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The efficacy of targeting civilians in war

Alexander B. Downes and
Kathryn McNabb Cochran

Introduction

The conventional wisdom both inside and outside the academy on the effectiveness of targeting civilians in war is that—to quote Talleyrand—it's worse than a crime, it's a blunder: strategies that seek victory by killing noncombatants are not only immoral and contrary to long-standing international norms and humanitarian laws, they consistently fail to provide the coercer with much leverage over the opponent.[1] However, it is worth reexamining the military utility of civilian victimization for three reasons.

First, the literature on interstate wars focuses exclusively on the efficacy of coercive victimization: punishment strategies that target enemy civilians to compel an enemy government to surrender by increasing the costs of war. Yet there is a second type of anti-civilian strategy that occurs regularly in conventional wars that may succeed more often: the targeting of noncombatants intended to "cleanse" them from a piece of coveted territory, which we term "eliminationist victimization." The circumstances in which eliminationist strategies are employed and the tactics used to implement them are different from the coercive variant studied in the extant literature. A broader study is needed to assess the overall effectiveness of targeting civilians and to compare the relative effectiveness of coercive and eliminationist victimization.

Second, current studies on the effectiveness of targeting civilians suffer from selection bias because strategies of victimization are not applied randomly and the factors that influence whether states choose to target civilians also influence the likelihood of victory. For example, states often resort to coercive victimization when they are embroiled in difficult wars of attrition, conflicts in which any strategy is unlikely to succeed. By contrast, states that use eliminationist victimization are usually winning the war and conquering territory, so it is difficult to tell if victimization is a cause or product of victory. An analysis is needed that takes into account the nonrandom circumstances in which these victimization strategies are employed.

Finally, recent literature on the causes of civilian victimization suggests that leaders implement these strategies because they believe that targeting civilians

can help them accomplish their objectives.[2] The disjuncture between the literature on the causes of civilian victimization and empirical evaluations of its military utility to date suggest that a reassessment of the latter may be warranted.

This chapter provides that reassessment by asking whether civilian victimization in interstate wars helps belligerents achieve their aims. Our theoretical work juxtaposes hypotheses from the literature on the causes of victimization and the literature on its effectiveness. Our empirical analysis improves on existing studies by (1) disaggregating civilian victimization into its coercive and eliminationist forms and evaluating their effectiveness separately, (2) addressing the bias that arises from the nonrandom selection processes for the two forms of victimization, and (3) considering whether the efficacy of coercive victimization is contingent on the regime type of the target state.

Our statistical analysis of interstate war outcomes between 1816 and 2007 yields a nuanced understanding of the effect of civilian victimization on war outcomes. After correcting for the nonrandom selection of coercive victimization using matching, we find that it is generally ineffective, except when employed against anocracies (states with a mix of democratic and autocratic institutions). Although eliminationist victimization initially appears to be correlated with victory, an instrumental variables analysis suggests that the relationship is endogenous: the process of winning enables states to target their enemy's civilians. Examination of these cases demonstrates that conquering territory enables states both to inflict civilian victimization and to win the war. Case study evidence also suggests that the role of coercive victimization in obtaining an anocratic target's surrender is limited to explaining the timing of when states that have largely been defeated on the battlefield will seek terms.

The chapter unfolds as follows. First, we briefly review the literature on the causes of civilian victimization, emphasizing why leaders choose to target civilians. Next, we draw on the literature on the causes and consequences of civilian victimization to develop hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of different types of civilian targeting as well as the types of regimes against which these strategies may be more or less effective. Third, we describe the data and methods we use in our statistical analysis. After presenting the results of the analysis, we explore some of these results in greater depth to determine if they represent causal relationships. We conclude by offering some suggestions for further research.

The strategic logic of civilian victimization

Scholarly interest in the causes of various forms of civilian victimization, such as genocide, mass killing, and the intentional targeting of noncombatants in war has surged since the turn of the century. One of the most important findings to emerge from this literature is that violence directed against the defenseless is not primarily a function of hatred, wickedness, barbarity, or

innate evil. Rather, it is oftentimes an instrumental strategy designed to achieve specific military and political goals. According to Valentino's "strategic perspective," mass killing of noncombatants "is most accurately viewed as an instrumental policy—a brutal strategy designed to accomplish leaders' most important ideological or political objectives and counter what they see as their most dangerous threats."[3] Valentino, Huth, and Croco concur that, "the killing of noncombatants during war is often a calculated military strategy designed to achieve victory by coercing the adversary or by undermining the war-related productive capacity of his civilian population."[4]

Scholars studying violence in civil wars have reached broadly similar conclusions. Kalyvas notes that, "even a cursory reading of descriptions points to the predominance of instrumental violence in civil war contexts."[5] Kalyvas argues that armed groups use violence to punish defection by civilians and hence deter it. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay claim that large-scale violence by governments engaged in counterinsurgency is adopted to destroy the civilian base of powerful rebellions,[6] while Hultman contends that civilian victimization is a means for struggling insurgents to raise the government's political and military costs.[7] Balcells suggests that actors use violence to consolidate their control over territory by preventively eradicating potential enemy supporters.[8]

In short, much of the literature on the causes of civilian victimization concludes that such violence is rational and instrumental, implemented by actors who variously wish to extract compliance from populations, secure control over territory, or achieve victory in war. When these objectives are jeopardized—as when civilians defect to the enemy, or wars become too costly—combatants often choose to enact strategies of civilian victimization. But do these strategies work?

Civilian victimization: definition, typology, and hypotheses on effectiveness

We define civilian victimization as a military strategy that either kills noncombatants intentionally, or wields force in such an indiscriminate manner that it cannot help but kill thousands of civilians.[9] As a strategy, civilian victimization is decided upon by top political and military elites, and consists of an extended campaign of military action (e.g., the bombing of Germany) rather than a single incident (the My Lai Massacre). Strategies that target civilians intentionally qualify as civilian victimization whether or not they kill large numbers of people. For example, Iraqi Scud missiles fired at Iran in the 1980s did not kill exorbitant numbers of people (12,000), but the decision to launch the missiles constituted a purposeful effort to kill civilians and terrorize others and thus counts as a campaign of civilian victimization.[10] In other instances the intent of belligerents is more ambiguous, but the means employed do not discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. We code such cases as civilian victimization. A classic case is the Rolling Thunder air campaign against North Vietnam from 1965 to 1968, which used unguided bombs to attack mostly military targets but nonetheless killed over 50,000 people.[11] Collateral damage is excluded unless it is part of an indiscriminate campaign.

In interstate wars, there are two varieties of civilian victimization. The first is what we call coercive victimization, which typically takes the form of starvation blockades, such as the Siege of Paris (1870–71), or aerial bombardment of civilians, as in the German "Blitz" on Britain in World War II. Coercive victimization occurs when leaders target an adversary's civilian population in the hope that doing so will raise the costs of war to an unacceptable level.[12] This can lead to victory in two different ways. First, leaders of the target country may decide to end the war if the costs to noncombatants exceed the value of the issue in dispute. Second, coercive victimization of civilians can influence the behavior of the population itself: the fear of violent death that results from being the target of deadly attacks motivates civilians to demand that their leaders stop the war. The first mechanism assumes that leaders care about the suffering of their civilian population such that pain inflicted on civilians constitutes a real "cost." The second mechanism assumes that targeting civilians dampens the resolve of the public and that the population has the means to influence its leader's wartime decisions.

There is no shortage of statements by policymakers and military officers historically expressing the belief that targeting civilians can successfully coerce an end to wars. General William T. Sherman, accused by Confederate officers of barbarism during the American Civil War, famously responded, "War is cruelty. There is no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over."[13] Former British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin argued during the interwar period that the belligerent that killed more enemy civilians would prevail in future wars: "The only defense is in offense, which means that you have to kill more women and children more quickly than the enemy if you want to save yourselves."[14] Winston Churchill wrote during World War II that the surest way to defeat Nazi Germany was "an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland."[15]

Most of the scholarly literature on civilian victimization suggests that, contrary to the views of these military officers and policymakers, coercing states by targeting civilians is ineffective. Pape's survey of all cases of strategic bombing from World War I to the Persian Gulf War finds hardly any cases in which punishing civilians persuaded states to make major concessions.[16] Olson's study of three blockades of Britain shows that even though the embargoes became progressively more encompassing, Britain's vulnerability to hunger actually decreased, as the state was able to adjust and compensate.[17]

Coercion by punishment is difficult for a variety of reasons. Modern states are highly nationalistic, so making substantial concessions offends the national pride of the population, and thus leaders who make concessions could face removal or punishment at the hands of angry constituents. Furthermore, the

limited destructive power of conventional weapons and the ability of governments to adjust to attacks by enacting civil defense measures make it unlikely that non-nuclear coercion can raise costs to an intolerable level.[18] Olson contends that the combination of strong bureaucratic state structures and the size and wealth of states allows them to lower their vulnerability to blockade by rationing food, substituting one good for another, or cultivating more land to increase food production.[19] Finally, coercive victimization assumes that a population cowering in shelters under massive bombardment or weakened by hunger and disease can act collectively to force its leaders to submit to the enemy's demands. On the contrary, the bombing campaigns of World War II generated political apathy as people struggled to survive on a daily basis and inhibited their ability to act collectively.

The beliefs of military and political leaders who implement coercive victimization notwithstanding, previous scholarly empirical studies on the effectiveness of coercion and punishment suggest that it possesses little utility for winning wars.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Coercive victimization does not increase a state's likelihood of victory.

Focusing on the mechanisms by which coercive victimization applies pressure to target states reveals that the relationship between victory and coercive victimization may be a function of the target's regime type. Some scholars argue that democracies are particularly susceptible to civilian targeting while others maintain that anocracies are the most vulnerable.

Institutional theories of democracy observe that democracies are characterized by regular elections and large selectorates.[20] Democratic leaders are thus easily removed from office relative to nondemocratic leaders and must rely on public policy success to remain in power because their supporters are too numerous to reward with private benefits. Since failing to protect the civilian population would likely be seen as a public policy failure, attacks on those civilians are likely to produce pressures on democratic leaders to halt such strikes as quickly as possible, perhaps by making concessions to the perpetrator of the attacks. Nondemocratic leaders are not subject to such pressures because they are not beholden to public opinion to maintain office and can pay off their comparatively small winning coalitions with private benefits. Nondemocratic leaders thus need pay little attention to civilian suffering in wartime.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Coercive victimization is more effective against democracies than against nondemocracies.

Leading studies of strategic bombing, however, have found that democracies are not more susceptible to punishment than nondemocracies.[21] Indeed, one can also use institutional theory to argue that democracies could be *less* vulnerable to coercive victimization. If democratic leaders depend on victory to assure themselves of retaining office, adversary attacks on their population may put even more pressure on leaders to win and thereby justify the costs suffered by civilians. Experiencing civilian victimization, in other words, could spur democratic leaders to fight harder. Other factors—such as the tendency for democratic citizens to "rally around the flag" in wartime, and direct their ire against the opponent rather than against their own leaders—could reinforce this resistance to coercion.[22]

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Coercive victimization is less effective against democracies than against nondemocracies.

Another possibility is that the relationship between target regime type and the effectiveness of civilian victimization is curvilinear. According to some scholars, anocracies inhabit particularly treacherous political terrain: they disenfranchise a substantial proportion of their populations, but are unable to use unlimited violence to repress public opposition to the regime.[23] Civilian victimization is intended to foment public displeasure with the war among the target population; anocratic regimes have difficulty quelling such resistance, and thus may be more willing to make concessions in the face of such attacks rather than face the prospect of domestic revolt. One study has found that economic sanctions are more likely to elicit concessions from anocracies than other types of regimes.[24]

Hypothesis 4 (H4): Coercive victimization is more effective against anocracies than against consolidated autocracies or democracies.

Eliminationist victimization targets civilians to gain or maintain control over contested territory and occurs when a belligerent believes that it will be unable to extract compliance from a particular group owing to the group's ethnicity, ideology, or its history of collaboration with the enemy.[25] Perceiving the group to be disloyal and willing to aid the enemy at the first opportunity, belligerents decide to eliminate the population rather than try to control it. In interstate wars, eliminationist victimization takes the form of cleansing or massacres in pursuit of territorial conquest designed to induce the targeted group to flee or to destroy it by mass murder.

Predicting the efficacy of this type of victimization is difficult in interstate conflicts because almost all of the scholarly literature on the effectiveness of

violence like this examines it in the context of insurgency.[26] However, we expect eliminationist victimization to contribute to victory in interstate wars for two reasons. First, eliminationist targeting of civilians undermines an opponent's ability to resist rather than its will to fight, and denial strategies are thought to be more effective than punishment strategies.[27] Eliminating the targeted population in a contested area prevents the other side from recruiting new participants or obtaining logistical support, supplies, and information from the residents of that territory.

Second, eliminationist victimization is both easier to inflict and more persuasive than coercive victimization. When belligerents use an eliminationist strategy, it means they have direct and probably uncontested access to the adversary's civilian population, a situation that makes their threats simple to carry out and highly credible. Moreover, in eliminationist scenarios, violence is used to change the behavior of the civilian population, whereas in coercive scenarios violence is used to change the behavior of the government representing those civilians. Because the effect of eliminationist victimization is a direct one on the victimized rather than an indirect one aimed at influencing another actor, it is more likely to be effective. We thus hypothesize that eliminationist victimization contributes to victory.

Hypothesis 5 (H5): Eliminationist victimization increases a state's likelihood of victory.

One objection to this argument is that eliminationist victimization is a forward-looking strategy designed to minimize future resistance by potentially hostile populations in conquered territory after the war rather than helping to win the current war. We agree that eliminationist victimization is in good measure a future-oriented strategy; however, eliminationist victimization's prospective utility does not preclude it from contributing to victory in the current war. Eliminationist victimization is often directed against groups either engaged in resistance or which might help the enemy if left alone during the current conflict. Invaders suspect that certain groups will aid the adversary if given the opportunity, and thus act preventively to eliminate a threat that could manifest itself during the war, and which could potentially be disastrous.

Research design

To evaluate our hypotheses about the effectiveness of civilian victimization, we use the Correlates of War (COW) dataset of participants in interstate wars, modified in two ways. First, following recent analyses we divided several long multi-phase, multi-participant wars into their constituent parts.[28] This is particularly important because COW codes many states that were

defeated at some point during such conflicts as winners. Second, we omit minor participants (those suffering fewer than 10 percent of the total war battle deaths) from large multilateral conflicts.

We assess effectiveness by estimating the impact of coercive and eliminationist victimization on a trichotomous indicator of war outcomes—wins are coded as two, draws as one, and losses as zero—using an ordinal logit estimator.[29] Most of the codings for bilateral wars are drawn from the COW dataset; we code outcomes for divided multilateral wars ourselves. Because there are multiple observations from each conflict and these observations are not independent, we use robust standard errors clustered on each war.

Our key explanatory variables are dummy variables for coercive victimization and eliminationist victimization. Civilian victimization is defined as a military strategy that targets noncombatants intentionally or which fails to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants. When it is unclear whether the attacking government intended to target civilians, we code cases as civilian victimization if the number of civilians killed exceeded ten thousand. Coercive victimization consists of those instances in which a state targets its adversary's civilian population in an effort to compel the government to quit the war. This form of civilian victimization is almost always inflicted from the outside-in by an attacker located outside the target's borders. We therefore code cases of civilian victimization as coercive if attackers employed deprivation of food during a siege or blockade or aerial or artillery bombardment of cities in the adversary's homeland.

Eliminationist victimization, on the other hand, is inflicted to remove civilians from territory claimed by the attacker. This is accomplished by massacre, devastation, scorched earth, and destruction of homes, villages, or towns, all designed to eradicate a group from a particular area through flight or mass killing. We code cases of civilian victimization as eliminationist if they are inflicted directly by invading forces on civilian populations in the process of taking control over territory.

Although we treat them separately, both forms of victimization can (and do) occur in the same conflict. In the early stages of the Korean War, for example, North and South Korean forces engaged in eliminationist victimization by massacring civilians they believed were dedicated supporters of the opposing regime.[30] Later in the conflict, the United States employed coercive victimization by bombing North Korean cities with incendiary weapons to destroy all supply and transit centers for communist forces, hoping to halt the disastrous UN retreat.[31] There are 31 instances of coercive victimization and 30 instances of eliminationist victimization inflicted by 54 belligerents in a total of 30 different wars in the dataset. Five belligerents engaged in both coercive and eliminationist targeting.[32]

To assess whether the effect of coercive victimization is contingent on the enemy's regime type we construct two dummy variables to denote whether a belligerent was fighting a democracy or an anocracy. We then multiply our measure of coercive victimization by these dummy variables. Enemy democracy

is coded one if the enemy received a score on the Polity IV index of democratic institutions of greater than six.[33] Enemy anocracy is coded one if the enemy had a Polity score greater than –7 and less than 7. The excluded category is autocracies that have a Polity score lower than –6.

We also control for a number of variables that the literature on military effectiveness suggests influence the likelihood of victory in war. The first is material capabilities, which we operationalize as the share of total capabilities of all the belligerents in the war controlled by each state.[34] Data are calculated from the COW National Material Capabilities dataset. Democracies are also thought to be more likely to win wars, and particularly wars that they start.[35] We use the Polity index to measure each belligerent's regime type, designating countries that score higher than six as democracies.[36] Data on war initiation is taken from Reiter and Stam supplemented with our own coding for wars that ended in draws. An interaction term (democracy × initiation) gauges the joint effect of democracy and initiation. We also include a dummy variable that designates whether the combatant had expansive war aims, defined as either regime change or conquest. We coded this variable ourselves using a variety of historical sources and the Militarized Interstate Dispute Dataset's coding of revision type. Although expansive war aims are probably more difficult to achieve, only those countries that possess superior military capabilities should adopt these aims. Thus, expansive war aims should be positively correlated with war outcomes. Lastly, we include a dummy variable that codes whether a war was fought in the post-1945 period because some analysts have found a decrease in decisive war outcomes after World War II.[37]

Assessing the effectiveness of civilian victimization

The discussion of our results is organized into four parts. First, we show the effects of coercive and eliminationist victimization on the likelihood of victory using an ordinal logit model. Second, we employ matching to assess whether the desperate circumstances in which coercive victimization is chosen causes us to underestimate its wartime utility. Third, we use interactive terms to test whether enemy regime type conditions the effectiveness of coercive victimization. Finally, we perform instrumental variables analysis to address whether the propitious circumstances under which states implement eliminiationist victimization cause us to overestimate its effect on victory.

Model 1 in Table 13.1 shows the results of our initial analysis. As expected, there are significant differences in the military utility of coercive and eliminationist victimization. Although both of the coefficients are positive, the coefficient for the eliminationist variable is larger and statistically significant ($p = 0.075$) whereas coercive victimization is not.[38] These results provide initial support for H1 and H5.

Figure 13.1 displays the substantive effects of coercive and eliminationist victimization as well as those for the control variables (along with 90 percent

Table 13.1 Ordinal logit estimates of the effect of coercive and eliminationist civilian victimization on interstate war outcomes, 1816–2007

	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*
	Baseline model	*Matched data*	*Regime effects baseline model*	*Regime effects matched data*	*Instrumental variables*
Coercive Victimization	0.19 (0.41)	0.10 (0.85)	–0.88 (0.76)	–1.04 (1.43)	0.24 (0.42)
Coercive Victimization × Enemy Anocracy	–	–	2.60** (1.18)	3.27* (1.80)	–
Coercive Victimization × Enemy Democracy	–	–	–36.12** (1.12)	–37.95** (1.64)	–
Eliminationist Victimization	0.78* (0.44)	0.56 (0.72)	0.88** (0.41)	1.00 (0.71)	0.26 (0.69)
Enemy Anocracy	–	–	0.10 (0.46)	–0.70 (1.11)	–
Enemy Democracy	–	–	–0.99** (0.50)	–36.07** (1.90)	–
Expansive War Aims	0.91** (0.38)	1.02 (0.86)	1.13** (0.42)	1.11 (1.05)	0.93** (0.39)
Capabilities	1.75** (0.60)	–1.17 (1.25)	1.71** (0.65)	–1.82 (1.54)	1.64** (0.58)
Initiation	0.61 (0.45)	0.66 (0.98)	0.61 (0.47)	0.18 (1.18)	0.60 (0.45)
Democracy	1.18 (0.72)	1.92** (0.87)	1.00 (0.66)	1.55 (1.00)	1.18 (0.74)
Democracy × Initiation	–0.09 (0.83)	–0.03 (1.29)	–0.25 (0.83)	0.56 (1.90)	–0.12 (0.83)
Post-1945	–0.97** (0.22)	–1.40** (0.69)	–0.56** (0.24)	–0.84 (0.99)	–0.91** (0.21)
Cut 1	0.76** (0.31)	–0.63 (0.75)	0.76 (0.44)	–1.54 (1.42)	0.69** (0.31)
Cut 2	1.38** (0.307)	0.01 (0.73)	1.42** (0.45)	–0.67 (1.33)	1.30** (0.30)
N	247	62	244	62	247
Psuedo-R^2	0.13	0.16	0.18	0.33	0.12

Notes
Robust standard errors in italics;
* $p < 0.10$;
** $p < 0.05$.



Figure 13.1 Impact of civilian victimization relative to other variables.

Note
Solid bars indicate change in probability; lines inside the bars show 90 percent confidence intervals. The last four bars show the joint effects of democracy and war initiation. Democracy (targets) shows the effect of being a democracy on the probability of victory for targets while Democracy (initiators) shows the effect of being a democracy on victory for initiators. Initiation (non-democracy) shows the effect of initiating a conflict for nondemocracies while Initiation (democracy) shows the effect of initiating a conflict for Democracies.

confidence intervals). Engaging in coercive victimization does not significantly change a belligerent's prospects for victory. Combatants that engage in eliminationist targeting, by contrast, are 18 percent more likely to win than those that do not. This is a sizable increase when compared to other factors that contribute to victory in Figure 13.1. A change in belligerent capabilities from one standard deviation below the mean to one above it increases the likelihood of victory by 23 percent. Thus, eliminationist victimization appears to improve a belligerent's prospects for victory by nearly as much as a two standard deviation increase in capabilities. Figure 13.1 also provides substantive effects for the other control variables. As expected, countries with expansive war aims are more likely to win whereas belligerents fighting after 1945 are less likely to win. Democracies, both targets and initiators, are also more likely to win.

Although the results from model 1 provide initial support for H1 and H5, the different circumstances in which coercive and eliminationist victimization are employed may account for the apparent discrepancy in their relative effectiveness. States often use coercive victimization when they experience harrowing battlefield challenges in wars of attrition, while states that use eliminationist strategies are often winning and taking territory when they decide to target civilians. We account for the different circumstances in which these strategies are used and the potential bias that these selection processes generate using matching for coercive victimization and instrumental variables for eliminationist victimization.

States tend to employ coercive victimization when they experience high losses, become bogged down in wars of attrition, and when they are desperate to win. This makes statistical inference problematic because it is difficult to assess whether civilian targeting influences war outcomes or whether the desperate conditions that make civilian targeting likely are driving outcomes.

To deal with possible selection bias in the case of coercive victimization, we use matching, a nonparametric statistical technique that attempts to correct for bias arising from nonrandom treatment assignment.[39] Matching compensates for nonrandom selection by using only those control cases that are most similar to the treatment cases, enabling researchers to compare treated cases to those cases that had a high probability of receiving the treatment but did not. Thus, matching permits us to compare war outcomes where states coercively targeted civilians with those where states refrained despite having the opportunity (they possessed the requisite material capabilities) and the incentives (they were desperate) to do so.

To implement matching we use variables identified by the literature as causes of civilian victimization to predict whether belligerents engage in coercive victimization.[40] Although the leading studies do not disaggregate civilian victimization into coercive and eliminationist types, these works strongly suggest that coercive victimization in particular is most prevalent in wars of attrition. These studies also find that powerful states are more likely to target civilians because they have the material resources to do so. Some find that an increased sensitivity to the costs of fighting makes democracies more likely to target civilians in these wars, and that civilian victimization has become less prevalent since 1945. Thus we employ a logistic analysis to predict coercive victimization using an attrition dummy variable that signifies "wars generally lacking in maneuver or movement, which are instead dominated by static, linear, or trench operations";[41] a variable which measures the relative military capability of the combatants as described in the previous section; the Polity score of the belligerent to measure its regime type; and a dummy variable for the post-1945 period.[42] Each belligerent is then assigned a propensity score equal to the probability that it would target civilians in a coercive campaign. Cases of coercive victimization are then matched with control cases that have the closest propensity score.

Matching was performed using *MatchIt*.[43] One-to-one nearest neighbor matching without replacement yielded the best results. The matching process

significantly improved the balance of the data. The difference in the mean propensity scores for the treatment and control group improved by 92 percent. The similarity in the relevant control variables improved by between 51 percent for regime type and 100 percent for attrition.[44] Because matching was not exact, we conducted parametric analysis with control variables to evaluate the effectiveness of coercive victimization on the matched dataset. The results are reported in model 2 of Table 13.1. As can be seen, coercive victimization is not associated with an increased likelihood of victory, even after controlling for the dampening effect of selection bias. The coefficient remains small and statistically insignificant.

Next, we test whether the utility of coercive victimization depends on the enemy's regime type by interacting coercive victimization with dummy variables for enemy democracy and enemy anocracy, first without controlling for potential selection bias and then using the matched dataset. The results of this analysis are reported in models 3 and 4 in Table 13.1.

Analyzing the unmatched data in model 3, we find that coercive victimization is effective when used against anocracies and is actually counterproductive when used against democracies. When employed against anocracies, coercive victimization increases belligerents' probability of victory by 36 percent (see Figure 13.2). When this strategy is employed against democracies, it reduces belligerents' likelihood of winning by 15 percent. The positive effect of coercive victimization against anocracies grows stronger and remains statistically significant after matching, as seen in model 4. Targeting civilians in these cases increases the probability of winning by 42 percent. This provides strong support for the hypothesis that anocracies are more vulnerable to coercive victimization. However, the negative effect of coercive victimization against democracies becomes negligible after matching. Although statistically significant, the substantive effect is very small (less than 0.00001 percent).[45] This lack of correlation may simply indicate that democracies are neither more nor less vulnerable to coercive victimization, but it could also be a function of multiple mechanisms operating in different directions. Democratic leaders might be more concerned about civilian suffering, but they may also face electoral incentives to secure victory against opponents who adopt strategies of civilian victimization. Thus, the positive and negative effects of democracy described in the theory section might cancel each other out, leading to a null finding. Controlling for the differential effect of coercive victimization across regime types also provides evidence that the selection effects discussed above biased the aggregate estimates downwards, dampening the positive effect of coercive targeting against anocracies and augmenting its negative effect against democracies.

Belligerents engage in eliminationist victimization to remove civilians from enemy territory in an attempt to prevent those civilians from providing support to an adversary. To conduct these types of campaigns, combatants must have conquered part of their enemy's territory. Thus, belligerents are often already "winning" the war (or at least advancing and taking territory)



Figure 13.2 Impact of coercive victimization on war outcomes by enemy regime type.

when they decide to target civilians. This makes isolating the causal effect of civilian targeting on war outcomes problematic because it is difficult to parse out whether targeting civilians makes victory likely or whether victory makes targeting civilians likely.

Instrumental variables are well suited to address this problem. Rather than using eliminationist victimization as our key explanatory variable, we use an instrument that is closely correlated with eliminationist victimization but is unrelated to war outcome. We construct this instrument by estimating the underlying probability that a state will target civilians using only variables that are unrelated to war outcome. We then use this instrument to estimate the effect of eliminationist victimization on victory. This procedure corrects for the bias arising from endogeneity because the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term in the ordinal logit equation. In this case, the instrument—unlike the dichotomous indicator—is not influenced by the state's ability to conquer territory. As a result, the estimates are unbiased.[46]

To implement this technique we identify variables that are good predictors of eliminationist victimization but are unrelated to war outcome.[47] Again, we draw on the literature on civilian victimization to select our predictors, focusing this time on variables most likely to be associated with eliminationist victimization. One prominent finding is that belligerents are more likely to

target civilians if they are involved in wars where the primary dispute is territorial. Belligerents whose goal is to annex or conquer their enemy's territory are more likely to engage in eliminationist campaigns.[48] In addition, states that are defending their territory from the incursions of others have also been known to target potential supporters in their own country (for example, Turkish massacres of Greeks in Anatolia during the Greco-Turkish War). Thus, we include a dummy variable—territorial war—that is coded one if a war involved a dispute over territory. We also include a dummy variable for ethnic intermingling coded one if a belligerent had co-ethnics living inside its enemy's borders or if its enemy had co-ethnics living inside its borders. In these, the incentive to use eliminationist targeting is higher because there is an obvious group that might aid the enemy. To account for the possibility that it is easier to dehumanize the enemy and justify civilian targeting when significant cultural differences divide the belligerents, we include a cultural difference dummy variable that measures whether the two belligerents are from different regions of the world as measured by COW. Finally, we include a dummy variable that indicates whether a belligerent targeted civilians in the most recent war it fought. Because states that have targeted civilians in previous wars have demonstrated insensitivity to the norms prohibiting the targeting of noncombatants, they should be more willing than other states to target civilians again.

Each of these variables is arguably exogenous to the outcome of the current war. The ethnic composition and regional location of the belligerents as well as the strategies they adopted in previous wars are clearly unrelated to the outcome of the current war. The issue at stake is more ambiguous because it might be related to war aims—which we found to be correlated with outcomes. However, we specifically constructed this variable so that it would be distinct from belligerents' war aims. The dummy variable is coded one for states that are trying to preserve the status quo by protecting their own territory, pursuing limited territorial gains, or attempting conquest of the enemy. In addition, both sides in the conflict receive the same coding since the issue in dispute is the same for both even if their political goals are different.

We use these variables to estimate a logit equation to predict eliminationist victimization in Table 13.2. The model fit is very good, suggesting that our instrument is highly correlated with the independent variable. We generate the predicted probability of eliminationist victimization from this model and use it as an instrument for eliminationist targeting in our ordinal logit analysis of war outcomes. The results are reported in model 5 of Table 13.1.

Once we control for endogeneity using the instrumental variable the significant relationship between eliminationist targeting and war outcomes disappears. The coefficient for eliminationist victimization is small and statistically insignificant, which suggests that the correlation we found in model 1 was spurious. Taking territory enables states to engage in eliminationist strategies and also increases the likelihood that they will win. The

Table 13.2 Logit estimates of probability of eliminationist victimization in interstate wars, 1816–2007

	Coefficient	*Standard error*	P-*value*
Territorial War	2.705	0.712	0.000
Civilizational Difference	1.723	0.531	0.001
Ethnic Intermingling	2.047	0.539	0.000
Previous Targeting	1.887	0.541	0.000
Constant	−6.032	0.875	0.000

Notes
$N = 250$;
Psuedo-$R^2 = 0.3722$;
ROCTab = 0.89.

analysis thus supports the conclusion that eliminationist victimization does not actually contribute to victory; instead, victory is a function of the battlefield conditions that made eliminationist targeting possible.

In sum, we find that in most cases targeting civilians is not an effective strategy. Although eliminationist victimization is correlated with victory, this finding is produced by states that employ this strategy while conquering territory. The causal arrow thus probably flows from victory to victimization: winning enables states to conquer territory, which enables them to employ eliminationist strategies. Once we account for this endogenous relationship with instrumental variables, the positive correlation between war outcomes and eliminationist targeting disappears. We also find that, for the most part, coercive targeting is not an effective strategy even when we control for selection effects. The one exception is when it is employed against anocracies. In these cases, it can increase belligerents' prospects for victory.

Additional evidence from cases of civilian victimization

One of the most surprising findings in the statistical analysis is that coercive victimization appears to contribute significantly to victory against anocratic regimes. Table 13.3 lists the cases of victory when a state employed coercive victimization. The table shows clearly that the targets in the vast majority of these cases were anocracies, which supports the statistical results. However, two other trends are evident in the table, both of which raise questions about the reliability of this finding. First, in only one case—the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71)—did events unfold in the manner predicted by the theory. During the Siege of Paris by the Prussian Army, the possibility of revolution in Paris made surrender both dangerous but also imperative for the French. The communists wanted to hold out and sortie the entire population, an eventuality the government regarded with horror. French authorities faced two enemies, "one which, night and day, tightened his ring of fire and steel, the other which at every instant was awaiting the moment to hurl itself upon

Table 13.3 Cases of coercive civilian victimization by winners of interstate wars, 1816–2007

War	*Year*	*Perpetrator(s)*	*Target*	*Anocracy*	*Event*
Franco-Prussian	1870–71	Prussia	France	Yes	Siege of Paris
Russo-Turkish	1877–78	Russia	Turkey	No	Siege of Plevna
Boxer Rebellion	1900	United States United Kingdom France Russia	China	Yes	Post-Siege Massacres
First Balkan	1912–13	Bulgaria Serbia	Turkey	Yes	Siege of Adrianople
WWI, West	1914–18	United States United Kingdom France	Germany	Yes	Blockade
Second Sino-Japanese	1931–33	Japan	China	Yes	Bombing of Shanghai
Italo-Ethiopian	1935–36	Italy	Ethiopia	Yes	Bombing of Ethiopian Towns
Germany–Poland	1939	Germany	Poland	Yes	Bombing of Warsaw
Russo-Finnish	1939–40	Russia	Finland	Yes	Bombing of Finnish Towns
German–Yugoslav	1941	Germany	Yugoslavia	Yes	Bombing of Belgrade
WWII, West	1940–45	United States United Kingdom	Germany	No	Bombing of German Cities
WWII, Pacific	1941–45	United States	Japan	Yes	Firebombing, Atomic Bombs
Lebanon	1982	Israel	Lebanon	No	Bombing of Beirut

Note
Anocracy is defined as a state with a Polity score from –6 to +6.

the Hotel de Ville."[49] If the government asked for terms it risked sparking a communist insurrection, yet peace with the Prussians was necessary to crush the government's domestic enemies on the Left. When the expected uprising came on January 22, 1871, "Rather than attempt to fight a war on two fronts, the Government considered it imperative to obtain an armistice with the least delay."[50]

Other cases, by contrast, provide less support for the fragile anocracies hypothesis. Germany, for example, fought for years during World War I—defeating Russia and nearly overwhelming France and Britain, all the while propping up Austria-Hungary—despite worsening health conditions among its population owing to the Allied blockade. In fact, Goemans argues that it was the very fear of domestic punishment if they admitted defeat that drove German leaders to fight so hard for so long.[51] Similarly, Japan endured massive punishment from US bombers in 1945 without any hint of a domestic uprising.[52] It was only when Japan's military strategy for defending the home islands and inflicting high costs on the American invaders collapsed in the face of the Soviet offensive in Manchuria and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that Japanese leaders sought terms.[53]

A second trend evident in the cases in Table 13.3 is that, when coercive victimization plays any role in contributing to victory, it does so only late in wars when targets are already beaten militarily. During the Siege of Paris, by the time that hunger and disease began to stalk Parisians and Prussian shells started to fall in the city, French military prospects were already bleak. Two breakout attempts by the Parisian garrison in November and January failed to break the iron ring encircling the capital. Moreover, there was little prospect of a rescue, as the new armies raised by the provisional government elsewhere in France were defeated by the Prussians. The military situation faced by French commanders in January 1871 was thus just as dire as that facing Paris's civilian population. The same could be said about the World War I blockade of Germany and the bombing of Warsaw in late September 1939. In both cases, the armies of the target countries were in retreat or collapsing. In the German case, the most that can be said is that civilian misery added to the scales weighing in favor of peace.[54] In the Polish case, German aerial and artillery bombardments of the Polish capital may have determined the timing of surrender, but Polish forces in the rest of the country had already been crushed and the Poles would likely have capitulated soon in any event.

On the other hand, an analysis of the cases confirms the finding that emerged from the matched analysis that coercive victimization has a negligible effect when employed against democracies. There are only four cases in which democracies were targets of coercive victimization: Britain in the two World Wars, Israel in the Persian Gulf War (Iraqi Scud missiles), and Armenia in its war against Azerbaijan. The British cases constitute good evidence against the hypothesis that democracies are more vulnerable to coercive victimization, as German aerial bombing and attempts to starve Britain via submarine blockades had little effect on popular attitudes and Germany (the perpetrator in both

instances) went on to lose the war. The Armenian case says little about the resilience of democracies to coercive victimization because the shelling was conducted against a city in a secessionist region of Azerbaijan rather than in Armenia itself. The Persian Gulf case consists of Saddam Hussein firing Scud missiles at Israel in a failed attempt to goad the Israelis into retaliating and thereby shattering the coalition arrayed against him. In short, none of these cases provides evidence that coercive victimization works against democracies, and two cases are insufficient to conclude that it is less effective against democracies than other regime types.

The case evidence also suggests, as discussed above, that the correlation between eliminationist victimization and victory is largely spurious. The cases reveal that the circumstances under which eliminationist victimization contributes to victory in conventional interstate wars—a high degree of intermingling of populations vying to control the same territory—are rare. When war breaks out in this situation, the front lines between the warring parties leave pockets of each group trapped on the "wrong" side, and territory controlled by each group is often not contiguous. In cases like these, areas populated by the other group represent real military threats.[55] In the Israeli War of Independence, for example, the nascent Zionist state faced a critical military dilemma because the major areas of Jewish settlement were separated by Arab-inhabited areas. In the conflict's first few months, Arab militias from nearby villages blocked the roads connecting Jewish population centers and attacked supply convoys.[56] To win the war, Jewish forces needed to conquer the intervening Arab territories, consolidate control over these areas by subduing or eliminating Arab civilians who sympathized with (and sometimes fought for) the enemy, and then expand outward, pushing the majority of the Arabs beyond the new state's borders.[57] Plan D and other operations helped eliminate the bulk of the population viewed by Jewish leaders as a fifth column.

This set of circumstances, however, is not common. The more typical scenario is a war of territorial aggression in which the invader targets members of the opposing nationality (or holders of the enemy's ideology). In these cases, the aggressor state must take enemy territory in order to engage in eliminationist victimization. Although cleansing may stabilize a belligerent's control over conquered territory, this does not by itself win the war. Territorial conquest makes eliminationist victimization possible, which then facilitates territorial control, but it does not defeat the adversary's army. In many cases, such as Turkey in Cyprus (1974) and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh (1992–94), territorial advances make cleansing possible and aggressors go on to win the conflict. In other cases, however, invaders who have inflicted ethnic or ideological cleansing—Germany on the Eastern Front in World War II and Uganda in its war against Tanzania—have gone on to see their territorial gains erased and suffered defeat in the war. Expulsions, cleansing, and massacres allow aggressors to pacify territory but, unless they are able to solidify their military gains, eliminationist victimization will not prevent eventual defeat.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that targeting civilians in war is a crime, but is it also a strategic blunder? Our statistical results, which differentiated between coercive and eliminationist variants of civilian victimization, suggest that only the latter type is correlated with victory. However, when we corrected for possible endogeneity in the relationship between eliminationist victimization and victory, the significance of this association disappeared. The only circumstance in which coercive victimization contributed to victory was against targets with anocratic governments.

Examination of the cases provided further insight into the relationship between the two types of civilian victimization and war outcomes. First, although the statistical analysis suggested that coercive victimization was more effective against anocracies, the cases revealed that this strategy exerted little effect on the populations or leaders in such regimes until the state had essentially lost the war militarily. Second, there is no evidence that democracies are more vulnerable to coercive victimization, and the finding that democracies are less vulnerable rests on a thin empirical foundation. Finally, the cases confirmed that the circumstances in which eliminationist victimization contributes to victory are rare.

Although we can be fairly confident that selection bias and endogeneity do not affect the statistical results, there are clearly several limitations to our investigation. War outcome, for example, is a relatively blunt indicator of effectiveness. Particularly in cases of eliminationist victimization, other dependent variables—such as post-war rebellion by the targeted group, or militarized disputes with the state from which territory was taken—will provide more analytical leverage on the long-term efficacy of civilian victimization. Future work should also address post-war political effects of targeting civilians: does the use of this strategy during war engender long-lasting bitterness? What is the effect of targeting civilians on the duration of post-war peace? Wars are also a blunt unit of analysis: future work might break wars down into war-years, particular campaigns, or exploit variation across time and space within a single conflict using statistics or case studies.

Notes

1 Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter, "When Does Aerial Bombing Work? Quantitative Empirical Tests, 1917–1999," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45, 2 (2001): 147–173; Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); Mancur Olson, *The Economics of the Wartime Shortage: A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1963). For exceptions in the context of non-interstate conflict, see Jason Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, 3 (2009): 331–362; Alexander B. Downes, "Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy," *Civil Wars* 9, 4 (2007): 420–444; and Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic

Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, 3 (2003): 343–361.

2 Alexander B. Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Sarah Croco, "Covenants without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War," *World Politics* 58, 3 (2006): 339–377; Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars," *Rationality and Society* 11, 3 (1999): 243–285; Kalyvas, "The Logic of Terrorism in Civil War," *Journal of Ethics* 8, 1 (2004): 98–137; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Benjamin Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, "'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare," *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 375–407.

3 Valentino, *Final Solutions*, 3.

4 Valentino, Huth, and Croco, "Covenants Without the Sword," 340.

5 Kalyvas, "The Logic of Terrorism," 99.

6 Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay, "'Draining the Sea.'"

7 Lisa Hultman, "Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Raising the Costs for Fighting," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19, 2 (2007): 205–222; see also Reed Wood, "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, 5 (2010): 601–614.

8 Laia Balcells, "Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars," *International Studies Quarterly* 54, 2 (2009): 291–313.

9 Downes, *Targeting Civilians*, 14–21. We use the terms "civilian" and "noncombatant" interchangeably to mean individuals who are not members of the armed forces, do not wear military uniforms, and do not participate directly in hostilities. See Nils Melzer, *Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009).

10 Taheri Shemirani, "The War of the Cities," in Farhang Rajaee (ed.), *The Iran-Iraq War: The Politics of Aggression* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 37.

11 Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 190.

12 Ibid., 58–86.

13 William Sherman, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2 (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1892), 126.

14 Quoted in Max Hastings, *Bomber Command* (New York: Dial Press, 1979), 43.

15 Quoted in Stephen Garrett, *Ethics and Airpower in World War II: The British Bombing of German Cities* (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 47.

16 Pape, *Bombing to Win*; Horowitz and Reiter, "When Does Aerial Bombing Work?"

17 Olson, *The Economics of the Wartime Shortage*.

18 Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 22, 23.

19 Olson, *The Economics of the Wartime Shortage*.

20 E.g., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).

21 Horowitz and Reiter, "When Does Aerial Bombing Work?"; Pape, *Bombing to Win*.

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24 Susan Allen, "The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, 6 (2008): 916–44.

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26 Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless?"; Kalyvas, "The Logic of Terrorism"; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence*; Matthew Kocher, Thomas Pepinsky, and Stathis Kalyvas, "Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War," *American Journal of Political Science* 55, 2 (2011): 201–218; Lyall, "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?"; and Downes, "Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves."

27 Pape, *Bombing to Win*.

28 Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). Wars divided into multiple conflicts include World War I (four); World War II (nine); Vietnam (two); and Persian Gulf (two).

29 Robustness tests using multinomial logit and binary logit (with draws coded as losses) are available in the supplemental information, posted online at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/downes. Results were substantively similar.

30 Dong Choon Kim, "Forgotten War, Forgotten Massacres—The Korean War (1950–1953) as Licensed Mass Killings," *Journal of Genocide Research* 6, 4 (2004): 523–544.

31 Conrad Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).

32 A table listing the belligerents that used civilian victimization in interstate wars, as well as the outcome of those wars, is available in the supplemental information.

33 Details on the Polity data are available at www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html.

34 Michael Desch, *Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).

35 Reiter and Stam, *Democracies at War*.

36 Regime type for coalitions was calculated by weighting each ally's Polity score by the percentage of military personnel it contributed to the coalition.

37 Page Fortna, "Where Have All the Victories Gone: War Outcomes in Historical Perspective" (unpublished manuscript, 2004).

38 Validating our decision to disaggregate the two types of civilian victimization, a dummy variable that combines them is positive and significant ($B = 0.71$, $p < 0.05$), which misleadingly suggests that all civilian victimization is effective.

39 Daniel E. Ho et al., "Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference," *Political Analysis* 15, 3 (2007): 199–236.

40 Downes, *Targeting Civilians*; Valentino, Huth, and Croco, "Covenants Without the Sword."

41 Downes, *Targeting Civilians*, 60.

42 To be used in matching, each of these variables must precede civilian targeting (they must be pretreatment). Military capabilities, regime type, and the year the war occurred are each obviously pretreatment. The attrition variable is not as straightforward because it is possible that civilian targeting could occur prior to a war becoming a war of attrition, but empirically this is rarely the case. Belligerents almost always become bogged down in wars of attrition first and then decide to target civilians (Downes, *Targeting Civilians*, 78–82).

43 Ho et al., "Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing."

44 Tables and graphs demonstrating the improvement in balance are available in the supporting information.

45 Although the coefficient is large, the substantive effect is small because the interactive term is measuring the joint effect of enemy democracy and coercive victimization. Because the effect of fighting an enemy democracy is large, the interactive coefficient is also large. When the coefficient for the interaction term is compared to the coefficient for the enemy democracy term, it becomes obvious that the difference is not statistically significant. A state is less likely to win if its adversary is a democracy—regardless of whether it engages in coercive victimization or not.
46 William Greene, *Econometric Analysis*, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2003); G.S. Maddala, *Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Charles Mallar, "The Estimation of Simultaneous Probability Models," *Econometrica* 45, 7 (1977): 1717–1722.
47 Larry Bartels, "Instrumental and 'Quasi-Instrumental' Variables," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, 3 (1991): 777–800; John Bound, David Jaeger, and Regina Baker, "Problems with Instrumental Variables Estimation When the Correlation between the Instruments and the Endogenous Explanatory Variables is Weak," *Journal of American Statistical Association* 90, 430 (1995): 443–450.
48 Downes, *Targeting Civilians*; Valentino, Huth, and Croco, "Covenants Without the Sword."
49 Quoted in Alistair Horne, *The Fall of Paris: The Siege and the Commune 1870–71* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 223.
50 Ibid., 239.
51 Goemans, *War and Punishment*, 106–115.
52 Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 129–131.
53 Scholars continue to debate the relative weight of these two factors. See, for example, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (ed.), *The End of the Pacific War: Reappraisals* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).
54 Avner Offer, *An Agrarian Interpretation of World War I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 72–78.
55 Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, 1 (1993): 27–47.
56 Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War*, 193.
57 Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 164.

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