her immigration to the United States. Although interesting on a personal level, these tangential topics often distract from the main topic of the book.

A Darkling Plain tries to provide a scholarly contribution to the literature on coping while also trying to give voice to those who have experienced traumatic events. Social scientists too often overlook the latter. Allowing for participants to speak on their behalf requires a deft touch, however, as it can lead a researcher to cross the line separating social science from journalism. Although it is enjoyable to read, *A Darkling Plain* does not successfully navigate this boundary.

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Dictators at War and Peace by Jessica L.P. Weeks. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2014. 264 pp. $24.95.

International relations scholars have traditionally characterized regime type as dichotomous: democracy versus nondemocracy. Nondemocracies are a diverse bunch, however, and recent research has begun to unpack this category and find some interesting and consequential variation. Jessica L.P. Weeks is at the forefront of this wave of scholarship.

In *Dictators at War and Peace*, Weeks categorizes authoritarian regimes based on whether leaders face domestic audiences that can hold them accountable for foreign policy failures—as in democracies—and whether leaders and audiences consist of civilian elites or military officers. Regimes in which leaders are vulnerable to removal fall into two types depending on whether both actors are civilians (*machines*) or military officers (*juntas*). Regimes in which leaders are immune from removal differ only in whether the leader has a civilian (*boss*) or military (*strongman*) background. Compared to machines and juntas, bosses and strongmen are more likely to go to war, more likely to lose those wars, but more likely to remain in power after defeat. Within the constrained and unconstrained categories, juntas and strongmen are somewhat more bellicose than their civilian-led counterparts owing to military officers' positive views on force.

The structural resemblance between elite constrained autocracies and democracies causes them to behave similarly. Weeks shows quantitatively that machines are no more likely than democracies to initiate militarized interstate disputes and that machines and juntas prevail in war at roughly the same rate as democracies. Leaders in these two regimes are also just as likely as democratic leaders to be removed for losing a war. In stark contrast, unconstrained bosses and strongmen start conflicts significantly more often than constrained regimes; they are less likely to win but more likely to survive defeat.

Dictators is an excellent book that constitutes a significant leap forward in the study of authoritarian regimes and international security. Importantly, the book reveals that not all dictators are alike. In fact, some are not dictators at all but rather face real constraints on their freedom of action. Others, by contrast, resemble the stereotypical despots who attack their neighbors on a whim but cling tenaciously to power even when crushed militarily. The book deserves to be read broadly in the academy and among policymakers. Its relevance for U.S. foreign policy is clear as the United States wrangles with several different types of authoritarian governments in China, Russia, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and elsewhere.

Weeks's theory, however, proves an awkward fit for some well-known cases because it insists that leaders in machines are removed only by other civilians, which neglects the possibility that civilian-led regimes could face military audiences. An important case of such a hybrid regime in the book is imperial Japan, where both the army and the navy under the Meiji Constitution could topple the government by having their respective ministers—who, by tradition (and sometimes law), had to be serving or retired military officers—resign. Civilian control of the military in Japan was also nonexistent, as officers on the Asian mainland repeatedly provoked and escalated military conflicts with China and the Soviet Union against the explicit orders of the government in Tokyo.

Weeks codes Japan in the 1930s first as a machine and later as a junta, but until 1941, Japan had a civilian-led government facing a military audience—which places it outside of her typology. Weeks's argument for the peacefulness of machines thus appears to rest on an unacknowledged assumption of strong civilian control of the military, which is not true of all machines. Civilian-led regimes that face military audiences—such as imperial Japan or Wilhelmine Germany—are probably more bellicose than those that face a civilian audience because the military audience may remove leaders who resist their aggressive plans, or the military is not subject to government control and is able to commit the state to conflict without clear regime approval.

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Divided Sovereignty: International Institutions and the Limits of State Authority by Carmen Pavel. New York, Oxford University Press, 2014. 240 pp. $74.00.

Carmen Pavel argues in this excellent study that states are not by themselves sufficient to guarantee protection of basic human rights. In this sense, the state is, as she puts it, an incomplete institutional form. Therefore, it is appropriate