PSC 8489
COERCION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Department of Political Science
The George Washington University

Fall 2021   Professor: Alexander B. Downes
Time: Tues., 12:45 – 3:15 p.m.   Office: 1957 E St. NW, #605B
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COURSE DESCRIPTION

One of the most basic questions in international relations is how do states get other states to do what they want? Possible methods of persuasion—listed roughly from least to most invasive/violent—include diplomacy and negotiations, statements or resolutions of condemnation, economic and diplomatic sanctions, militarized threats, covert intervention and other forms of subversion, low level uses of force (such as missile strikes or bombing campaigns), war, and remaking the target through foreign-imposed regime change or military occupation. This course looks at a set of tools known as coercion that fall in the intermediate range of potential options. Coercion is the manipulation of (mostly) costs and (to a lesser extent) benefits to influence a target's decision-making process in pursuit of some policy objective. Although coercion typically involves the threat or imposition of costs—or the capacity to thwart a target's ability to achieve its goals—it also entails reassurances, specifically a coercer's ability to credibly promise to refrain from (or stop) an action if the target complies with its demands. Coercion thus requires credibility of threats *and* promises.

This course evaluates the effectiveness of coercion for obtaining states' goals. It asks questions such as the following: what are the forms of coercion? What are the variables that coercers need to affect to change a target's decision calculus? How does deterrence work at the conventional and nuclear levels? Is the theory of mutual assured destruction (MAD)—which dominated the study of nuclear deterrence for decades—empirically valid? Is deterrence possible during ongoing wars, and if so how does it work? What are the different tools of compellence and how effective are they both in peacetime and in war? What are some non-traditional means of compellence and how well do they work?

The course is divided into three parts. In the first section, we examine the common framework of costs and benefits that characterizes both deterrence and compellence and then delve into the issue of credibility—a key ingredient of coercion. In the second section, we study the deterrence of conventional war, nuclear war, and escalation within war. This section is framed around a series of debates: what was the best method to deter a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe during the Cold War? How should scholars identify cases of conventional deterrence and how does that affect the results of important studies? And why did the United States and the Soviet Union zealously continue to pursue nuclear counterforce if MAD made victory impossible? We close the section on deterrence with an examination of the question of how to deter or prevent escalation during ongoing wars. The third section turns to the effectiveness of compellence, starting with traditional tools such as coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions, terrorism, and nuclear compellence before considering some newer methods, including compellence with people, compellence with words, coercion in cyberspace, and wrapping up with intrawar compellence.

WHAT WILL YOU LEARN?

Coercion is an important tool in relations among the great powers, between great and minor powers, among minor powers, between states and non-state actors, and by non-state actors against each other and against civilian populations. The United States, for example, has attempted coercive diplomacy more than twenty times since 1945. Washington has also taken to doling out sanctions like candy: according to figures cited by Daniel Drezner, the Obama administration sanctioned an average of 500 targets per year, a figure that doubled during the Trump administration. Yet coercion has also been at the heart of major contributions to the literature on civil war and terrorism, such as Stathis Kalyvas's book *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. The portability of the concept makes it an important one to understand for students of international relations and comparative politics.

1

After taking this class, students ought to be able to:

- Describe the basics of coercion and apply it in multiple settings
- Articulate some of the important historical and contemporary debates over the effectiveness of coercion
- Explain the methodological hurdles to determining the efficacy of coercion
- Explain why strong actors often fail to compel concessions from weaker actors
- Assess recent debates over what it takes to deter in the nuclear realm
- Explain how non-state actors employ coercion
- Understand the basics of coercion in cyberspace

HOW WILL I ASSESS YOUR LEARNING?

- **Research Paper (60%)**: The principal assignment in the course is an article length research paper that examines coercion broadly defined in some empirical domain. Journals vary greatly in their word limits, from roughly 8,000 at the low end (*Journal of Conflict Resolution*) to a high of 15,000 (*International Security*), but most fall in the 10,000 to 14,000-word range, which is a good range to shoot for. Papers could take the form of a case study of the effectiveness of deterrence or compellence in a single case or in multiple cases. Papers could also employ quantitative data to assess deterrence or compellence success. For the modelers among you, a paper that develops a formal model and assesses it empirically (along the lines of Todd Sechser's article "Goliath's Curse") is also acceptable. Whatever form your paper takes, it must ask a researchable question, assess the existing literature on your question, develop a theory or set of hypotheses to answer the question, and investigate those possible answers empirically. Students should consult with the instructor about their topic by the end of September—and sooner if possible.

- **Class Attendance and Participation (20%)**: Students are expected to attend every class session, do all of the required reading before class, and come prepared to discuss it. Missing more than one class session without an excuse will adversely affect the participation grade. Participation in discussion will be judged not only by the quantity of a student's remarks, but also by their quality.

- **Class Presentation (15%)**: Over the course of the semester, each student will present and critique one of the readings in class. These presentations should last roughly 10-15 minutes. No more than one-third of that time (and preferably less) should be devoted to summarizing the work in question. The principal task is to criticize. For example, is the theory logically flawed? Are there problems with the study's research design or methodology? Do the empirics (quantitative or qualitative) support the theory? Treat these presentations as if you are a discussant at a conference or workshop and the author is in the room.

- **Pre-Class Questions (5%)**: Students should also e-mail at least two questions on the week's readings to the instructor before midnight the evening before each class. Questions can address key themes, theoretical, empirical, or methodological shortcomings, relationships to other parts of the IR literature, etc.

WHAT WE'LL BE READING

1. Books

We will read large parts of the following books, which are available for purchase (or in some cases rental) through The George Washington University Bookstore; they may also be purchased from many online outlets. A copy of each has been placed on 2-hour reserve at Gelman Library. Books indicated by an asterisk (*) are available online through the GW Library.

Kelly M. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010).*

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).*

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).*

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).*

Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

2. Articles and Book Chapters

All of the journal articles listed below in the required reading, book chapters that are not in the required books, and readings listed as recommended in the main part of the syllabus are available online on the Blackboard site that has been established for the class. Click on "Blackboard" from the "My GW" page (http://my.gwu.edu), log in, go to the page for this class, and click on "Course Readings." There are folders for each class session; inside the folders, readings are listed by the author's last name.

COURSE CALENDAR

Part I. Introduction

1.	August 31	Course Introduction
2.	September 7	Coercion: Concepts and Frameworks
3.	September 14	Credibility and Reputation

Part II. Deterrence

4.	September 21	Conventional Deterrence
5.	September 28	Deterrence Debate 1: What is Deterrence and How Do You Measure It?
6.	October 5	Deterrence Debate 2: MAD
7.	October 12	Intrawar Deterrence

Part III. Compellence

8.	October 19	Compellent Threats and Coercive Diplomacy
9.	October 26	Economic Sanctions
10.	November 2	Terrorism
11.	November 9	Nuclear Compellence
12.	November 16	Compellence with People
13.	November 23	Coercion in Cyberspace
14.	November 30	Compellence with Words
15.	December 7	Intrawar Compellence

DETAILED COURSE SCHEDULE

Part I. Introduction

1. **Course Introduction**   **August 31**

   - No required readings

   <u>Recommended</u>

2. **Coercion: Concepts and Frameworks**   **September 7**

   <u>Required Reading</u>
   - Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), 3-40.
   - Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977), Chapter 2 (27-47).
   - Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), Chapters 1-2 (1-91).
   - Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, "Coercion: An Analytical Overview," in Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, eds., *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), Chapter 1 (3-32).
   - Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), Chapters 1-3.
   - Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke, eds., *Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Age of Complexity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), Chapters 1-2, 9.

   <u>Recommended Reading</u>
   - Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

3. **Credibility, Reputation, and Resolve**   **September 14**

   <u>Required Reading</u>
   - Max Fisher, "The Credibility Trap," Vox.com, April 29, 2016; an updated, abbreviated, version is available in The Interpreter Newsletter, *New York Times*, August 20, 2021. Both are posted.
   - Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Chapters 1-3.
   - Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), Introduction and Chapters 1-2.
   - Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), Introduction and Chapter 1.
     - If you don't own the book, you can get a flavor of the empirics in Daryl G. Press, "The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the 'Appeasement' Crises of the 1930s," *International Security* 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/05): 136-69.
   - Todd Sechser, "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power," *International Organization* 64, no. 4 (October 2010): 627-60.
   - Joshua D. Kertzer, *Resolve in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016), Chapters 1-2.

   <u>Recommended Reading</u>
   - For recent empirical assessments of the effects of reputation, see:
     - Todd S. Sechser, "Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62, no. 2 (2018): 318-45.
     - Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics," *International Organization* 69, no. 2 (March 2015): 473-95.

- Danielle L. Lupton, *Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2020).
- Keren Yarhi-Milo, *Who Fights for Reputation? The Psychology of Leaders in Conflict* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2018).
- Barbara F. Walter, *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

Part II. Deterrence

4. Conventional Deterrence   September 21

Required Reading
- John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), Chapter 2.
- Jonathan Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), Chapters 1-2.
- Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Active Denial: Redesigning Japan's Response to China's Military Challenge," *International Security* 42, no. 4 (Spring 2018): 128-69.
- John J. Mearsheimer, "Why the Soviets Can't Win Quickly in Central Europe," *International Security* 7, no. 1 (Summer 1982): 3-39.
- Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," *International Security* 8, no. 3 (Winter 1983/84): 32-56.
- Richard K. Betts, "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence," *World Politics* 37, no. 2 (January 1985): 153-79.

Recommended Reading
- Ian Bowers and Henrik Stålhane Hiim, "Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas: South Korea's Deterrence Strategy and Stability on the Korean Peninsula," *International Security* 45, no. 3 (Winter 2020/21): 7-39.

5. Deterrence Debate 1: What is Deterrence and How Do You Measure It?   September 28

Required Reading
- Read one of the following:
  - Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 496-526.
  - Paul K. Huth, "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 2 (June 1988): 423-43.
- Read one of the following:
  - Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," *World Politics* 42, no. 3 (April 1990): 336-69.
  - Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of the Social Issues* 43, no. 4 (Winter 1987): 5-71.
- Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," *World Politics* 42, no. 4 (July 1990): 466-501.
- James D. Fearon, "Selection Effects and Deterrence," *International Interactions* 28 (2002): 5-29.
- Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," *World Politics* 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 143-69.

6. Deterrence Debate 2: Is It a MAD World after All?   **October 5**
Special Guest: Prof. Charles Glaser, GWU

Required Reading
- Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly* 94, no. 4 (Winter 1979-1980): 617-33.
- Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,1989), Chapter 1 (1-45).
- Charles L. Glaser, *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), Chapter 2, especially 49-60.
- Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace: Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 38-78.
- Brendan Rittenhouse Green, *The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), Introduction and Chapters 1-3.
- Read one of the following:
  - Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy," *International Security* 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 7-44.
  - Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence," *International Security* 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 9-49.

Recommended Reading
- Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, *The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020).
- Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, "The MAD Who Wasn't There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance," *Security Studies* 26, no. 4 (2017): 606-41.
- Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, nos. 1-2 (2015): 38-73.
- Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, "Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China," *International Security* 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 49-98.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 3 (September 1990): 731-45.

7. Intrawar Deterrence   **October 12**

Required Reading
- John Ellis van Courtland Moon, "Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World War II Experience," *International Security* 8, no. 4 (Spring 1984): 3-35.
- Jeffrey Legro, *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), Chapter 3.
- Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Chapter 5.
- Austin Carson, *Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2018), Chapters 1-2.
- Caitlin Talmadge, "Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States," *International Security* 41, no. 4 (Spring 2017): 50-92.
- Caitlin Talmadge, "Emerging Technology and Intra-War Escalation Risks: Evidence from the Cold War, Implications for Today," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42, no. 6 (2019): 864-87.

Recommended Reading
- George H. Quester, *Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy* (New York: Wiley, 1966).
- Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks," *International Security* 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000): 85-115.

Part III. Compellence

8. Compellent Threats and Coercive Diplomacy   October 19

Required Reading
- Review Todd Sechser, "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power," *International Organization* 64, no. 4 (October 2010): 627-60.
- Todd S. Sechser, "A Bargaining Theory of Coercion," in Greenhill and Krause, eds., *Coercion*, Chapter 3.
- Phil Haun, *Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), Chapters 2-3.
- Dianne Pfundstein-Chamberlain, *Cheap Threats: Why the United States Struggles to Coerce Weak States* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), Introduction and Chapter 1.
- Robert J. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (USIP, 2003), 359-420.
- Joshua A. Schwartz and Christopher W. Blair, "Do Women Make More Credible Threats? Gender Stereotypes, Audience Costs, and Crisis Bargaining," *International Organization* 74, no. 4 (Fall 2020): 872-95.

Recommended Reading
- Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994).
- Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1991).
- Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978).

9. Economic Sanctions   October 26

Required Reading
- Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 90-137.
- Daniel Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," *International Organization* 57, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 643-59.
- Daniel W. Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapters 1-2.
- Thomas J. Biersteker, Marcos Tourinho, and Sue E. Eckert, "The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions," in Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Marcos Tourinho, eds., *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 220-47.
- Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion," *International Security* 44, no. 1 (Summer 2019): 42-79.
- Rosemary Kelanic, "The Petroleum Paradox: Oil, Coercive Vulnerability, and Great Power Behavior," *Security Studies* 25, no. 2 (2016): 181-213.

Recommended Reading
- Daniel W. Drezner, "The United States of Sanctions: The Use and Abuse of Economic Coercion," *Foreign Affairs* 100, no. 5 (September/October 2021): 142-54.
- Daniel W. Drezner, "Economic Sanctions in Theory and Practice: How Smart Are They?" in Greenhill and Krause, ed., *Coercion*, Chapter 12.
- Nicholas L. Miller, "The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions," *International Organization* 68, no. 4 (September 2014): 913-44.
- Gary Clyde Hufbauer, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007).

10. Terrorism   **November 2**

Required Reading
- Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 343-61.
- Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security* 31/2 (Fall 2006): 42-78.
- Max Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy," *International Security* 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008): 78-105.
- Peter Krause, "The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive Debate," *Security Studies* 22 (2013): 259-94.
- Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," *Rationality and Society* 11, no. 3 (1999): 243-85.
- Stathis N. Kalyvas, "The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War," *Journal of Ethics* 8, no. 1 (2004): 97-138.
- Virginia Page Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes," *International Organization* 69, no. 3 (June 2015): 519-56.

Recommended Reading
- Max Abrahms, *Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
- Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," *IS* 30/3 (Winter 2005/06): 87-123.
- Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

11. Nuclear Compellence   **November 9**

Required Reading
- Matthew Kroenig, "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes," *IO* 67/1 (Winter 2013): 141-171.
- Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2017).
- Alexander B. Downes, Charles L. Glaser, and Jasen J. Castillo, "Revisiting Nuclear Compellence: Explaining the Success and Failure of Nuclear Compellent Threats," unpublished paper, GWU and Texas A&M.

Recommended Reading
- Matthew Kroenig, *The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
- Matthew Kroenig, Todd Sechser, and Matthew Fuhrmann, "Debating the Benefits of Nuclear Superiority for Crisis Bargaining, Parts I-III," *Duck of Minerva*, March 25 and 28, 2013, http://duckofminerva.com/2013/03/debating-the-benefits-of-nuclear-superiority-part-iii.html.

12. Compellence with People   **November 16**

Required Reading
- Kelly M. Greenhill, *Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2010).
- In a very different vein: Jessica Chen Weiss, "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China," *International Organization* 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 1-35.

13. Coercion in Cyberspace   November 23
Special Guest: Prof. Fiona Cunningham, Univ. of Pennsylvania

Required Reading
- Jacquelyn G. Schneider, "Deterrence in and Through Cyberspace," in Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke, eds., *Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 95-120.
- Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace," *International Security* 41, no. 3 (Winter 2016/17): 44-71.
- Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, "The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace," *Security Studies* 26, no. 3 (2017): 452-81.
- Jon R. Lindsay, "Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare," *Security Studies* 22, no. 3 (2013): 365-404.
- Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, "Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace," *Security Studies* 24, no. 2 (2015): 316-48.
- Henry Farrell and Charles L. Glaser, "The Role of Effects, Saliencies, and Norms in U.S. Cyber Doctrine," *Journal of Cybersecurity* 3, no. 1 (2017): 7-17.
- Fiona S. Cunningham, paper TBD.

14. Compellence with Words: Naming and Shaming   November 30

Required Reading
- Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).
- Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *International Organization* 52, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 613-44.
- Ronald Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric," *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007): 35-66.
- Rochelle Terman, "Rewarding Resistance: Theorizing Defiance to International Shaming," Unpublished ms. University of Chicago, June 2019.

15. Intrawar Compellence   December 7

Required Reading
- Pape, *Bombing to Win*, Chapters 4-9.
- Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Chapter 4.
- Wyn Bowen, Jeffrey W. Knopf, and Matthew Moran, "The Obama Administration and Syrian Chemical Weapons: Deterrence, Compellence, and the Limits of the 'Resolve plus Bombs' Formula," *Security Studies* 29, no. 5 (2020): 797-831.
- Nadia Kostyuk and Yuri Zhukov, "Invisible Digital Front: Can Cyber Attacks Shape Battlefield Events," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 2 (2017): 317-47.
- Matthew Adam Kocher, Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War," *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 2 (April 2011): 201-18.
- Jason Lyall, "Bombing to Lose? Airpower, Civilian Casualties, and the Dynamics of Violence in Counterinsurgency Wars," unpublished ms., Dartmouth College, 2017.

Recommended Reading
- Daniel R. Lake, "The Limits of Coercive Airpower: NATO's Victory in Kosovo Revisited," *International Security* 34, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 83-112.
- Alexander B. Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2008).
- Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," *International Security* 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/03): 124-57.
- Wallace J. Thies, *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

EVALUATION PROCEDURES

It is unfortunate but true that I must assign a single letter grade that captures your entire performance in this class. Grades will be based on the following criteria.

Assignment	Percentage of Course Grade
Class Attendance and Participation	20%
Class Presentation	15%
Pre-Class Questions	5%
Research Paper	60%

GRADES

The grading scale below will be used to determine your final letter grade in the course.

Excellent	Good	Satisfactory	Fail
94-100: A	87-89: B+	77-79: C+	0-69: F
90-93: A-	84-86: B	74-76: C	
	80-83: B-	70-73: C-	

CLASS POLICIES AND UNIVERSITY RESOURCES

- **Attendance and Reading**: Students are expected to attend every class session, do all of the assigned reading before class, and come prepared to discuss it. Exceptions will of course be made for religious holidays (see "religious observances" below), illness, and other emergencies.

- **Blackboard**: Blackboard will be used for posting course files and assignments and for communicating with the class. You are already enrolled for this course on Blackboard if you have completed registration for the course. It is your responsibility to periodically check the course site (log in at http://blackboard.gwu.edu/ using your gwu.edu address) for updates to the syllabus/readings. The Official Blackboard Help Site, FAQs, and a variety of short video tutorials are available from Blackboard. Also, when logged in to Blackboard, check out the Student Guides section for links to helpful documentation. Additionally, students can contact the GW Division of IT at (202) 994-4948 for Blackboard assistance.

- **Civility**: I expect students in this class to treat each other with respect. That means, among other things, allowing others to speak no matter how much you disagree with what they are saying and refraining from interrupting. Please remain professional, respectful, and courteous at all times.

- **COVID-19**: In accordance with university policy and DC government rules, students must wear masks at all times in the classroom. The instructor is allowed to remove his or her mask if and only if all students are masked and the instructor remains six feet away from any student. Our classroom (1957 E St. NW, #313) is not large; it is arrayed in three rows of desks with seven seats in each row. I would prefer to remove my mask while teaching but will (1) see if this is possible given the room size and (2) what your preferences are on the matter. I am fully vaccinated, my spouse (who works from home) is as well, but my children are too young for the vaccines. They will be tested regularly at their school, however, which had zero cases of coronavirus last year.

- **Ideological Perspectives**: I do not care *what* you think, I care *that* you think. My mission is to get you to think critically about important issues in international security, not convince you that my view is right. There is no "approved solution" or "right" or "wrong" view in this class, only better or worse arguments. Good arguments require sound logic, solid evidence, and a consideration of alternative explanations.

- **Instructor Response Time**: I will endeavor to respond to email inquiries within 24 hours, except on weekends or holidays, when you can expect a response the next business day. I will do my best to return graded assignments within 1 week for short assignments and 2 weeks for longer ones.

- **Papers**. All papers turned in for this class must be double-spaced, have one-inch margins on all sides, include page numbers, be printed in 12-point font, and stapled. Late papers will be accepted up to 24 hours after the deadline, but one letter grade will be deducted. Papers that are more than 24 hours late will not be accepted. Exceptions will be made only in cases of illness or personal/family emergency; if you find yourself in such a situation, please consult the instructor as soon as is feasible to make arrangements for an extension.

- **Plagiarism, Cheating, and Academic Integrity**: According to the university's Code of Academic Integrity, "Academic dishonesty is defined as cheating of any kind, including misrepresenting one's own work, taking credit for the work of others without crediting them and without appropriate authorization, and the fabrication of information." The rest of the code is available at https://studentconduct.gwu.edu/. In general, I expect that you will not lie, cheat, steal, or otherwise conduct yourselves dishonorably, and will do something if you observe others engaging in such conduct. All work you submit for this course must be your own, and must be completed in accordance with the GWU Code of Academic Integrity. **I will not tolerate any form of academic dishonesty**. Suspected cases will be referred to the Office of Academic Integrity. If you have questions about what constitutes proper use of published or unpublished sources, please ask the instructor. For more information see Academic Dishonesty Prevention.

UNIVERSITY POLICIES, RESOURCES, AND SERVICES

- **Copyright Policy Statement**: Materials used in connection with this course may be subject to copyright protection under Title 17 of the United States Code. Under certain Fair Use circumstances specified by law, copies may be made for private study, scholarship, or research. Electronic copies should not be shared with unauthorized users. If a user fails to comply with Fair Use restrictions, he/she may be liable for copyright infringement. For more information, including Fair Use guidelines, see Libraries and Academic Innovations Copyright page.

- **Disabilities**: If you may need disability accommodations based on the potential impact of a disability, please register with Disability Support Services (DSS) at disabilitysupport.gwu.edu/registration. If you have questions about disability accommodations, contact DSS at 202-994-8250 or dss@gwu.edu or visit them in person in Rome Hall, Suite 102. For additional information see: disabilitysupport.gwu.edu

  For information about how the course technology is accessible to all learners, see the following resources:

  - Blackboard accessibility
  - Kaltura (video platform) accessibility.

- **Emergency Preparedness and Response Procedures**: The University has asked all faculty to inform students of these procedures, prepared by the GW Office of Public Safety and Emergency Management in collaboration with the Office of the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs.

  To Report an Emergency or Suspicious Activity: Call the University Police Department at 202-994-6111 (Foggy Bottom) or 202-242-6111 (Mount Vernon).

  Shelter in Place, General Guidance: Although it is unlikely that we will ever need to shelter in place, it is helpful to know what to do just in case. No matter where you are, the basic steps of shelter in place will generally remain the same.

  - If you are inside, stay where you are unless the building you are in is affected. If it is affected, you should evacuate. If you are outdoors, proceed into the closest building or follow instructions from emergency personnel on the scene.
  - Locate an interior room to shelter inside. If possible, it should be above ground level and have the fewest number of windows. If sheltering in a room with windows, move away from the windows. If there is a large group of people inside a particular building, several rooms may be necessary.
  - Shut and lock all windows (for a tighter seal) and close exterior doors.

- Turn off air conditioners, heaters, and fans. Close vents to ventilation systems as you are able. (University staff will turn off ventilation systems as quickly as possible).
- Make a list of the people with you and ask someone to call the list in to UPD so they know where you are sheltering and who is with you. If only students are present, one of the students should call in the list.
- Await further instructions. If possible, visit GW Campus Advisories for incident updates or call the GW Information Line 202-994-5050.
- Make yourself comfortable and look after one other. You will get word as soon as it is safe to come out.

Evacuation: An evacuation will be considered if the building we are in is affected or we must move to a location of greater safety. We will always evacuate if the fire alarm sounds. In the event of an evacuation, please gather your personal belongings quickly (purse, keys, GWorld card, etc.) and proceed to the nearest exit. Every classroom has a map at the door designating both the shortest egress and an alternate egress. Anyone who is physically unable to walk down the stairs should wait in the stairwell, behind the closed doors. Firemen will check the stairwells upon entering the building. Once you have evacuated the building, proceed to our primary rendezvous location: Rawlins Park, the green space across E Street from the Elliott School. From our rendezvous location, we will await instructions to re-enter the School.

Alert DC: Alert DC provides free notification by e-mail or text message during an emergency. Visit GW Campus Advisories for a link and instructions on how to sign up for alerts pertaining to GW. If you receive an Alert DC notification during class, you are encouraged to share the information immediately.

GW Alert: GW Alert provides popup notification to desktop and laptop computers during an emergency. In the event that we receive an alert to the computer in our classroom, we will follow the instructions given. You are also encouraged to download this application to your personal computer. Visit GW Campus Advisories to learn how.

Additional Information: Additional information about emergency preparedness and response at GW or the University's operating status can be found on GW Campus Advisories or by calling the GW Information Line at 202-994-5050.

- **GW Acceptable Use for Computing Systems and Services**: All members of the George Washington University must read and comply with the Acceptable Use Policy when accessing and using computing systems and services, including email and Blackboard. Please read the Acceptable Use Policy to familiarize yourself with how GW information systems are to be used ethically.

- **Incomplete Grades**: At the option of the instructor, an Incomplete may be given for a course if a student, for reasons beyond the student's control, is unable to complete the work of the course, and if the instructor is informed of, and approves, such reasons before the date when grades must be reported. An Incomplete can only be granted if the student's prior performance and class attendance in the course have been satisfactory. Any failure to complete the work of a course that is not satisfactorily explained to the instructor before the date when grades must be turned in will be graded F, Failure.

  If acceptable reasons are later presented to the instructor, the instructor may initiate a grade change to the symbol I, Incomplete. The work must be completed within the designated time period agreed upon by the instructor, student, and school, but no more than *one semester* from the end of the semester in which the course was taken. A completed and signed Incomplete Contract, with approval from the Director of Graduate Studies, should be submitted to the CCAS Office of Graduate Studies. All students who receive an Incomplete must maintain active student status during the subsequent semester(s) in which the work of the course is being completed. If not registered in other classes during this period, the student must register for continuous enrollment status. For more information regarding Incompletes please review the relevant sections in the University Bulletin:

  - http://bulletin.gwu.edu/university-regulations/#graduatetext

- **Mental Health**: The University's Mental Health Services offers 24/7 assistance and referral to address students' personal, social, career, and study skills problems. Services for students include: crisis and emergency mental health consultations confidential assessment, counseling services (individual and small group), and referrals. For additional information call 202-994-5300 or see: counselingcenter.gwu.edu/.

- **Religious Observances**: In accordance with University policy, students should notify faculty during the first week of the semester of their intention to be absent from class on their day(s) of religious observance. For details and policy, see: registrar.gwu.edu/university-policies#holidays.

- **Sharing of Course Content**: Unauthorized downloading, distributing, or sharing of any part of a recorded lecture or course materials, as well as using provided information for purposes other than the student's own learning may be deemed a violation of GW's Student Conduct Code.

- **Use of Student Work**: The professor will use academic work that you complete during this semester for educational purposes in this course during this semester. Your registration and continued enrollment constitute your consent.

- **Workload Expectation Statement**: PSC 8489 meets for two hours and thirty minutes once per week. Over the course of the semester, students will spend roughly 35 hours in the classroom. Weekly assignments—mostly reading, but also the research paper—are expected to take up, on average, 7 to 10 hours per week. At a minimum, therefore, students will spend roughly 100-140 hours over the course of the semester (and possibly more) preparing for class.

APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL READING ON SELECTED TOPICS COVERED IN CLASS

To conserve on space, in this appendix I use a short hand notation for journal titles:

AJPS	American Journal of Political Science
APSR	American Political Science Review
ARPS	Annual Review of Political Science
BJPS	British Journal of Political Science
CMPS	Conflict Management and Peace Science
EJIR	European Journal of International Relations
FA	Foreign Affairs
FP	Foreign Policy
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
IS	International Security
ISP	International Studies Perspectives
ISQ	International Studies Quarterly
JCR	Journal of Conflict Resolution
JOP	Journal of Politics
JPR	Journal of Peace Research
JSS	Journal of Strategic Studies
POP	Perspectives on Politics
PSQ	Political Science Quarterly
RIS	Review of International Studies
SS	Security Studies
TPV	Terrorism and Political Violence
WP	World Politics

Reputation, Credibility, and Threats

Reputation and Credibility
- Danielle L. Lupton, *Reputation for Resolve: How Leaders Signal Determination in International Politics* (Cornell UP, 2020).
- Ryan Brutger and Joshua D. Kertzer, "A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs," *IO* 72/3 (Summer 2018): 693-724.
- Jonathan Renshon, Allan Dafoe, and Paul Huth, "Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics," *AJPS* 62/2 (April 2018): 325-39.
- Keren Yarhi-Milo, *Who Fights for Reputation? The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict* (Princeton, 2018).
- Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics," *IO* 69/2 (March 2015): 473-95.
- Barbara F. Walter, *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts are So Violent* (Cambridge, 2009).
- Vaughn P. Shannon and Michael Dennis, "Militant Islam and the Futile Fight for Reputation," *SS* 16/2 (April-June 2007): 287-317.
- Mark J. C. Crescenzi, "Reputation and Interstate Conflict (Friends and Foes)," *AJPS* 51/2 (2007): 382-96.
- Mark J. C. Crescenzi, Jacob Kathman, Stephen Gent, "Reputation, History and War: The Competing Pressures of Escalation and Settlement," *JPR* 44/6 (2007): 651-68.
- Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Cornell, 2005).
- Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Cornell, 1996).

Compellence and Military Coercion
- Rosemary A. Kelanic, *Black Gold and Blackmail: Oil and Great Power Politics* (Cornell, 2020).
- Ketian Zhang, "Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea," *IS* 44/1 (Summer 2019): 117-59.

- Bryan R. Early and Marcus Schulzke, "Still Unjust, Just in Different Ways: How Targeted Sanctions Fall Short of Just War Theory's Principles," *ISR* 21 (2019): 57-80.
- Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause, *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics* (Oxford, 2018).*
- Jason Lyall, "Bombing to Lose? Airpower, Civilian Casualties, and the Dynamics of Violence in Counterinsurgency Wars," unpublished ms., Dartmouth College, 2017.
- Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (Princeton, 2017).*
- Tristan Volpe, "Atomic Leverage: Compellence with Nuclear Latency," *SS* 27/3 (2017): 517-44.
- Virginia Page Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes," *IO* 69/3 (June 2015): 519-56.*
- Navin A. Bapat and Bo Ram Kwan, "When Are Sanctions Effective? A Bargaining and Enforcement Framework," *IO* 69/1 (Winter 2015): 131-62.
- Or Rabinowitz and Nicholas L. Miller, "Keeping the Bombs in the Basement: U.S. Nonproliferation Policy toward Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan," *IS* 40/1 (Summer 2015): 47-86.
- Gene Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions," *IS* 39/4 (Spring 2015): 91-129.
- Nicholas Miller, "The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions," *IO* 68/4 (Fall 2014): 913-44.
- Matthew Kroenig, "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes," *IO* 67/1 (Winter 2013): 141-171.
- Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail," *IO* 67/1 (Winter 2013): 173-95.*
- Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "Reinterpreting Libya's WMD Turnaround: Bridging the Carrot-Coercion Divide," *JSS* 35/4 (2012): 489-512.
- Daniel W. Drezner, "Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice," *International Studies Review* 13 (2011): 96-108.
- Alexander B. Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran, "Targeting Civilians to Win? Assessing the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization in Interstate War," in *Rethinking Violence: States and Non-State Actors in Conflict*, ed. Adria Lawrence and Erika Chenoweth (MIT, 2010), 23-56.*
- Dursun Peksen, "Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights," *JPR* 46/1 (January 2009): 59-77.
- Todd Sechser, "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power," *IO* 64 (Fall 2010): 627-60.*
- Reed M. Wood, "'A Hand Upon the Throat of the Nation': Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001," *ISQ* 52/3 (September 2008): 489-513.
- Alexander B. Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War* (Cornell, 2008).*
- Bruce W. Jentleson and Christopher A. Whytock, "Who 'Won' Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy," *IS* 30/3 (Winter 2005/06): 47-86.*
- Nikolay Marinov, "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" *AJPS* 49/3 (July): 564-76.
- Solomon Major and Anthony J. McGann, "Caught in the Crossfire: 'Innocent Bystanders' as Optimal Targets of Economic Sanctions," *JCR* 43/3 (June 2005): 337-59.
- Robert A. Pape, "The True Worth of Air Power," *FA* 83/2 (March/April 2004): 116-30.
- Daniel Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," *IO* 57/3 (Summer 2003): 643-59.*
- Andrew L. Stigler, "A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO's Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo," *IS* 27/3 (Winter 2002/03): 124-57.
- Jonathan Kirshner, "Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art," *SS* 11/4 (Summer 2002): 160-79.
- Risa A. Brooks, "Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?" *SS* 11/4 (Summer 2002): 1-50.
- Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might* (Cambridge, 2002).
- Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," *IS* 26/2 (Fall 2001): 5-44.
- Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate," *IS* 24/4 (Spring 2000): 5-38.
- John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23/1 (March 2000): 163-87; or "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," *FA* 78/3 (May/June 1999): 43-53.

- Daniel Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (Cambridge, 1999).
- Karl Mueller, "Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power," *SS* 7/3 (Spring 1998): 182-228.*
- Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work," *IS* 23/1 (Summer 1998): 66-77.
- Kimberly Ann Elliott, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?" *IS* 23/1 (Summer 1998): 50-65.
- Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *IS* 22/2 (Fall 1997): 90-137.*
- T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," *ISQ* 41/1 (March 1997): 27-50.
- Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: International Institute for Economics, 1990).
- Wallace J. Thies, *When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).
- Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale, 1966).*
- Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Harvard, 1960).*

Deterrence, General
- Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, eds., *Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity* (Oxford, 2019).
- Roseanne W. McManus, "Making it Personal: The Role of Leader-Specific Signals in Extended Deterrence," *JOP* 80/3 (July 2018): 982-95.
- Ron Gurantz and Alexander V. Hirsch, "Fear, Appeasement, and the Effectiveness of Deterrence," *JOP* 79/3 (July 2017): 1041-56.
- Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Compellence in the Gulf, 1990-1991: A Failed or Impossible Task?" *IS* 17/2 (Fall 1992): 147-79.
- John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence* (Ithaca, 1983).*
- Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977).*
- Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Columbia, 1974).
- Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security* (Princeton, 1961).

Deterrence Debates
- Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference," *WP* 42/4 (July 1990): 466-501.
- Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," *WP* 42/3 (April 1990): 336-69.
- "The Rational Deterrence Debate: A Symposium," *WP* 41/2 (January 1989): 143-237.*
- Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (Yale, 1988).
- Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," *Journal of Social Issues* 43/4 (1987): 5-71.*
- Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980," *WP* 36/4 (July 1984): 496-526.*

Nuclear Deterrence
- Keir Lieber and Daryl G. Press, *The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age* (Cornell, 2020).
- Brendan R. Green, *The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War* (Cambridge, 2020).
- Brendan R. Green and Austin Long, "The MAD Who Wasn't There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance," *SS* 26/4 (2017): 606-41.
- Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence," *IS* 41/4 (Spring 2017): 9-49.

- Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, "Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy toward China," IS 41/1 (Summer 2016): 49-98.
- Robert Powell, "Nuclear Brinksmanship, Limited War, and Military Power," *IO* 69/3 (Summer 2015): 589-626.
- Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy," *JSS* 38/1-2 (2015): 38-73.*
- Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "Why States Won't Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists," *IS* 38/1 (Summer 2013): 80-104.
- Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton, 2013).*
- Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age* (Cornell, 2012).
- M. Taylor Favel and Evan S. Madeiros, "China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure," *IS* 35/2 (Fall 2010): 48-87.
- Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability," *IS* 34/3 (Winter 2009/10): 38-78.*
- Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945* (Cambridge, 2008).*
- Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy," *IS* 30/4 (Spring 2006): 7-44.*
- Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
- Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *IO* 53/3 (Summer 1999): 433-68.*
- Barry R. Posen, "U.S. Security Policy in a Nuclear-Armed World; Or: What if Iraq had had Nuclear Weapons?" *SS* 6/3 (Spring 1997): 1-31.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *APSR* 84/3 (September 1990): 731-45.*
- Charles L. Glaser, *Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy* (Princeton, 1990).*
- Robert Powell, *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility* (Cambridge, 1990).
- Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Cornell, 1989).*
- John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," *IS* 13/2 (Fall 1988): 55-79.
- Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment," *IS* 13/2 (Fall 1988): 80-90.
- Richard K. Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Brookings, 1987).
- John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," *IS* 10/4 (Spring 1986): 99-142.*
- Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Cornell, 1984).
- Fred Kaplan, *The Wizards of Armageddon* (Stanford, 1983).
- Colin S. Gray, "Victory is Possible," *FP* 39 (Summer 1980): 14-27.
- Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *PSQ* 94/4 (Winter 1979/80): 617-33.*
- Paul H. Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," *FP* 25 (Winter 1976/77): 195-210.
- Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *FA* 37 (January 1959): 209-34.*
- Bernard Brodie, *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (Harcourt, Brace, 1946).*

Terrorism

- Max Abrahms, *Rules for Rebels: The Science of Victory in Militant History* (Oxford, 2018).
- Max Abrahms and Justin Conrad, "The Strategic Logic of Credit Claiming: A New Theory for Anonymous Terrorist Attacks," *SS* 27/2 (2017): 279-304.
- David B. Carter, "Provocation and the Strategy of Terrorist and Guerrilla Attacks," *IO* 70/1 (Winter 2016): 133-73.
- Daniel Byman, "Understanding the Islamic State—A Review Essay," *IS* 40/4 (Spring 2016): 127-65.
- Virginia Page Fortna, "Do Terrorists Win? Rebels' Use of Terrorism and Civil War Outcomes," *IO* 69/3 (June 2015): 519-56.*

- Max Abrahms and Philip B.K. Potter, "Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics," *IO* 69/2 (March 2015): 311-42.
- Anna Getmansky and Thomas Zeitzoff, "Terrorism and Voting: The Effect of Rocket Threat on Voting in Israeli Elections," *APSR* 108/3 (August 2014): 588-604.
- Max Abrahms and Matthew S. Gottfried, "Does Terrorism Pay? An Empirical Analysis," *TPV* (2014).
- Jacob N. Shapiro, *The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations* (Princeton, 2013).*
- Matthew C. Wilson and James A. Piazza, "Autocracies and Terrorism: Conditioning Effects of Authoritarian Regime Type on Terrorist Attacks," *AJPS* 57/4 (October 2013): 941-55.
- Peter Krause, "The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive Debate," *SS* 22/2 (2013): 259-94.*
- Dennis Aksoy, David B. Carter, and Joseph Wright, "Terrorism in Dictatorships," *JOP* 74/3 (July 2012): 810-26.
- Michael G. Findley, James A. Piazza, and Joseph K. Young, "Games Rivals Play: Terrorism in International Rivalries," *JOP* 74/1 (January 2012): 235-48.
- Jose G. Montalvo, "Reexamining the Evidence on the Electoral Impact of Terrorist Attacks: The Spanish Election of 2004," *Electoral Studies* 31/1 (March 2012): 96-106.
- Jose G. Montalvo, "Voting after the Bombings: A Natural Experiment on the Effects of Terrorist Attacks on Democratic Elections," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 93/4 (2011): 1146-54.
- Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Organizations* (Princeton, 2011).
- Eli Berman, *Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism* (MIT, 2011).
- Michael C. Horowitz, "Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism," *IO* 64 (Winter 2010): 33-64.
- Erika Chenoweth, "Democratic Competition and Terrorist Activity," *JOP* 72/1 (January 2010): 16-30.
- James A. Piazza, "Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous? An Empirical Study of Group Ideology, Organization, and Goal Structure," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21/1 (2009): 62-88.
- "Terrorism: New Research," Special Issue of *SS*, 18/4 (2009).
- Assaf Moghadam, "Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks," *IS* 33/3 (Winter 2009): 46-78.*
- Assaf Moghadam, *The Globalization of Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks* (Johns Hopkins, 2008).
- Alan B. Krueger, *What Makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton, 2008).
- Max Abrahms, "What Terrorists Really Want," *IS* 32/4 (Spring 2008): 78-105.*
- James A. Piazza, "A Supply-Side View of Suicide Terrorism: A Cross-National Study," *JOP* 70/1 (January 2008): 28-39.
- Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (UPenn, 2008).
- Martha Crenshaw, "Explaining Suicide Terrorism: A Review Essay," *SS* 16/1 (January 2007): 133-62.
- Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *IS* 31/2 (Fall 2006): 42-78.*
- Assaf Moghadam, "Suicide Terrorism, Occupation, and the Globalization of Martyrdom: A Critique of Dying to Win," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29/8 (December 2006): 707-29.*
- Scott Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," *Washington Quarterly* 29/2 (Spring 2006): 127-47.
- Audrey Kurth Cronin, "How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups," *IS* 31/1 (Spring 2006): 7-48.
- Bruce Hoffmann, *Inside Terrorism*, rev. and expanded ed. (Columbia, 2006).*
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