

POLSCI 286S
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Department of Political Science
Duke University

Spring 2011
Time: Tuesday, 6.15-8.45PM
Room: Perkins 307
Office Hours: Wednesday, 3.30-5.00PM

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COURSE DESCRIPTION

Theory and Practice of International Security is a seminar devoted to the security studies subfield of international relations (or, in the new Political Science graduate curriculum, the international side of the Security, Peace, and Conflict subfield). The course has four major goals: (1) to understand the major theoretical perspectives in security studies; (2) to survey some of the most important substantive areas and debates in the field with an emphasis on recent contributions; (3) to apply theories and arguments from the academic literature to contemporary policy problems; and (4) to help political science Ph.D. students prepare for their preliminary exams.

The first several class sessions focus on the traditionally dominant theories in international security: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. We will read contemporary statements of each of these perspectives. In the second part of the course, the focus shifts to substantive issues, such as reputation and the credibility of compellent and deterrent threats; military coercion; military effectiveness; nuclear proliferation; state death; religion and conflict; and the diffusion of military innovations.

Each week is built around a major recent work, and often includes critical perspectives. This course is by no means a comprehensive overview of the literature, but rather a selection of recent contributions that have made an impact on the field and how we think about international security.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

The course is organized into one two-and-a-half hour seminar meeting per week. Students are expected to attend every class session, do all of the required reading before class, and come prepared to discuss it. Grades will be based on the following criteria.

- **Class Attendance and Participation (20%):** Participation will be judged not only by the quantity of a student's remarks, but also by their quality.
- **Reaction Papers (20%):** Two short (5 pages double-spaced maximum) papers critiquing the readings for class sessions of the student's choice (a sign-up sheet will be circulated). Papers should be EMAILED to the instructor by 9.00AM on the day of class. These papers should not merely summarize the reading; rather, they should engage a common theme, develop a line of criticism, discuss theoretical, empirical, or methodological flaws or shortcomings or new directions for research.
- **Literature Review (30%):** 15-20 pages, HARD COPY due in instructor's office by 5.00PM on Friday, April 22. Students must meet with the instructor to discuss their paper topic. Papers should critically engage a question, subject, or literature of the student's choice in the field of international security. All papers should summarize and organize the literature under discussion; identify the theoretical/empirical questions it attempts to answer; explain key concepts and arguments; discuss some of the major theoretical and empirical contributions; locate logical flaws, empirical or methodological shortcomings, and unanswered questions; suggest ways to repair those shortcomings or answer those unanswered questions; and suggest directions for future research. Alternative hypotheses, potential sources of additional data, or new research designs and strategies should be explored. Papers should also evaluate the extent to which research in the area is progressing or digressing.

- **Take-Home Final Examination (30%):** Open-book, open-note, take-home exam. Students will be given three sets of three questions and asked to answer one question in each category. The questions will be drawn from the literature we have read in class. Essays should not exceed 7 double-spaced pages each.
 - Political Science Ph.D. students will have 8 hours to complete the exam (date to be arranged), which mirrors the format of the graduate field exams. Completed exams should be EMAILED to the instructor by the pre-arranged deadline.
 - All other students: The exam will be distributed by email on Wednesday, April 27, at 5.00PM, and will be due on Monday, May 2, at 5PM, in HARD COPY at the instructor's office.

ACADEMIC INTEGRITY

Students are expected to comply with the Duke Community Standard in their work for this course, meaning that you will not lie, cheat, steal, or otherwise conduct yourselves dishonorably, and will do something if you observe others engaging in such conduct (see <http://www.registrar.duke.edu/bulletins/communitystandard/>; for specific definitions, see <http://www.studentaffairs.duke.edu/conduct/resources/academicdishonesty>). All work you submit for this course must be your own. I will not tolerate any form of academic dishonesty. Suspected cases will be referred to the Office of Judicial Affairs. If you have questions about what constitutes proper use of published or unpublished sources, please consult "Plagiarism: Its Nature and Consequences" on the Duke Library website (<http://www.library.duke.edu/research/citing/plagiarism.html>), or ask the instructor.

OTHER POLICIES

- Late papers will be accepted only in cases of extraordinary personal or family emergency; if you find yourself in such a situation, consult the instructor as soon as possible
- Laptops are allowed in class for note-taking purposes, not for checking e-mail or surfing the web
- The only cell phones allowed in class are those that have been turned off

BOOKS

With one exception (Elizabeth Kier's *Imagining War*), the following books – which are required reading for the course – are available for purchase at the Duke University Bookstore. All books are on reserve at Perkins Library.

Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).

Stephen G. Brooks, *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

Tanisha M. Fazal, *State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).

Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Ron E. Hassner, *War on Sacred Grounds* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009).

Michael C. Horowitz, *The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press).

Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). This book is out of print. You should attempt to locate it online. I will also make available a photocopy.

Matthew Kroenig, *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010).

John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).

Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).

Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Highly Recommended: Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). This book has been reprinted by Waveland Press and is now available at a reasonable price.

ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS

Almost all of the journal articles listed in the required reading are available online from databases through the Duke University Library. To conserve on space, I have used a short-hand notation for journal titles:

AJPS	American Journal of Political Science
APSR	American Political Science Review
ARPS	Annual Review of Political Science
FA	Foreign Affairs
FP	Foreign Policy
IO	International Organization
IS	International Security
ISQ	International Studies Quarterly
JCR	Journal of Conflict Resolution
JOP	Journal of Politics
JPR	Journal of Peace Research
JSS	Journal of Strategic Studies
POP	Perspectives on Politics
PSQ	Political Science Quarterly
SS	Security Studies
WP	World Politics

Occasionally, an article is not available online, or I have assigned a section of a book. These are placed on E-Reserve, and are indicated by the term “e-res” in parentheses after the citation. These texts are easily obtained through the Blackboard site that has been established for the class. Click on “Blackboard” from the library’s main page, log in, go to the page for this class, and click on “E-Reserves.”

GUIDE TO THE READINGS

This syllabus is designed in part as a study aid for graduate students preparing for preliminary exams. To that end, I have included a substantial amount of recommended reading for each subject (and several additional subjects) in an appendix at the end of the syllabus. This reading is **not** required for class, nor are students expected to read it to complete their reaction papers (although they may wish to read certain selections anyway). However, it may prove helpful in getting started on literature review papers. In general, recommended readings are listed in reverse chronological order, with the most important selections marked by a star instead of the usual bullet point. To construct this list of readings, I have drawn heavily on resources that students studying for prelims may wish to consult, especially the syllabus for “International Security: A Survey of the Field,” by Ronald Krebs at the University of Minnesota (<http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~ronkrebs>). Another valuable resource is Jack Levy’s lengthy syllabus (currently 106 pages) for “Theories of War and Peace” at Rutgers (<http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/courses.html>).

COURSE OUTLINE1. Offensive Realism January 18

Note: In this course, I assume that all students are familiar with Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). If you have not read it, please do so *before* the first class meeting.

- John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (Norton, 2001).
- Colin Elman, "Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional Hegemony," *APSR* 98/4 (November 2004): 563-76 (online).
- Christopher Layne, "The 'Poster Child for Offensive Realism': America as a Global Hegemon," *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002): 120-64 (online).

2. Defensive Realism January 25

- Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics* (Princeton, 2010).

3. Democratic Peace: Audience Costs February 1

- Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge, 2001). Read at least the introduction, chaps. 1-5, and chap. 8.
- James D. Fearon, "Domestic Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes," *APSR* 88/3 (September 1994): 577-92 (online).
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et.al., "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *APSR* 94/4 (December 1999): 791-807 (online).
- Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *IO* 62/1 (Winter 2008): 35-64 (online).
- Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser, "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," unpublished ms., Duke University and University of Virginia (Blackboard).

4. International Institutions: UN Peacekeeping February 8

- Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton, 2008).
- Michael J. Gilligan and Ernest J. Sergenti, "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference," *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 2 (July 2008): 89-122 (online).

5. Interdependence: Multinational Corporations February 15

- Stephen G. Brooks, *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict* (Princeton, 2005).

6. Norms, Culture, and Military Doctrine February 22

- Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars* (Princeton, 1997).
- Douglas Porch, "Military 'Culture' and the Fall of France in 1940: A Review Essay," *IS* 24/4 (Spring 2000): 157-80 (online).

7. Reputation, Credibility, and Threats March 1
Special Guest: Prof. Todd Sechser, University of Virginia

- Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Cornell, 2005).
- Todd Sechser, "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power," *IO* 64 (Fall 2010): 627-60 (online).

8. NO CLASS: SPRING BREAK March 8

9. Coercion and Air Power March 15

Note: This class will have to be rescheduled.

- Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Cornell, 1996). Read at least chaps. 1-4 and 7-9.
- Karl Mueller, "Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power," *SS* 7/3 (Spring 1998): 182-228 (online).
- Robert J. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (USIP, 2003), 359-420 (e-res, 2 parts).
- Daniel Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," *IO* 57/3 (Summer 2003): 643-59 (online).

Highly Recommended: Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale, 1966).

10. State Death, Military Occupation, and Foreign-Imposed Regime Change March 22

- Tanisha M. Fazal, *State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation* (Princeton, 2007).
- David Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *IS* 29/1 (Summer 2004): 49-91 (online).
- Alexander B. Downes, "Catastrophic Success? Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Civil War," unpublished ms., Duke University (Blackboard).

11. Military Effectiveness March 29

- Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, 2004).
- Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, III, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," *APSR* 92/2 (June 1998): 377-89 (online).
- Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12/2 (Summer 1948): 280-315 (online).
- Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," *JSS* 19/2 (June 1996): 171-212 (e-res).
- Risa Brooks, "An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt's Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973," *SS* 15/3 (July-September 2006): 396-430 (online).

12. Religion and Conflict April 5

- Ron E. Hassner, *War on Sacred Grounds* (Cornell, 2009).
- Stacie E. Goddard, "Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy," *IO* 60/1 (Winter 2006): 35-68 (online).

13. Nuclear Proliferation April 12
Special Guest: Prof. Matthew Fuhrmann, University of South Carolina
- Matthew Kroenig, *Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (Cornell, 2010).
 - Matthew Fuhrmann, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," *IS* 34/1 (Summer 2009): 7-41 (online).
 - Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *IS* 21/3 (Winter 1996/97): 54-86 (online).
 - Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test," *JCR* 48, no. 6 (December 2004): 859-885 (online).
14. Diffusion of Military Power April 19
- Michael C. Horowitz, *The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics* (Princeton, 2010).
15. Dinner at Downes's House: Other Research Frontiers April 26
- Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, III, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *IO* 63/1 (Winter 2009): 67-106 (online).
 - Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *APSR* 97/3 (August 2003): 343-361 (online).
 - Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *IS* 31/2 (Fall 2006): 42-78 (online).
 - Jenna Jordan, "When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation," *SS* 18/4 (2009): 719-755 (online).

**APPENDIX:
RECOMMENDED READING ON TOPICS COVERED IN CLASS AS WELL AS FURTHER TOPICS
AND DEBATES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

Offensive Realism

- ❖ Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Cornell, 2006).
- ❖ Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," *SS* 6/4 (Summer 1997): 1-49.
- Peter Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies* (Princeton, 1996).
- ❖ John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *IS* 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49.
- ❖ Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," *IS* 18/2 (Fall 1993): 125-53.
- ❖ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). States maximize power because human beings have a lust for power and a will to dominate.
- John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *WP* 2/2 (January 1950): 157-80.
- G. Lowes Dickinson, *The European Anarchy* (New York: Macmillan, 1917), esp. 13-17, 127-133.

Recommended Critiques

- Richard Little, "British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back," *SS* 16/1 (January 2007): 68-95.
- Peter Thompson, "The Case of the Missing Hegemon: British Nonintervention in the American Civil War," *SS* 16/1 (January 2007): 96-132.
- Richard N. Rosecrance, "War and Peace," *WP* 55/1 (October 2002): 137-66.
- Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay," *IS* 27/1 (Summer 2002): 149-73.
- Peter Gowan, "A Calculus of Power," *New Left Review* 16 (July-August 2002): 47-67.
- Barry R. Posen, "The Best Defense," *The National Interest* (Spring 2002): 119-26.
- Steven Lobell, "War is Politics: Offensive Realism, Domestic Politics, and Security Strategies," *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002): 165-95.
- Gerald Geunwook Lee, "To Be Long or Not to Be Long—That is the Question: The Contradiction of Time-Horizon in Offensive Realism," *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002): 196-217.

Neorealism, Defensive Realism, Offense-Defense Theory

- João Resende-Santos, *Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army* (Cambridge, 2007).
- Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton, 2005).
- ❖ Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Offense, Defense, and War* (MIT, 2004).
- ❖ Karen Ruth Adams, "Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance," *IS* 28/3 (Winter 2003/04): 45-83.
- ❖ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *IS* 25/3 (Winter 2000/01): 128-61.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 5-41.
- ❖ Stephen Van Evera, *The Causes of War, Vol. 1: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Cornell, 1999).
- ❖ Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?" *IS* 22/4 (Spring 1998): 44-82.
- ❖ Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *IS* 22/4 (Spring 1998): 5-43.
- Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *WP* 50/1 (October 1997): 171-201.
- Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *SS* 7/1 (Autumn 1997): 114-54.
- ❖ Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," *WP* 49/3 (April 1997): 371-400.
- João Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1914," *SS* 5/3 (Spring 1996): 193-260.
- Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Cornell, 1996).

- ❖ Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and its Critics," *SS* 4/4 (Summer 1995): 660-94.
- ❖ Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *IS* 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 50-90.
- Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," *WP* 44/4 (July 1992): 497-538.
- Barry R. Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks* (Cornell, 1991).
- ❖ Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *IO* 44/2 (Spring 1990): 137-68.
- Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," *IS* 14/1 (Summer 1989): 5-49.
- ❖ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 39-52.
- ❖ Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell, 1987).
- ❖ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Cornell, 1984).
- ❖ Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," *IS* 9/1 (Summer 1984): 58-108. Reprinted in *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War*, ed. Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera (Princeton, 1991), 59-109.
- ❖ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *WP* 30/2 (January 1978): 167-214.
- ❖ George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: Wiley, 1977).
- ❖ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976), 58-113 (Chapter 3: "Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary").

Recommended Critiques

- ❖ Keir Lieber, "The New History of World War I and what it Means for International Relations Theory," *IS* 32/2 (Fall 2007): 155-91.
- Evan Braden Montgomery, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty," *IS* 31/2 (Fall 2006): 151-85.
- Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z. Haftel, and Kevin Sweeney, "Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment," *JCR* 49/1 (February 2005): 67-89.
- Keir Lieber, *War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology* (Cornell, 2005).
- Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," *JOP* 63/3 (August 2001): 741-74.
- Keir Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 71-104.
- Peter D. Feaver, et al., "Correspondence: Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?)," *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 165-93.
- ❖ Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" *IS* 24/2 (Fall 1999): 5-55.
- Richard K. Betts, "Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay," *IS* 24/2 (Fall 1999): 166-98 (review of Van Evera, *Causes of War*).
- Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, 1999).
- ❖ John A. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing Proposition," *APSR* 91/4 (December 1997): 899-912, and responses by Waltz, Christensen and Snyder, Elman and Elman, Schweller, and Walt.
- Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," *IO* 51/3 (Summer 1997): 445-77.
- James D. Fearon, "The Offense-Defense Balance and War Since 1648" (unpub. ms., April 1997, available at <http://www.stanford.edu/~jfeardon>).
- ❖ Colin Elman, "Horses for Courses: Why *Not* Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?" *SS* 6/1 (Autumn 1996): 7-53.
- Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *SS* 5/3 (Spring 1996): 90-121.
- Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," *IS* 20/2 (Fall 1995): 5-34.
- Jonathan Shimshoni, "Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship," *IS* 15/3 (Winter 1990/91): 187-215.
- ❖ Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (Columbia, 1986).

- ❖ Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis," *ISQ* 28/2 (June 1984): 219-38.

"Neoclassical" Realism

- ❖ Steven E. Lobell et al., eds., *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, 2009).
- Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power* (Princeton, 2006).
- Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," *IS* 29/4 (Fall 2004): 159-201.
- Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," *WP* 51/1 (October 1998): 144-72.
- Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton, 1998).
- ❖ Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* (Columbia, 1998).
- Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, 1996).
- ❖ Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *IS* 19/1 (Summer 1994): 72-107.
- William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Cornell, 1993).

Democratic Peace

In General

- Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 2003).
- Lars-Erik Cederman, "Back to Kant: Reinterpreting the Democratic Peace as a Macrohistorical Learning Process," *APSR* 95/1 (March 2001): 15-31.
- ❖ Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (Norton, 2001).
- Zeev Maoz, "The Controversy over the Democratic Peace: Rearguard Action or Cracks in the Wall?" *IS* 22/1 (Summer 1997): 162-98.
- Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations," *IO* 50/1 (Winter 1996): 109-39.
- ❖ David L. Rousseau et al., "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-1988," *APSR* 90/3 (September 1996): 512-33.
- James Lee Ray, *Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
- ❖ Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace," *APSR* 87/3 (September 1993): 624-38.
- ❖ Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, 1993).
- Stuart A. Bremer, "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965," *JCR* 36/2 (1992): 309-41.
- ❖ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* (Summer 1989): 3-18.
- ❖ Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1983), 107-43.

Norms

- ❖ David Sobek, M. Rodwan Abouharb, and Christopher G. Ingram, "The Human Rights Peace: How the Respect for Human Rights at Home Leads to Peace Abroad," *JOP* 68/3 (August 2006): 519-29.
- ❖ Markus Fischer, "The Liberal Peace: Ethical, Historical, and Philosophical Aspects," BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-07, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.
- Spencer Weart, *Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One Another* (Yale, 1998).
- Michael W. Doyle, *Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism* (Norton, 1997).
- ❖ John M. Owen, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security* (Cornell, 1997).

- ❖ William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," *APSR* 88/1 (March 1994): 14-32.
- Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *APSR* 80/4 (December 1986): 1151-69.
- Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12/3 (Summer 1983): 205-35.
- Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12/4 (Fall 1983): 323-53.

Institutions

- Michael Tomz, "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," *IO* 61/4 (Fall 2007): 821-40.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et. al., "Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War," *WP* 56/3 (April 2004): 363-88.
- ❖ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et. al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (MIT, 2003).
- ❖ Charles Lipson, *Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace* (Princeton, 2003).
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