassination of Chang Tso-lin," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (August 1952), p. 454.

[41] Sheridan, "The Warlord Era," p. 317. See also Shinkichi Eto, "China's International Relations, 1911−1931," in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 12, p. 113; McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, p. 215; Marius B. Jansen, *Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894−1972* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1975), p. 375; Itoh, *The Making of China's War with Japan*, p. 63; Chi Man Kwong, *War and Geopolitics in Interwar Manchuria: Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique during the Northern Expedition* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), p. 135; Edward L. Dreyer, *China at War, 1901−1949* (London: Longman, 1995), p. 150; and Saburō Ienaga, *The Pacific War, 1931−1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan's Role in World War II* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 59.

[42] Hallett Abend, "Peking Unharmed as Northern Hosts Pour Out of City," *New York Times*, June 4, 1928.

leaving the capital. According to C. Martin Wilbur's version, Chang called in the diplomatic corps on June 1 to notify them of his impending departure and "had already made arrangements to turn over governance of the city to a Peace Preservation Commission made up of Chinese elder statesmen, headed by Wang Shih-chen."[43] Wilbur also notes that the generalissimo "issued a farewell telegram to the Chinese people, expressing regret that he had not successfully concluded the anti-Red campaign, and announcing his return to Manchuria in order to spare further bloodshed."[44] Another account relates that "as the Northern Expedition forces approached Peking, Zhang [Chang] took leave of the diplomatic corps and assigned the security of Peking to the police force and a single Manchurian brigade."[45]

None of these sources definitely states that Chang Tso-lin formally abdicated. One says that he "gave up" his dictatorship; another notes that he delegated "governance" of Beijing to a commission; a third states that he assigned security duties to the police and a brigade of his army. Other sources, by contrast, assert that Chang did not renounce his position when he left for Mukden. Indeed, the same *New York Times* article that claims Chang "gave up" his position also reports that "Chang Tso-lin's farewell message, broadcast to all Provinces, hints at his possible return. He does not surrender his title of dictator but merely moves over to Manchuria to avoid further bloodshed and the possibility of further foreign entanglements."[46] This interpretation receives additional support from Keiji Furuya's biography of Chiang Kai-shek, which also discusses Chang's meeting with the foreign diplomatic envoys: "On June 1, in full military regalia, he [Chang] entertained the diplomatic corps at a farewell party. He announced that he

[43] C. Martin Wilbur, "The Nationalist Revolution: From Canton to Nanking, 1923−28," in *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 12, p. 710.
[44] Ibid., 710.
[45] David Bonavia, *China's Warlords* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 84.
[46] Abend, "Peking Unharmed as Northern Hosts Pour Out of City."

had decided to withdraw his troops from within the Great Wall. The removal of his headquarters from Peking to Mukden, he said, did not detract an iota from his being a patriotic Chinese. 'I, Chang Tso-lin,' he proclaimed with considerable pride, 'will never sell China down the river, nor am I afraid to die.'"[47] Read literally, this recounting of events merely states that Chang intended to move his headquarters, and his statement about patriotism could be read as meaning that he did not intend to leave his position as leader of the republic. Further support derives from the fact that following Chang's death, his son, Chang Hsüeh-liang, continued to fly the Five Color Flag of the North China Republic in Mukden until December 28, 1928, when he formally pledged allegiance to the Kuomintang.[48] Finally, the two authoritative encyclopedias of world leaders each list Chang's rein as ending on or after June 4.[49] Both of these sources list Chiang Kai-shek as the next leader of China, noting that his tenure did not begin until October 10.[50]

Given the absence of clear evidence that Chang Tso-lin formally relinquished the office of dictator of China upon leaving Beijing, we follow the coding of the general encyclopedias and consider Chang Tso-lin to be the head of China's internationally recognized government until his death on June 4. Considering the historical ambiguity of what exactly happened in the last twenty-four hours of Chang's life and the absence of a successor regime during this period, we

---

[47] Keiji Furuya, *Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times*, abridged English ed. by Chun-ming Chang (New York: St. John's University, 1981), p. 252.

[48] Chang the younger officially switched the flags in what is referred to as the Northeastern Flag Replacement. Itoh, *The Making of China's War with Japan*, pp. 71, 73.

[49] Ross and Spuler, *Rulers and Governments of the World,* Vol. 2, p. 129; and Lentz, *Encyclopedia of Heads of States and Governments*, pp. 84−85. Interestingly, the Lentz volume erroneously states that Chang's train was bombed on *October 4* rather than *June 4*, and thus codes his tenure as ending when he eventually died on October 10. It seems obvious that Lentz meant June when he wrote October, especially since Lentz also states that "Chang abandoned Peking to go to Mukden in early June 1928." Ibid., p. 85.

[50] Multiple sources also show that a new Premier (Tan Yankai) did not take office until October. Ross and Spuler, *Rulers and Governments of the World,* Vol. 2, p. 131; Cahoon, *WorldStatesmen.org*; and Schemmel, *Rulers*.

believe that this coding is appropriate. This assessment aligns with other Political Science datasets on leaders, including Cali Ellis, Michael Horowitz, and Allan Stam's *Leader Experience and Attribute Descriptions* (LEAD) dataset and H.E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza's *Archigos* dataset of state leaders.[51]

JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE DEATH OF CHANG TSO-LIN

Su's final critique is that Chang Tso-lin's assassination was not a FIRC because the killing was not initiated or approved by Japan's civilian leadership, and thus it was not Japanese policy. Rather, it was the unsanctioned act of rogue officers within the Kwantung Army based in Manchuria. While we concur with the assessment that Japanese military officials ordered Chang's assassination against the wishes of the Japanese Prime Minister, we made no claims in the article or in our coding rules that FIRCs had to be ordered by civilian leaders to be included in the study.[52] Nevertheless, the case is complicated and Su's critique is worth discussing in greater detail.

Chang's assassination arose out of a disagreement within Japanese official circles regarding whether to continue Japan's long-running policy of supporting Chang. The Kwantung Army was strongly in favor of disarming Chang and deposing him in favor of his son, Chang Hsüeh-liang, whom they believed would be more responsive to Japan's demands. Prime Minister

[51] Cali Mortenson Ellis, Michael C. Horowitz, and Allan C. Stam, "Introducing the LEAD Data Set," *International Interactions*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (2015), pp. 718−741; and Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2009), pp. 269−283. Interestingly, the Archigos collection, which relies heavily on Lentz, reproduces his error regarding the timing of Chang's departure from office, dating it as October 10, 1928. See H.E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, *Archigos: A Data Set on Leaders, 1875−2015*, Version 4.1, February 29, 2016, "Case Descriptions," p. 733, available online at http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/Archigos_4.1.pdf.

[52] Downes and O'Rourke, "You Can't Always Get What You Want," pp. 65−67.

Tanaka Giichi, on the other hand, was more inclined to continue to support Chang Tso-lin as long as he could be made to see the error of his ways.[53] Numerous historical sources agree that the government of Premier Tanaka did not order the assassination.[54]

In an attempt to force Chang out of Beijing, Tanaka's envoy in Beijing presented Chang with an ultimatum on the night of May 17−18, 1928: retreat now and we will allow your forces to enter Manchuria unhindered, or wait to fall back until fighting comes to Beijing and be disarmed by the Kwantung Army.[55] The concern was that if the war spilled over into Manchuria, the Nationalists might be able to extend their control into the three northeast provinces, with negative repercussions for Japanese interests. Chang resisted this advice, however, and lingered on in Beijing until the beginning of June, although by May 19 he had made the decision to leave.[56] As a result of their disagreement over support for Chang, Tanaka did not issue the necessary orders for the Kwantung Army to deploy south so that it could be in a position to disarm Chang's retreating forces. Officers of the Kwantung Army felt that Tanaka's policy was not sufficiently aggressive, and decided to take matters into their own hands. McCormack summarizes what happened next: "Muraoka Chōtarō, commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army, made secret approaches to the commander of Japan's North China garrison army to have Chang Tso-lin assassinated before his return. When Muraoka's staff officer, Colonel Kōmoto Daisaku, learned of this, he thought he could do better by arranging the murder in the Northeast

[53] Edward J. Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853−1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), p. 164.
[54] Dull, "Assassination of Chang Tso-Lin"; Ienaga, *Pacific War*, p. 59; Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army*, pp. 164−165; Wilbur, "The Nationalist Revolution," p. 710; McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, pp. 247−248; Jansen, *Japan and China*, p. 306; and Itoh, *The Making of China's War with Japan*, p. 64.
[55] Wilbur, "The Nationalist Revolution," p. 709; and McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, p. 246.
[56] McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, p. 247.

in such a way as to foment the immediate crisis that, it was hoped would allow a Japanese military takeover as a result."[57] In the early morning hours of June 4, explosives placed by engineers of Japan's Korea Army detonated under the car of the train in which Chang was riding; the generalissimo likely died from his wounds within a few hours, although his death was not formally announced until June 20.[58]

On the face of it, the basis for coding the assassination as an act of the Japanese state appears questionable. But as we noted in our published response, the procedures that characterized the Japanese government at the time allowed the military to take actions that the Cabinet could not stop beforehand or disavow afterwards. The key issue, as Saburō Ienaga summarizes, was that "the military could topple cabinets by having an army or navy minister resign or prevent their formation by refusing to provide officers to serve in these positions… Control over the appointment of service ministers gave the military the power of life or death over any cabinet."[59] The problem this created for Prime Minister Tanaka was that the perpetrators of the assassination could not be held responsible without the agreement of the military services.[60] Tanaka quickly suspected that the Kwantung Army was behind Chang's murder and set up a committee to investigate. Soon he possessed ample evidence that his suspicions were correct. Tanaka favored punishing the plotters, as did the young Emperor

---

[57] Ibid., p. 248.
[58] For a detailed account of this event, see Dull, "Assassination of Chang Tso-Lin."
[59] Ienaga, *The Pacific War*, p. 36. Ienaga also notes that the "service ministries remained the special preserve of professional military men. No civilian control was ever allowed…. Even a party cabinet—that is, a cabinet formed by the majority party in the Diet, the pattern from the 1920s on—had to name military men to the service posts. There could be no civilian or Diet-member cabinets." Ibid. 35−36.
[60] The following account is based on Dull, "Assassination of Chang Tso-Lin"; Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army*, pp. 165−166; Mayumi Itoh, *The Making of China's War with Japan*, pp. 64−66. These accounts are not always consistent with one another. We have done our best to accurately represent the key events.

Hirohito. Tanaka, however, boxed himself in by promising the emperor that the perpetrators would be punished. War Minister Shirakawa Yoshinori, however, even though he knew that Kōmoto had carried out the crime, refused to go along, arguing that revealing Japan's involvement would damage the Army's reputation and Japan's national interests. The dispute reached a head on June 27, 1929, when Shirakawa reported to Tanaka that the Army leadership continued to deny any role in the killing. According to Edward Drea, "The prime minister upbraided Shirakawa, who stormed out in a rage, threatening to resign and bring down the government. Unwilling to self-destruct, the next day the cabinet endorsed the war minister's version of events."[61]

Tanaka not only lost this debate, he soon lost his job, and then his life. Tanaka reported to the emperor the next day that "there was no evidence that the Japanese Army or Japanese officers were involved in the incident and he recommended that only administrative measures (not court-martials) be taken in order to straighten out military behavior."[62] Having previously told the emperor that he would court martial Kōmoto and anybody else involved, Tanaka was caught. The emperor noticed the discrepancy in the prime minister's reports and immediately demanded that he resign. As Itoh notes, "This was the first and only case in Japanese modern history in which the emperor's words caused the resignation of a prime minister and the resignation of a cabinet en masse."[63] Tanaka sunk into a deep depression and died a few months later.

In short, although it is true that officers of the Kwantung Army planned and executed the assassination of Chang Tso-lin without permission from—and against the wishes of—the

[61] Drea, *Japan's Imperial Army*, p. 166.
[62] Itoh, *The Making of China's War with Japan*, p. 65.
[63] Ibid., pp. 65−66.

Japanese Prime Minister, it still makes sense to code the assassination as an act of Japanese policy. The reason is that civilian governments could not renounce actions taken by the military without committing political suicide. If the Cabinet had decided to acknowledge that Japanese officers had murdered Chang Tso-lin and tried to punish them, the ministers representing the military would have resigned, thereby bringing down the government. Because the military would refuse to nominate ministers (who had to be active duty officers) to serve in any Cabinet that intended to implement such measures, Japanese policy was held hostage to the military's preferences. Tanaka learned this the hard way, having pledged to punish the guilty parties without checking first with the military. When he tried to save his premiership by reneging in front of the emperor, he was immediately forced to resign. As we wrote in our published response, "These pathological civil-military relations allowed the Japanese military to dictate state policy—a trend that would continue in the Mukden (1931) and Marco Polo Bridge (1937) Incidents."[64]

TWO ADDITIONAL POINTS

Two additional arguments, although not directly germane to the issues raised in Su's letter, are worth considering in the general discussion of the Japan-China FIRC of 1928. First, we have defended our decision to code Chang Tso-lin as the leader of China because China was a recognized state and Manchuria was not. If we relax the formal rules of recognition, however, there are good grounds for considering Manchuria to be independent of China in the 1920s, and Chang Tso-lin, of course, was the undisputed ruler of Manchuria. Multiple accounts confirm that

[64] Downes and O'Rourke, "Correspondence," pp. 176−177.

Manchuria under Chang was akin to an autonomous state.[65] Thus, even if Chang is only considered to be the leader of Manchuria rather than China, there are still grounds for coding this case as, if not a FIRC, then a quasi-FIRC—the overthrow of the ruler of a highly autonomous region or unrecognized state. Note that a "Japan-Manchuria" FIRC in 1928 would still be followed by at least one MID—the 1931 Mukden Incident that resulted in the creation of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo on the territory of Manchuria.

Second, the removal of Chang Tso-lin is a textbook example of our argument about the counterproductive effects of leadership FIRC. According to one historian, Col. Kōmoto, the principal plotter, believed that "the death of Chang Tso-lin would deprive Manchuria of its leader and plunge it into chaos. The Japanese army would then step in to restore order, and occupy Manchuria."[66] Kōmoto also assumed that Chang's son and probable successor would be far more malleable than his father. In a speech at the Yamato Hotel in Dairen, Kōmoto had already made his views on the two men clear: "The malignant cancer today of Japan's Manchuria and Mongolia policy is Chang Tso-lin. If we get rid of him somehow, after that there will be no difficulty from appeasement with [sic] the youthful Chang Hsueh-liang."[67]

In the event, neither of these things came to pass. Understanding that the Japanese were his father's likely killers, Chang Hsüeh-liang was careful to refrain from any provocations that could give the Kwantung Army an excuse to swing into action.[68] Chaos did not result, calm soon prevailed, and no pretext emerged for Japanese forces to seize power.[69] Worse than this, however, was that the assassination was completely counterproductive from the point of view of

[65] Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria*, p. 258; and Boorman, ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, Vol. 1, p. 117.
[66] Shinkichi Eto, "China's International Relations," p. 113.
[67] Quoted in Dull, "Assassination of Chang Tso-Lin," p. 455.
[68] Eto, "China's International Relations," p. 114.
[69] Dull, "Assassination of Chang Tso-Lin," p. 457.

Japanese interests, for it destroyed any chance of a friendly regime in Manchuria or a sympathetic government in Beijing. In fact, it ensured that Chang Hsüeh-liang would ally with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang regime, which had no intention of allowing Japan to expand its control over Manchuria. After pledging his loyalty to the Kuomintang in late December 1928, Chang the younger was named commander of the Northeast Frontier Army and administrator of Manchuria; he later rose to become second in command of the Nationalist Army.[70]

This judgment is supported by every historical account we have found. Gavan McCormack, for example, writes that "Kōmoto's action was singularly counterproductive, since not only did it not lead to the resolution of any of the issues disputed between China and Japan…but it led very soon to the establishment of the Chang Hsueh-liang regime, which, by making its peace with Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government at Nanking, realized the worst dreams of both Kōmoto and Japanese Premier Tanaka."[71] Marius Jansen comes to a similar conclusion: "This Japanese action thus removed Chiang Kai-shek's most important competitor for military unification in north China from the scene and replaced him with a son who was to show himself resentful of his father's murderers and later to cooperate with Kuomintang power."[72] Dick Wilson argues that assassinating Chang was another of Japan's "many miscalculations in China, because the Young Marshal proved more fiery and nationalistic than his father" and soon moved into the Nationalist camp.[73] In other words, as Donald Jordan writes,

---

[70] Jansen, *Japan and China*, p. 376; Itoh, *The Making of China's War with Japan*, p. 73; and Nicholas D. Kristof, "Zhang Xueliang, 100, Dies; Warlord and Hero of China," *New York Times*, October 19, 2001. Chang Hsüeh-liang ultimately fell out of favor with Chiang Kai-shek as a result of the Xian Incident in 1936, in which Chang kidnapped Chiang and held him hostage until he agreed to form a united front with the communists to resist Japanese aggression. Chiang's previous policy had been to fight the communists first and the Japanese second.
[71] McCormack, *Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China*, p. 248.
[72] Jansen, *Japan and China*, p. 306.
[73] Dick Wilson, *China's Revolutionary War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 28.

"When Chang Hsueh-liang seized the reins of power left by his father, he proved to be even less of a Japanese puppet than his father had been."[74] Saburō Ienaga similarly maintains that "the assassination of Chang backfired; the flames of Chinese resistance burned brighter. Chang Hsueh-liang pledged allegiance to the Nationalists and placed his forces under Chiang Kai-shek's banner and moved ahead with a plan to develop Manchuria without Japanese assistance."[75] Michael Barnhart's assessment concurs with the others: "Kōmoto's act ended any chance of an 'independent' regime in Manchuria friendly to Japan. Chang Hsueh-liang, the murdered warlord's son and successor, rapidly formed ties with the Kuomintang. By 1929 he had not only refused to allow the Japanese to build any railroads in Manchuria but also commenced construction of rival lines of his own. Army planners and railway officials feared that their entire interest and investment in Manchuria was in jeopardy."[76]

Many of these assessments focus on how, by ensuring that Chang Hsüeh-liang would throw in his lot with the Nationalists, the 1928 FIRC failed to serve Japan's immediate interests in Manchuria. Indeed, some of the MIDs that Su mentions between 1928 and 1938 refer to Japanese attacks in Manchuria or other engagements with forces led by Chang Hsüeh-liang. These MIDs thus directly reflect the failure of the 1928 regime change to install a pliant leader willing to pursue Japan's interests in the region. The broader point, however, is that no matter who we consider to be Chang Tso-lin's successor—his son in Manchuria or Chiang Kai-shek in China—regime change removed a leader who at least sometimes acceded to Japan's wishes and replaced him with leaders bound and determined to resist Japanese expansion on the mainland.

---

[74] Donald A. Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926−1928* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), p. 168.
[75] Ienaga, *The Pacific War*, p. 59.
[76] Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919−1941* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987), p. 31. For other, similar, assessments beyond those already cited, see Dreyer, *China at War*, p. 151.

This case is thus an unusually direct example of FIRC can empower hostile leaders opposed to the interests of the intervener.

Conclusion

We appreciate the opportunity afforded by Ruolin Su's letter to explain the methodology and coding criteria we used in "You Can't Always Get What You Want" in greater detail. Although we believe our methods and coding decisions were appropriate, and the results they produced sound, ultimately more debate and transparency about these procedures is undoubtedly a good thing for the advancement of knowledge about foreign-imposed regime change and its effects.

Table S1. States that Never Participated in a Militarized Interstate Dispute, 1816−2000

Bahamas
Jamaica
Barbados
Dominica
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Antigua and Barbuda
St. Kitts and Nevis
Monaco
Andorra
Bavaria
Baden*
Wuerttemburg
Czech Republic
Slovakia
San Marino
Modena*
Parma*
Malta
Belarus
Cape Verde
Sao Tome and Principe
Madagascar
Mauritius
Seychelles
Kazakhstan
Bhutan
Maldives
Brunei
Vanuatu
Solomon Islands
Kiribati
Tuvalu
Tonga
Marshall Islands
Federated States of Micronesia
Samoa

* Indicates state experienced a FIRC.

Table S2. Replication of Our Original Analysis and Comparison to Results When 39 Countries that Never Participated in a Militarized Interstate Dispute Are Excluded

	Original Analysis, All States Included		Analysis Excluding States that Never Participate in a MID	
	1	2	3	4
Overt FIRC	-0.05 (0.10)	-	-0.08 (0.10)	-
Overt Leadership FIRC	-	0.26* (0.11)	-	0.23* (0.11)
Overt Institutional FIRC	-	-0.48 (0.37)	-	-0.51 (0.37)
Overt Restoration FIRC	-	-0.89** (0.34)	-	-0.92** (0.34)
N	180,498	180,498	166,696	166,696

Control variables included by not shown. * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Table S3. Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) in Dyads in which a Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) Occurred

Dyad	Year of FIRC	FIRC Type	MID Ever Initiated by State A?	MID Initiated by State A Prior to FIRC?	Years between Most Recent MID and FIRC
U.S.-Haiti	1915	L	Yes	Yes	1
Haiti-U.S.	1915	L	No	No	-
U.S.-Haiti	1994	R	Yes	Yes	1
Haiti-U.S.	1994	R	No	No	-
U.S.-Dominican Republic	1912	I	Yes	Yes	7
Dominican Republic-U.S.	1912	I	Yes	No	-
U.S.-Dominican Republic	1914*	I	Yes	Yes	9
Dominican Republic-U.S.	1914	I	Yes	No	-
U.S.-Dominican Republic	1916*	I	Yes	Yes	2
Dominican Republic-U.S.	1916	I	Yes	No	-
U.S.-Grenada	1983*	I	Yes	No	-
Grenada-U.S.	1983	I	No	No	-
U.S.-Mexico	1914	L	Yes	Yes	1
Mexico-U.S.	1914*	L	Yes	Yes	21
U.S.-Honduras	1911	L	No	No	-
Honduras-U.S.	1911	L	No	No	-
U.S.-Nicaragua	1909*	L	Yes	No	-
Nicaragua-U.S.	1909	L	No	No	-
U.S.-Nicaragua	1910	I	Yes	Yes	1
Nicaragua-U.S.	1910	I	No	No	-
U.S.-Nicaragua	1926*	I	Yes	Yes	16
Nicaragua-U.S.	1926	I	No	No	-
U.S.-Costa Rica	1920 (1919)	I	No	No	-
Costa Rica-U.S.	1920 (1919)	I	No	No	-
U.S.-Panama	1990	I	Yes	Yes	3
Panama-U.S.	1990*	I	Yes	Yes	1
U.S.-Netherlands	1945	R	No	No	-
Netherlands-U.S.	1945	R	No	No	-
U.S.-Belgium	1918	R	No	No	-
Belgium-U.S.	1918	R	No	No	-
U.S.-Belgium	1944	R	No	No	-
Belgium-U.S.	1944	R	No	No	-
U.S.-Luxembourg	1944	R	No	No	-
Luxembourg-U.S.	1944	R	No	No	-
U.S.-France	1944	R	Yes	Yes	79
France-U.S.	1944	R	Yes	Yes	109
U.S.-Germany	1945*	I	Yes	Yes	4
Germany-U.S.	1945*	I	Yes	Yes	5
U.S.-Norway	1945	R	No	No	-
Norway-U.S.	1945	R	No	No	-
U.S.-Denmark	1945	R	No	No	-
Denmark-U.S.	1945	R	No	No	-
U.S.-Japan	1945*	I	Yes	Yes	5
Japan-U.S.	1945	I	Yes	Yes	8
France-Mexico	1863*	L	Yes	Yes	2
Mexico-France	1863	L	No	No	-
Guatemala-El Salvador	1876*	L	Yes	No	-

Dyad	Year of FIRC	FIRC Type	MID Ever Initiated by State A?	MID Initiated by State A Prior to FIRC?	Years between Most Recent MID and FIRC
El Salvador-Guatemala	1876	L	No	No	-
El Salvador-Guatemala	1885	L	No	No	-
Guatemala-El Salvador	1885*	L	Yes	Yes	9
Nicaragua-Honduras	1907	L	Yes	No	-
Honduras-Nicaragua	1907*	L	Yes	No	-
Brazil-Paraguay	1869*	L	Yes	Yes	7
Paraguay-Brazil	1869	L	Yes	Yes	6
Brazil-Argentina	1852*	L	Yes	Yes	1
Argentina-Brazil	1852	L	Yes	No	-
UK-Netherlands	1918	R	Yes	Yes	1
Netherlands-UK	1918	R	No	No	-
UK-Netherlands	1945	R	Yes	Yes	6
Netherlands-UK	1945	R	No	No	-
UK-Belgium	1918	R	No	No	-
Belgium-UK	1918	R	No	No	-
UK-Belgium	1944	R	No	No	-
Belgium-UK	1944	R	No	No	-
UK-France	1944	R	Yes	Yes	4
France-UK	1944	R	Yes	Yes	48
UK-Portugal	1834*	R	Yes	Yes	3
Portugal-UK	1834	R	No	No	-
UK-Germany	1945	I	Yes	Yes	24
Germany-UK	1945	I	Yes	Yes	57
UK-Greece	1917*	L	Yes	Yes	1
Greece-UK	1917	L	Yes	Yes	63
UK-Norway	1945	R	Yes	Yes	5
Norway-UK	1945	R	Yes	Yes	31
UK-Denmark	1945	R	Yes	Yes	5
Denmark-UK	1945	R	Yes	No	-
UK-Ethiopia	1941	R	No	No	-
Ethiopia-UK	1941	R	No	No	-
UK-Iran	1941*	L	Yes	Yes	85
Iran-UK	1941	L	Yes	No	-
UK-Iraq	1941*	R	Yes	No	-
Iraq-UK	1941	R	Yes	No	-
France-Belgium	1918	R	No	No	-
Belgium-France	1918	R	No	No	-
France-Spain	1823*	R	Yes	Yes	1
Spain-France	1823	R	Yes	No	-
France-Portugal	1834*	R	Yes	Yes	3
Portugal-France	1834	R	Yes	No	-
France-Papal States	1849	R	No	No	-
Papal States-France	1849	R	No	No	-
France-Modena	1859	L	No	No	-
Modena-France	1859	L	No	No	-
France-Greece	1917*	L	Yes	Yes	1
Greece-France	1917	L	No	No	-
France-Gabon	1964*	R	Yes	No	-
Gabon-France	1964	R	No	No	-
France-CAR	1979	L	No	No	-
CAR-France	1979	L	No	No	-

Dyad	Year of FIRC	FIRC Type	MID Ever Initiated by State A?	MID Initiated by State A Prior to FIRC?	Years between Most Recent MID and FIRC
France-Comoros	1989*	L	Yes	No	-
Comoros-France	1989	L	No	No	-
France-Comoros	1995	R	Yes	Yes	6
Comoros-France	1995	R	No	No	-
Germany-Netherlands	1940*	L	Yes	Yes	1
Netherlands-Germany	1940	L	No	No	-
Germany-Belgium	1914	L	Yes	Yes	82
Belgium-Germany	1914	L	Yes	No	-
Germany-Belgium	1940*	L	Yes	Yes	1
Belgium-Germany	1940	L	Yes	Yes	19
Germany-Luxembourg	1940*	L	Yes	Yes	1
Luxembourg-Germany	1940	L	No	No	-
Germany-France	1870	L	Yes	Yes	4
France-Germany	1870*	L	Yes	Yes	30
Germany-Baden	1849	R	No	No	-
Baden-Germany	1849	R	No	No	-
Germany-Saxony	1849	R	Yes	No	-
Saxony-Germany	1849	R	No	No	-
Germany-Hungary	1944*	L	Yes	Yes	4
Hungary-Germany	1944	L	No	No	-
Germany-Yugoslavia	1941*	L	Yes	Yes	1
Yugoslavia-Germany	1941	L	Yes	Yes	7
Germany-Greece	1941	L	Yes	Yes	44
Greece-Germany	1941	L	No	No	-
Germany-Latvia	1920 (1919)	L	Yes	No	-
Latvia-Germany	1920 (1919)	L	No	No	-
Germany-Norway	1940*	L	Yes	Yes	1
Norway-Germany	1940	L	No	No	-
Germany-Denmark	1943 (1940)*	L	Yes	Yes	25
Denmark-Germany	1943 (1940)	L	Yes	Yes	26
Austria-Papal States	1849*	R	Yes	Yes	2
Papal States-Austria	1849	R	Yes	Yes	1
Austria-Two Sicilies	1821*	R	Yes	No	-
Two Sicilies-Austria	1821	R	No	No	-
Austria-Tuscany	1849*	R	Yes	No	-
Tuscany-Austria	1849	R	No	No	-
Romania-Hungary	1919	L	Yes	No	-
Hungary-Romania	1919	L	Yes	No	-
Russia-Germany	1945	I	Yes	Yes	9
Germany-Russia	1945	I	Yes	Yes	5
Russia-Hungary	1945	I	Yes	No	-
Hungary-Russia	1945	I	No	No	-
Russia-Hungary	1956*	R	Yes	No	-
Hungary-Russia	1956	R	No	No	-
Russia-Czechoslovakia	1948	I	Yes	No	-
Czechoslovakia-Russia	1948	I	No	No	-
Russia-Czechoslovakia	1968*	R	Yes	No	-
Czechoslovakia-Russia	1968	R	No	No	-
Russia-Bulgaria	1944*	I	Yes	Yes	3
Bulgaria-Russia	1944*	I	Yes	Yes	3
Russia-Romania	1945*	I	Yes	Yes	5

Dyad	Year of FIRC	FIRC Type	MID Ever Initiated by State A?	MID Initiated by State A Prior to FIRC?	Years between Most Recent MID and FIRC
Romania-Russia	1945*	I	Yes	Yes	4
Russia-Estonia	1940	I	Yes	Yes	1
Estonia-Russia	1940	I	No	No	-
Russia-Latvia	1940	I	Yes	Yes	1
Latvia-Russia	1940	I	No	No	-
Russia-Lithuania	1940	I	Yes	No	-
Lithuania-Russia	1940	I	No	No	-
Russia-Iran	1941*	L	Yes	Yes	8
Iran-Russia	1941	L	Yes	No	-
Russia-Afghanistan	1979	L	Yes	Yes	40
Afghanistan-Russia	1979	L	Yes	Yes	57
Russia-Afghanistan	1986	L	Yes	Yes	47
Afghanistan-Russia	1986	L	Yes	Yes	64
Russia-Mongolia	1925	L	No	No	-
Mongolia-Russia	1925	L	No	No	-
Russia-Mongolia	1984	L	No	No	-
Mongolia-Russia	1984	L	No	No	-
Italy-Albania	1916	L	Yes	Yes	2
Albania-Italy	1916	L	Yes	No	-
Italy-Albania	1939*	L	Yes	Yes	5
Albania-Italy	1939	L	Yes	No	-
Italy-Ethiopia	1936	L	Yes	Yes	6
Ethiopia-Italy	1936	L	Yes	Yes	2
Two Sicilies-Papal States	1849	R	No	No	-
Papal States-Two Sicilies	1849	R	No	No	-
Greece-Cyprus	1974	L	No	No	-
Cyprus-Greece	1974	L	No	No	-
Turkey-Cyprus	1974*	R	Yes	Yes	9
Cyprus-Turkey	1974	R	Yes	Yes	9
Guinea-Sierra Leone	1998*	R	Yes	Yes	1
Sierra Leone-Guinea	1998	R	No	No	-
Angola-Congo	1997*	R	Yes	Yes	2
Congo-Angola	1997	R	No	No	-
Uganda-DRC	1997	L	No	No	-
DRC-Uganda	1997	L	Yes	Yes	10
Rwanda-DRC	1997	L	No	No	-
DRC-Rwanda	1997	L	Yes	No	-
Tanzania-Uganda	1979	L	No	No	-
Uganda-Tanzania	1979	L	Yes	Yes	2
South Africa-Lesotho	1994*	R	Yes	Yes	12
Lesotho-South Africa	1994*	R	Yes	No	-
Japan-China	1928*	L	Yes	Yes	1
China-Japan	1928	L	Yes	Yes	43
Japan-Korea	1907 (1905)	L	Yes	Yes	8
Korea-Japan	1907 (1905)	L	No	No	-
Vietnam-Cambodia	1979*	L	Yes	Yes	4
Cambodia-Vietnam	1979	L	No	No	-

* FIRC is coded as a MID, or FIRC occurred during or as the culmination of a war initiated by the most recent MID.

Table S4. Number and Proportion of Different Types of Overt Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) that Never Experienced a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) or Were Not Preceded by a MID

FIRC Type	Total Directed Dyads	Number (Percentage) of Directed Dyads in which State A Never Initiated a MID against State B	Number (Percentage) of Directed Dyads in which State A Did Not Initiate a MID against State B Prior to FIRC
All overt FIRCs	196	79 (40)	113 (58)
Overt leadership FIRC	86	28 (33)	45 (52)
Overt institutional FIRC	38	10 (26)	17 (45)
Overt restoration FIRC	72	39 (54)	51 (71)

Figure S1. Overt Foreign-Imposed Regime Change (FIRC) and the Probability of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs), Excluding States that Never Participated in a MID