

**PSC 8452**  
**THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**  
Department of Political Science  
*The George Washington University*

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Spring 2021  
Time: Tues., 12:45 – 3:15 p.m.  
Room: Remote Instruction  
Office Hours: W, 3:30 p.m. – 5:30 p.m.

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## **COURSE DESCRIPTION**

*Theories of International Security* is a seminar designed to introduce you to enduring and contemporary theoretical and empirical questions in international security, a field that has traditionally been defined as encompassing the threat, use, and control of military force by states to achieve their political and military objectives. The course is intended to follow PSC 8441, *Advanced Theories of International Relations*, and assumes students are familiar with the content of that course.

The course has four major goals: (1) to understand the major theoretical perspectives or paradigms in international security studies; (2) to survey some of the most important substantive areas and debates in the field with an emphasis on recent contributions; (3) to apply theories and arguments from the academic literature to contemporary policy problems; and (4) to help political science Ph.D. students prepare for preliminary exams.

The course is loosely divided into two parts. The first half of the course focuses on the major theoretical traditions in IR—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—as applied to international security. We will read contemporary statements of each of these perspectives and two extensions: (1) the bargaining model of war, an offshoot of neorealism that has gained prominence since the mid-1990s; and (2) the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes, the flip side of liberalism’s focus on democratic/republican regimes. In the second part of the course, the focus shifts to important substantive questions in international security, such as reputation and the credibility of compellent and deterrent threats; military coercion; military effectiveness; military intervention; and nuclear proliferation.

This course is by no means a comprehensive overview of the international security studies literature. Compared to European approaches, it is rather narrow and reflects an American bias; compared to syllabi of scholars trained in earlier generations, however, it is relatively broad. Many important topics and debates are not covered. The course attempts both to introduce students to the big theoretical traditions/paradigms that have long dominated the sub-field in the United States and cover a selection of recent contributions that have made an impact on the field and how we think about international security. Students are encouraged to consult the appendices to the syllabus for additional readings on topics covered—and not covered—in the course.

## **WHAT WILL YOU LEARN?**

After taking this course, students should:

- Possess a solid grasp of the major theoretical traditions in international security, and be able to assess their strengths and weaknesses
- Understand debates about the role of structure in shaping state behavior
- Be familiar with debates about the role of regime type in security studies
- Understand how international institutions and economic interdependence affect security outcomes
- Understand the bargaining approach to war
- Have a good understanding of debates about the role of reputation and sources of credibility in IR
- Understand the coercive strategies available to states and non-state actors in wartime, as well as the efficacy of these strategies
- Understand the determinants of victory in crises, battles, and wars
- Understand the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation
- Be able to make policy recommendations based on theories in different topics in security
- Have a solid foundation for studying for comprehensive exams

## HOW WILL I ASSESS YOUR LEARNING?

Students are bound to have different levels of interest in the subject matter of this course. Some of you will go on to write dissertations in international security. Others may be more interested in IPE or institutions, and for still others IR is a second field and you need to take this course to pass the minor comprehensive exam. With that in mind, students can pursue two different sets of assignments: (1) three short papers, or (2) a lengthier literature review.

### Track I

- **Three Analytical Papers** (25% each): 5-7 double-spaced pages, due electronically by the beginning of Class #5 (February 9), Class #9 (March 9), and Class #14 (April 13). Questions will be distributed on Blackboard one week before each paper is due. You may be asked to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of a theory discussed in class or in the readings, compare the explanatory power of two or more theories, apply theories to a case, or use theories to analyze a current policy problem and make policy recommendations based on your analysis. Readings beyond those assigned for class are not required to complete these papers.

### Track II

- **Literature Review** (75%): c. 20 pages, due electronically by 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, May 4. Students must meet with the instructor to discuss their paper topic, ideally by early February. Papers should critically engage a question, subject, or literature of the student's choice in the field of international security. The required readings can serve as the core of the literature that is analyzed, but students will be expected to read well beyond them. All papers should summarize and organize the literature under discussion; identify the theoretical/empirical questions it attempts to answer; explain key concepts and arguments; discuss some of the major theoretical and empirical contributions; locate logical flaws, empirical or methodological shortcomings, and unanswered questions; suggest ways to repair those shortcomings or answer those unanswered questions; and suggest directions for future research. Alternative hypotheses, potential sources of additional data, or new research designs and strategies should be explored. Papers should also evaluate the extent to which research in the area is progressing or digressing.

### Tracks I & II

- **Class Attendance, Participation, Pre-Class Questions, and Presentation** (25%)
  - Students are expected to attend every class session, do all of the required reading before class, and come prepared to discuss it. Missing more than one class session without an excuse will adversely affect the participation grade. Participation in discussion will be judged not only by the quantity of a student's remarks, but also by their quality.
  - Students should also e-mail at least two questions on the week's readings to the instructor the evening before each class. Questions can address key themes, theoretical, empirical, or methodological shortcomings, relationships to other parts of the IR literature, etc.
  - Over the course of the semester, each student will present and critique one of the readings in class. These presentations should last roughly 10-15 minutes. No more than one-third of that time should be devoted to summarizing the work in question. The principal task is to criticize. For example, is the theory logically flawed? Are there problems with the study's research design or methodology? Do the empirics (quantitative or qualitative) support the theory? Treat these presentations as if you are a discussant at a conference or workshop and the author is in the room.

## WHAT WE'LL BE READING

### 1. Books

We will read large parts of the following books, which are available for purchase (or in some cases rental) through The George Washington University Bookstore; they may also be purchased from many online outlets. A copy of each has been placed on 2-hour reserve at Gelman Library. Books indicated by an asterisk (\*) are available online through the GW Library.

Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).\*

Dale C. Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2014).\*

Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010).\*

Daniel Krmaric, *The Justice Dilemma: Leaders and Exile in an Era of Accountability* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2020).

John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton, 2001).

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).\*

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).\*

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

Jessica L. P. Weeks, *Dictators at War and Peace* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014).\*

## 2. Articles and Book Chapters

All of the journal articles listed below in the required reading, book chapters that are not in the required books, and readings listed as recommended in the main part of the syllabus are available online on the Blackboard site that has been established for the class. Click on “Blackboard” from the “My GW” page (<http://my.gwu.edu>), log in, go to the page for this class, and click on “Course Readings.” There are folders for each class session; inside the folders, readings are listed by the author’s last name.

To conserve on space, I have used a short hand notation for journal titles:

AJPS	American Journal of Political Science
APSR	American Political Science Review
ARPS	Annual Review of Political Science
BJPS	British Journal of Political Science
CMPS	Conflict Management and Peace Science
EJIR	European Journal of International Relations
FA	Foreign Affairs
FP	Foreign Policy
IO	International Organization
IR	International Relations
IS	International Security
ISP	International Studies Perspectives
ISQ	International Studies Quarterly
JCR	Journal of Conflict Resolution
JOP	Journal of Politics
JPR	Journal of Peace Research
JSS	Journal of Strategic Studies
POP	Perspectives on Politics
PSQ	Political Science Quarterly
RIS	Review of International Studies
SS	Security Studies
TPV	Terrorism and Political Violence
WP	World Politics

## GUIDE TO THE READINGS

This syllabus is designed in large part as a study aid for graduate students preparing for preliminary exams. To that end, I have included a few recommended readings for each week plus a substantial amount of additional reading for each topic (and several additional topics) in two appendices at the end of the syllabus. Neither the recommended reading for each week nor the additional readings in the appendices is required for class. However, the recommended and additional readings may prove helpful in getting started on literature review papers. In general, additional readings are listed in reverse chronological order, with the most important selections marked with an asterisk. To construct this list of readings, I have drawn heavily on resources that students studying for prelims may wish to consult, especially the syllabus for “International Security: A Survey of the Field,” by Ronald Krebs at the University of Minnesota (<https://www.ronkrebs.com/teaching>). Another valuable resource is Jack Levy’s lengthy syllabus (currently 137 pages) for “Theories of War and Peace” at Rutgers/Columbia (<http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/courses.html>).

## COURSE CALENDAR

1. January 12 Course Introduction

### Part I. Broad Theoretical Traditions Applied to Security

2. January 19 Neorealism, Offensive Realism...and Structural Constructivism?
3. January 26 Defensive and Neoclassical Realism
4. February 2 Realist Extension: Bargaining and War
5. February 9 Institutionalism
6. February 16 Economic Interdependence
7. February 23 Democratic Peace and Audience Costs
8. March 2 Domestic Politics Extension: Authoritarian Regimes and War
9. March 9 Norms, Culture, and Force
10. March 16 *No Class: Spring Break*

### Part II. Selected Topics in Security

11. March 23 Reputation, Credibility, and Threats
12. March 30 Military Coercion
13. April 6 Military Effectiveness
14. April 13 Military Intervention
15. April 20 Nuclear Proliferation

## DETAILED COURSE SCHEDULE

### Part I. Broad Theoretical Traditions Applied to Security

#### 1. Course Introduction

January 12

- No required readings

##### Recommended

- Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *ISQ* 35/2 (June 1991): 211-39.
- Edward Kolodziej, "Renasissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!" *ISQ* 36/4 (December 1992): 421-38.
- David A. Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," *WP* 48/1 (October 1995): 117-41.
- Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Chapters 1 and 7.

#### 2. Neorealism and Offensive Realism

January 19

##### Required Reading

- Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, particularly Chapters 4-9.
- Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, particularly Chapters 1-3, 5, 8-9.
- William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," *IS* 24/1 (Summer 1999): 5-41.

##### Recommended Reading

- Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *SS* 5/3 (Spring 1996): 90-121.
- Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," *IO* 51/3 (Summer 1997): 445-77.
- Colin Elman, "Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional Hegemony," *APSR* 98/4 (November 2004): 563-76.
- William C. Wohlforth, "Gilpinian Realism and International Relations," *IR* 25/4 (2011): 499-511.

#### 3. Defensive, Motivational, and Neoclassical Realism, and...Structural Constructivism?

January 26

##### Required Reading

- Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *WP* 30/2 (January 1978): 167-214.
- Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics*, Chapters 1-3, 5-6, 9, and pp. 93-102.
- Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *IO* 46/2 (Spring 1992): 391-425.
- Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Cornell, 1991), Chapters 1-2.
- Randall L. Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing," *IS* 29/4 (Fall 2004): 159-201.
- Kevin Narizny, "On Systemic Paradigms and Domestic Politics: A Critique of the Newest Realism," *IS* 42/2 (Fall 2017): 155-90.

##### Recommended Reading

- Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge UP, 1999).
- Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" *IS* 22/4 (Spring 1998): 44-82.
- Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," *IO* 51/3 (Summer 1997): 445-77.
- Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *SS* 7/1 (Autumn 1997): 114-54.

- Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *IS* 19/1 (Summer 1994): 72-107.
- Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” *IS* 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 50-90.
- Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).
- Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell UP, 1987), Chapters 1-2.
- Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” *IS* 9/1 (Summer 1984): 58-108.
- Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976), 58-113 (Chapter 3: “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary”).

#### 4. Realist Extension: Bargaining and War

February 2

- James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” *IO* 49/3 (Summer 1995): 379-414.
- Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” *IO* 60/1 (Winter 2006): 169-203. A friendly amendment and reduction of Fearon’s three rationalist explanations to two.

##### Applications of the Bargaining Model (read Weisiger and one other of your choice)

- Alex Weisiger, *Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts* (Cornell, 2013), Introduction and Chapter 1.
- James D. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” *JPR* 41/3 (May 2004): 275-302.
- Ron Hassner, “To Halve and Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility,” *SS* 12/4 (Summer 2003): 1-33.
- H. E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Fate of Leaders and the First World War* (Princeton, 2000), Chapters 1-2.

##### Criticisms of the Bargaining Model (read Lake, Gallop, and one of Kirshner’s articles)

- David A. Lake, “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War,” *IS* 35/3 (Winter 2010/11): 7-52.
- Max Gallop, “More Dangerous than Dyads: How a Third Party Enables Rationalist Explanations for War,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 29/3 (July 2017): 353-81.
- Jonathan Kirshner, “The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist Alternative,” *WP* 67/1 (January 2015): 155-83.
- Jonathan Kirshner, “Rationalist Explanations for War?” *SS* 10/1 (Autumn 2000): 143-50.

##### Recommended Reading

- James D. Fearon, “Cooperation, Conflict, and the Costs of Anarchy,” *IO* 72 (Summer 2018): 523-59.
- Stacie E. Goddard, *Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy: Jerusalem and Northern Ireland* (Cambridge, 2010).
- Ron E. Hassner, *War on Sacred Grounds* (Cornell, 2009).
- Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations,” *APSR* 97/4 (November 2003): 621-32.
- Dan Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model of War,” *POP* 1/1 (March 2003): 27-43.
- Monica Duffy Toft, “Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War,” *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002/2003): 81-118.

## 5. Institutionalism

February 9

### Required Reading

- Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace* (Princeton, 2004), Introduction and Chapter 1.
- G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After War* (Princeton UP, 2001), Chapters 1-3.
- Krcmaric, *The Justice Dilemma*, all.

### Recommended Reading

- Charles L. Glaser, "A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept is Misguided," *IS* 43/4 (Spring 2019): 7-50.
- John J. Mearsheimer, "Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order," *IS* 43/4 (Spring 2019): 7-50.
- Tanisha M. Fazal, *Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences of the Regulation of Armed Conflict* (Cornell UP, 2018).
- G. John Ikenberry, *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, 2011).

## 6. Economic Interdependence

February 16

### General Theories

- Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War*, Introduction, Chapters 1-5.
- Stephen G. Brooks, *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict* (Princeton, 2005), Chapters 1-3.

### The Critical Case of World War I

- Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu, "Trading on Preconceptions: Why World War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence," *IS* 36/4 (Spring 2012): 115-50.
- Patrick J. McDonald and Kevin Sweeney, "The Achilles Heel of Liberal IR Theory? Globalization and Conflict in the Pre-World War I Era," *WP* 59/3 (April 2007): 370-403.
- David M. Rowe, "The Tragedy of Liberalism: How Globalization Caused the First World War," *SS* 14/3 (July-September 2005): 407-47.

### Recommended Reading

- Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, "Weaponized Interdependence," *IS* 44/1 (Summer 2019): 42-79.
- Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (Norton, 2001).
- Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World* (Basic Books, 1986).
- Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1913).

## 7. Democratic Peace and Audience Costs

February 23

### Democratic Peace

- Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), Chapters 1-2.
- Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12/3-4 (Summer and Autumn 1983): 205-35, 323-53.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace," *APSR* 94/4 (December 1999): 791-807.
- Sebastian Rosato, "The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory," *APSR* 97/4 (November 2003): 585-602.

### Audience Costs

- James D. Fearon, "Domestic Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes," *APSR* 88/3 (September 1994): 577-92.
- Kenneth A. Schultz, "Democratic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises," *APSR* 92/4 (December 1998): 829-44.
- Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *IO* 62/1 (Winter 2008): 35-64.
- Jack Snyder and Erica D. Borghard, "The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound," *APSR* 105/3 (August 2011): 437-56.
- Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser, "The Illusion of Democratic Credibility," *IO* 66/3 (Summer 2012): 457-89.

### Recommended Readings: Democratic Peace

- Joslyn Barnhart, Robert F. Trager, Elizabeth Saunders, and Allen Dafoe, "The Suffragist Peace," *IO* (forthcoming 2020).
- Patrick J. McDonald, "Great Powers, Hierarchy, and Endogenous Regimes: Rethinking the Domestic Causes of Peace," *IO* 69/3 (Summer 2015): 557-88.
- Michael R. Tomz and Jessica L.P. Weeks, "Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace," *APSR* 107/4 (November 2013): 849-65.
- Douglas A. Van Belle, "Dinosaurs and the Democratic Peace: Paleontological Lessons for Avoiding the Extinction of Theory in Political Science," *ISP* 7/3 (August 2006): 287-306.
- John M. Owen, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," *IS* 19/2 (Fall 1994): 87-125.

### Recommended Readings: Audience Costs

- Matthew S. Leventusky and Michael C. Horowitz, "When Backing Down is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs," *JOP* 74/2 (April 2012): 323-38.
- Marc Trachtenberg, "Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis," *SS* 21/1 (January 2012): 3-42, and responses.
- Michael Tomz, "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach," *IO* 61/4 (Fall 2007): 821-40.
- Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge, 2001).

## **8. Domestic Politics Extension: Authoritarian Regimes and War**

**March 2**

- Review Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs."
- Weeks, *Dictators at War and Peace*, all.
- Mark Peceny and Caroline Beer, with Shannon Sanchez-Terry, "Dictatorial Peace?" *APSR* 96/1 (March 2002): 15-26.
- Jeff D. Colgan, "Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International Conflict," *IO* 64/4 (October 2010): 661-94.
- Review Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Cornell, 1991), Chapter 2.

### Recommended Readings

- Jeff D. Colgan and Jessica L.P. Weeks, "Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict," *IO* 69/1 (Winter 2015): 163-94.
- Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Cornell, 2015).



## 9. Norms, Culture, and Force

March 9

### Required Reading

- Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Columbia, 1996), 186-215.
- Martha Finnemore, "Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention," in *ibid.*, 153-85.
- Jeffrey W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of Internationalism," *IO* 51/1 (Winter 1997): 31-63.
- Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *IO* 53/3 (Summer 1999): 433-68.
- Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines," *IO* 52/3 (Summer 1998): 613-44.
- Ward Thomas, "Norms and Security: The Case of International Assassination," *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 105-33.
- Michelle Murray, "Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War," *SS* 19/4 (2010): 656-88.

### Recommended Reading

- Charli Carpenter and Alexander H. Montgomery, "The Stopping Power of Norms: Saturation Bombing, Civilian Immunity, and U.S. Attitudes toward the Laws of War," *IS* 45/2 (Fall 2020): 140-69.
- Joslyn Barnhart, "Humiliation and Third-Party Aggression," *World Politics* 69, no. 3 (July 2017): 532-68.
- Joslyn Barnhart, "Status Competition and Territorial Aggression: Evidence from the Scramble for Africa," *SS* 25/3 (2016): 385-419.
- Tanisha M. Fazal and Brooke C. Greene, "A Particular Difference: European Identity and Civilian Targeting," *BJPS* 45/4 (October 2015): 829-51.
- Stacie E. Goddard, "When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power," *IS* 33/3 (Winter 2008/09): 110-42.
- Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *IO* 52/4 (Autumn 1998): 887-917.

## 10. Spring Break: No Class

March 16

## Part II. Selected Topics in Security

## 11. Reputation, Credibility, and Threats

March 23

### Required Reading

- Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Chapters 1-3.
- Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Cornell, 2005), Introduction and Chapter 1.
- Todd Sechser, "Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power," *IO* 64/4 (October 2010): 627-60.
- Robert J. Art, "Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know?" in *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (USIP, 2003), 359-420.

### Recommended Reading

- Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo, "Revisiting Reputation: How Past Actions Matter in International Politics," *IO* 69/2 (March 2015): 473-95.
- Daniel Drezner, "The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion," *IO* 57/3 (Summer 2003): 643-59.
- Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *IS* 22/2 (Fall 1997): 90-137.
- Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Cornell, 1996).

## 12. Military Coercion

March 30

### Required Reading

- Pape, *Bombing to Win*, Chapters
- Karl Mueller, "Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment, and the Future of Air Power," *SS* 7/3 (Spring 1998): 182-228.
- Alexander B. Downes and Kathryn McNabb Cochran, "It's a Crime, but Is It a Blunder? Investigating the Military Effectiveness of Civilian Victimization," in *Civilians and Warfare in History*, ed. Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 288-312.
- Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *APSR* 97/3 (August 2003): 343-61.
- Max Abrahams, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *IS* 31/2 (Fall 2006): 42-78.

### Recommended Reading

- Jason Lyall, "Bombing to Lose? Airpower, Civilian Casualties, and the Dynamics of Violence in Counterinsurgency Wars," unpublished ms., Dartmouth College, 2017.
- Alexander B. Downes, *Targeting Civilians in War* (Cornell, 2008).
- Stephen Biddle, "Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq," *IS* 30/3 (Winter 2005/06): 161-76.
- Robert A. Pape, "The True Worth of Air Power," *FA* 83/2 (March/April 2004): 116-30.
- Daryl G. Press, "The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare," *IS* 26/2 (Fall 2001): 5-44.

## 13. Military Effectiveness

April 6

### Required Reading

- Biddle, *Military Power*, Chapters 1-4 and one case study chapter; skim the remainder.
- Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), Chapters 2-3.
- Risa Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008), Chapter 2.
- Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," *JSS* 19/2 (June 1996): 171-212.
- Caitlin Talmadge, "Different Threats, Different Militaries: Explaining Organizational Practices in Authoritarian Armies," *SS* 25/1 (2016): 111-41.
- Jason Lyall, *Divided Armies: Inequality and Battlefield Performance in Modern War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2020), Chapters 1-2.

### Recommended Reading

- See Downes's syllabus for "Military Power and Effectiveness," <https://alexanderdownes.weebly.com/teaching.html>.
- Ryan Grauer, *Commanding Military Power: Organizing for Victory and Defeat on the Battlefield* (Cambridge, 2016).
- Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Cornell, 2015).
- Jasen Castillo, *Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion* (Stanford, 2014).
- Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12/2 (Summer 1948): 280-315.

## 14. Military Intervention

April 13

### Required Reading

- Alexander B. Downes, *Catastrophic Success: Why Regime Change Goes Wrong* (Cornell UP, forthcoming), Introduction, Chapters 1-2, and 1 empirical chapter of your choice.
- David Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *IS* 29/1 (Summer 2004): 49-91.
- Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, "Forced to Be Free: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization," *IS* 37/4 (Spring 2013): 90-131.
- Matthew Adam Kocher, Adria K. Lawrence, and Nuno P. Monteiro, "Nationalism, Collaboration, and Resistance: France under Nazi Occupation," *IS* 43/2 (Fall 2018): 117-50.
- Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald, and Ryan Baker, "Small Footprint, Small Payoff: The Military Effectiveness of Security Force Assistance," *JSS* 41/1-2 (2018): 89-142.

### Recommended Reading

- Eli Berman and David A. Lake, eds., *Proxy Wars: Suppressing Violence through Local Agents* (Cornell UP, 2019).
- Lindsey O'Rourke, *Covert Regime Change: America's Secret Cold War* (Cornell UP, 2018).
- Melissa Willard-Foster, *Toppling Foreign Governments: The Logic of Regime Change* (University of Pennsylvania UP, 2018).
- John J. Mearsheimer, *The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities* (Yale UP, 2018), Chapters 5-6.
- Stephen Gent, "Going in When It Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome of Civil Conflicts," *ISQ* 52/4 (2008): 713-35.
- Patricia L. Sullivan and Johannes Karreth, "The Conditional Impact of Military Intervention on Internal Armed Conflict Outcomes," *CMPS* 32/3 (2015): 269-88.
- Jeremy Ferwerda and Nicholas L. Miller, "Political Devolution and Resistance to Foreign Rule: A Natural Experiment," *American Political Science Review* 108, no. 3 (August 2014): 642-660.
- Matthew A. Kocher and Nuno P. Monteiro, "Lines of Demarcation: Causation, Design-Based Inference, and Historical Research," *Perspectives on Politics* 14, no. 4 (December 2016): 952-975.
- Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, "Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?" *IS* 37/1 (Summer 2012): 7-40.
- Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, III, "Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," *IO* 63/1 (Winter 2009): 67-106.

## 15. Nuclear Proliferation: Causes and Consequences

April 20

### Required Reading

- Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *IS* 21/3 (Winter 1996/97): 54-86.
- Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs, "The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Proliferation," *IS* 39/2 (Fall 2014): 7-51.
- Matthew Fuhrmann, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," *IS* 34/1 (Summer 2009): 7-41.
- Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Norton, 2003), 3-87.
- Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability," *IS* 34/3 (Winter 2009/10): 38-78.
- Matthew Kroenig, "Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes," *IO* 67/1 (Winter 2013): 141-171.
- Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, "Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail," *IO* 67/1 (Winter 2013): 173-95.

### Recommended Reading

- Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (Princeton, 2017).
- Vipin Narang, “Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How States Pursue the Bomb,” *IS* 41/3 (Winter 2016/2017): 110-50.
- Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” *IS* 40/1 (Summer 2015): 9-46.
- Mark S. Bell, “Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy,” *IS* 40/1 (Summer 2015): 87-119.
- Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton, 2013).
- Matthew Kroenig, Todd Sechser, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Debating the Benefits of Nuclear Superiority for Crisis Bargaining, Parts I-III,” *Duck of Minerva*, March 25 and 28, 2013, <http://duckofminerva.com/2013/03/debating-the-benefits-of-nuclear-superiority-part-iii.html>.
- Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” *IS* 19/2 (Fall 1994): 126-69.

## EVALUATION PROCEDURES

It is unfortunate but true that I must assign a single letter grade that captures your entire performance in this class. Grades will be based on the following criteria.

### Track 1

Assignment	Percentage of Course Grade
Class Participation	25%
Literature Review Paper	75%

### Track 2

Assignment	Percentage of Course Grade
Class Participation	25%
Short Papers	25% each

## GRADES

The grading scale below will be used to determine your final letter grade in the course.

Excellent	Good	Satisfactory	Fail
94-100: A	87-89: B+	77-79: C+	0-69: F
90-93: A-	84-86: B	74-76: C	
	80-83: B-	70-73: C-	

## CLASS POLICIES AND UNIVERSITY RESOURCES

- **Attendance and Reading:** Students are expected to attend every class session, do all of the assigned reading before class, and come prepared to discuss it. Exceptions will of course be made for religious holidays (see “religious observances” below), illness, and other emergencies.
- **Blackboard:** Blackboard will be used for posting course files and assignments and for communicating with the class. You are already enrolled for this course on Blackboard if you have completed registration for the course. It is your responsibility to periodically check the course site (log in at <http://blackboard.gwu.edu/> using your gwu.edu address) for updates to the syllabus/readings. The Official Blackboard Help Site, FAQs, and a variety of short video tutorials are available from Blackboard. Also, when logged in to Blackboard, check out the Student Guides section for links to helpful documentation. Additionally, students can contact the GW Division of IT at (202) 994-4948 for Blackboard assistance.
- **Civility:** I expect students in this class to treat each other with respect. That means, among other things, allowing others to speak no matter how much you disagree with what they are saying and refraining from interrupting. Please remain professional, respectful, and courteous at all times.
- **Differences in Time Zones:** All the times in this syllabus correspond to the U.S. Eastern Time zone (e.g., Washington, D.C.). It is your responsibility to convert these times to the time zone of your location so that you can meet this course’s deadlines.
- **Ideological Perspectives:** I do not care *what* you think, I care *that* you think. My mission is to get you to think critically about important issues in international security, not convince you that my view is right. There is no “approved solution” or “right” or “wrong” view in this class, only better or worse arguments. Good arguments require sound logic, solid evidence, and a consideration of alternative explanations.

- **Instructor Response Time:** I will endeavor to respond to email inquiries within 24 hours, except on weekends or holidays, when you can expect a response the next business day. I will do my best to return graded assignments within 1 week for short assignments and 2 weeks for longer ones.
- **Papers.** All papers turned in for this class must be double-spaced, have one-inch margins on all sides, include page numbers, be printed in 12-point font, and stapled. Late papers will be accepted up to 24 hours after the deadline, but one letter grade will be deducted. Papers that are more than 24 hours late will not be accepted. Exceptions will be made only in cases of illness or personal/family emergency; if you find yourself in such a situation, please consult the instructor as soon as is feasible to make arrangements for an extension.
- **Plagiarism, Cheating, and Academic Integrity:** According to the university's Code of Academic Integrity, "Academic dishonesty is defined as cheating of any kind, including misrepresenting one's own work, taking credit for the work of others without crediting them and without appropriate authorization, and the fabrication of information." The rest of the code is available at <https://studentconduct.gwu.edu/>. In general, I expect that you will not lie, cheat, steal, or otherwise conduct yourselves dishonorably, and will do something if you observe others engaging in such conduct. All work you submit for this course must be your own, and must be completed in accordance with the GWU Code of Academic Integrity. **I will not tolerate any form of academic dishonesty.** Suspected cases will be referred to the Office of Academic Integrity. If you have questions about what constitutes proper use of published or unpublished sources, please ask the instructor. For more information see [Academic Dishonesty Prevention](#).

## UNIVERSITY POLICIES, RESOURCES, AND SERVICES

- **Copyright Policy Statement:** Materials used in connection with this course may be subject to copyright protection under Title 17 of the United States Code. Under certain Fair Use circumstances specified by law, copies may be made for private study, scholarship, or research. Electronic copies should not be shared with unauthorized users. If a user fails to comply with Fair Use restrictions, he/she may be liable for copyright infringement. For more information, including Fair Use guidelines, see [Libraries and Academic Innovations Copyright page](#).
- **Disabilities:** If you may need disability accommodations based on the potential impact of a disability, please register with Disability Support Services (DSS) at [disabilitysupport.gwu.edu/registration](http://disabilitysupport.gwu.edu/registration). If you have questions about disability accommodations, contact DSS at 202-994-8250 or [dss@gwu.edu](mailto:dss@gwu.edu) or visit them in person in Rome Hall, Suite 102. For additional information see: [disabilitysupport.gwu.edu](http://disabilitysupport.gwu.edu)

For information about how the course technology is accessible to all learners, see the following resources:

- [Blackboard accessibility](#)
- [Kaltura \(video platform\) accessibility](#).
- **Emergency Preparedness and Response Procedures:** The University has asked all faculty to inform students of these procedures, prepared by the GW Office of Public Safety and Emergency Management in collaboration with the Office of the Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs.

To Report an Emergency or Suspicious Activity: Call the University Police Department at 202-994-6111 (Foggy Bottom) or 202-242-6111 (Mount Vernon).

Shelter in Place, General Guidance: Although it is unlikely that we will ever need to shelter in place, it is helpful to know what to do just in case. No matter where you are, the basic steps of shelter in place will generally remain the same.

- If you are inside, stay where you are unless the building you are in is affected. If it is affected, you should evacuate. If you are outdoors, proceed into the closest building or follow instructions from emergency personnel on the scene.

- Locate an interior room to shelter inside. If possible, it should be above ground level and have the fewest number of windows. If sheltering in a room with windows, move away from the windows. If there is a large group of people inside a particular building, several rooms may be necessary.
- Shut and lock all windows (for a tighter seal) and close exterior doors.
- Turn off air conditioners, heaters, and fans. Close vents to ventilation systems as you are able. (University staff will turn off ventilation systems as quickly as possible).
- Make a list of the people with you and ask someone to call the list in to UPD so they know where you are sheltering and who is with you. If only students are present, one of the students should call in the list.
- Await further instructions. If possible, visit [GW Campus Advisories](#) for incident updates or call the GW Information Line 202-994-5050.
- Make yourself comfortable and look after one other. You will get word as soon as it is safe to come out.

Evacuation: An evacuation will be considered if the building we are in is affected or we must move to a location of greater safety. We will always evacuate if the fire alarm sounds. In the event of an evacuation, please gather your personal belongings quickly (purse, keys, GWorld card, etc.) and proceed to the nearest exit. Every classroom has a map at the door designating both the shortest egress and an alternate egress. Anyone who is physically unable to walk down the stairs should wait in the stairwell, behind the closed doors. Firemen will check the stairwells upon entering the building. Once you have evacuated the building, proceed to our primary rendezvous location: Rawlins Park, the green space across E Street from the Elliott School. From our rendezvous location, we will await instructions to re-enter the School.

Alert DC: Alert DC provides free notification by e-mail or text message during an emergency. Visit GW Campus Advisories for a link and instructions on how to sign up for alerts pertaining to GW. If you receive an Alert DC notification during class, you are encouraged to share the information immediately.

GW Alert: GW Alert provides popup notification to desktop and laptop computers during an emergency. In the event that we receive an alert to the computer in our classroom, we will follow the instructions given. You are also encouraged to download this application to your personal computer. Visit GW Campus Advisories to learn how.

Additional Information: Additional information about emergency preparedness and response at GW or the University's operating status can be found on GW Campus Advisories or by calling the GW Information Line at 202-994-5050.

- **GW Acceptable Use for Computing Systems and Services:** All members of the George Washington University must read and comply with the Acceptable Use Policy when accessing and using computing systems and services, including email and Blackboard. Please read [the Acceptable Use Policy](#) to familiarize yourself with how GW information systems are to be used ethically.
- **Inclement Weather:** Please note that online courses at the George Washington University will continue to be held even when the University is closed for inclement weather.
- **Incomplete Grades:** At the option of the instructor, an Incomplete may be given for a course if a student, for reasons beyond the student's control, is unable to complete the work of the course, and if the instructor is informed of, and approves, such reasons before the date when grades must be reported. An Incomplete can only be granted if the student's prior performance and class attendance in the course have been satisfactory. Any failure to complete the work of a course that is not satisfactorily explained to the instructor before the date when grades must be turned in will be graded F, Failure.

If acceptable reasons are later presented to the instructor, the instructor may initiate a grade change to the symbol I, Incomplete. The work must be completed within the designated time period agreed upon by the instructor, student, and school, but no more than *one semester* from the end of the semester in which the course was taken. A completed and signed Incomplete Contract, with approval from the Director of Graduate Studies, should be submitted to the CCAS Office of Graduate Studies. All students who receive

an Incomplete must maintain active student status during the subsequent semester(s) in which the work of the course is being completed. If not registered in other classes during this period, the student must register for continuous enrollment status. For more information regarding Incompletes please review the relevant sections in the University Bulletin:

- <http://bulletin.gwu.edu/university-regulations/#graduatetext>
- **Mental Health:** The University's Mental Health Services offers 24/7 assistance and referral to address students' personal, social, career, and study skills problems. Services for students include: crisis and emergency mental health consultations confidential assessment, counseling services (individual and small group), and referrals. For additional information call 202-994-5300 or see: [counselingcenter.gwu.edu/](http://counselingcenter.gwu.edu/).
- **Religious Observances:** In accordance with University policy, students should notify faculty during the first week of the semester of their intention to be absent from class on their day(s) of religious observance. For details and policy, see: [registrar.gwu.edu/university-policies#holidays](http://registrar.gwu.edu/university-policies#holidays).
- **Sharing of Course Content:** Unauthorized downloading, distributing, or sharing of any part of a recorded lecture or course materials, as well as using provided information for purposes other than the student's own learning may be deemed a violation of GW's Student Conduct Code.
- **Use of Student Work:** The professor will use academic work that you complete during this semester for educational purposes in this course during this semester. Your registration and continued enrollment constitute your consent.
- **Workload Expectation Statement:** PSC 8452 meets for two hours and thirty minutes once per week. Over the course of the semester, students will spend roughly 35 hours in the classroom. Weekly assignments—mostly reading, but also the literature review—are expected to take up, on average, 7 to 10 hours per week. At a minimum, therefore, students will spend roughly 100-140 hours over the course of the semester (and possibly more) preparing for class.



## APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL READING ON TOPICS COVERED IN CLASS

### What is Security and Security Studies?

- Mike Bourne, *Understanding Security* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), Chapters 1-3.
- Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).\*
- Steve Smith, "The Contested Concept of Security," in *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, ed. Ken Booth (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2005), 27-62.
- Richard K. Betts, "Should Strategic Studies Survive?" *WP* 50/1 (October 1997): 7-33.\*
- Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (Columbia, 1996), 1-32.
- David A. Baldwin, "Security Studies and the End of the Cold War," *WP* 48/1 (October 1995): 117-41.\*
- Edward Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!" *ISQ* 36/4 (December 1992): 421-38.
- Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *ISQ* 35/2 (June 1991): 211-39.\*
- Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security," *IS* 8/1 (Summer 1983): 129-53.
- Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Johns Hopkins, 1962), Chapter 10 ("National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol").

### Offensive Realism

- Yuan-kang Wang, *Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics* (Columbia UP, 2010).
- Christopher Layne, *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Cornell, 2006).\*
- Colin Elman, "Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional Hegemony," *APSR* 98/4 (November 2004): 563-76.\*
- Christopher Layne, "The 'Poster Child for Offensive Realism': America as a Global Hegemon," *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002): 120-64.\*
- Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," *SS* 6/4 (Summer 1997): 1-49.
- Peter Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies* (Princeton, 1996).
- John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *IS* 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 5-49.\*
- Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," *IS* 18/2 (Fall 1993): 125-53.
- Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948).\* States maximize power because human beings have a lust for power and a will to dominate.
- John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *WP* 2/2 (January 1950): 157-80. One of the earliest statements of the security dilemma.
- G. Lowes Dickinson, *The European Anarchy* (New York: Macmillan, 1917), esp. 13-17, 127-133.

### Critiques of Offensive Realism

- Jonathan Kirshner, "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China," *EJIR* 18/1 (March 2012): 53-75.
- Brandon Valeriano, "The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Testing Aggressive Power Politics Models," *International Interactions* 35/2 (2009): 179-206.
- Richard Little, "British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil War: The English School Strikes Back," *SS* 16/1 (January 2007): 68-95.
- Peter Thompson, "The Case of the Missing Hegemon: British Nonintervention in the American Civil War," *SS* 16/1 (January 2007): 96-132.
- Colin Elman, "Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional Hegemony," *APSR* 98/4 (November 2004): 563-76.\*
- Christopher Layne, "The 'Poster Child for Offensive Realism': America as a Global Hegemon," *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002): 120-64.\*

- Richard N. Rosecrance, "War and Peace," *WP* 55/1 (October 2002): 137-66.
- Glenn H. Snyder, "Mearsheimer's World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay," *IS* 27/1 (Summer 2002): 149-73.
- Peter Gowan, "A Calculus of Power," *New Left Review* 16 (July-August 2002): 47-67.
- Barry R. Posen, "The Best Defense," *The National Interest* (Spring 2002): 119-26.
- Steven Lobell, "War is Politics: Offensive Realism, Domestic Politics, and Security Strategies," *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002): 165-95.
- Gerald Geunwook Lee, "To Be Long or Not to Be Long—That is the Question: The Contradiction of Time-Horizon in Offensive Realism," *SS* 12/2 (Winter 2002): 196-217.

### Neorealism, Defensive Realism, Offense-Defense Theory, Neoclassical Realism

- Joseph M. Parent and Sebastian Rosato, "Balancing in Neorealism," *IS* 40/2 (Fall 2015): 51-86.
- "Debating Charles L. Glaser's *Rational Theory of International Politics*," *SS* 20/3 (2011): 416-89.\*
- Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics* (Princeton, 2010).\*
- William C. Wohlforth, "Gilpinian Realism and International Relations," *International Relations* 25/4 (2011): 499-511.\*
- Cameron G. Thies, "State Socialization and Structural Realism," *SS* 19/4 (2010): 689-717.
- João Resende-Santos, *Neorealism, States, and the Modern Mass Army* (Cambridge, 2007).\*
- Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton, 2005).\*
- Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Offense, Defense, and War* (MIT, 2004).\*
- Karen Ruth Adams, "Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence Balance," *IS* 28/3 (Winter 2003/04): 45-83.
- Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *IS* 25/3 (Winter 2000/01): 128-61.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 5-41.
- Stephen Van Evera, *The Causes of War, Vol. 1: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Cornell, 1999).\*
- Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" *IS* 22/4 (Spring 1998): 44-82.\*
- Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," *IS* 22/4 (Spring 1998): 5-43.\*
- Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," *WP* 50/1 (October 1997): 171-201.
- Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other," *SS* 7/1 (Autumn 1997): 114-54.
- Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," *WP* 49/3 (April 1997): 371-400.\*
- João Resende-Santos, "Anarchy and the Emulation of Military Systems: Military Organization and Technology in South America, 1870-1914," *SS* 5/3 (Spring 1996): 193-260.\*
- Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Cornell, 1996).
- Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and its Critics," *SS* 4/4 (Summer 1995): 660-94.\*
- Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," *IS* 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 50-90.\*
- Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," *WP* 44/4 (July 1992): 497-538.
- Barry R. Posen, *Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks* (Cornell, 1991).\*
- Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *IO* 44/2 (Spring 1990): 137-68.
- Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy," *IS* 14/1 (Summer 1989): 5-49.
- Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 39-52.\*
- Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Cornell, 1987).\*
- Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine* (Cornell, 1984).\*

- Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” *IS* 9/1 (Summer 1984): 58-108. Reprinted in *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War*, ed. Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera (Princeton, 1991), 59-109.\*
- Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” *WP* 30/2 (January 1978): 167-214.\*
- George Quester, *Offense and Defense in the International System* (New York: Wiley, 1977).\*
- Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, 1976), 58-113 (Chapter 3: “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and the Intentions of the Adversary”).\*

#### Critiques of Neorealism, Defensive Realism, etc.

- Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot, “How Realism Waltzed Off: Liberalism and Decisionmaking in Kenneth Waltz’s Neorealism,” *IS* 40/2 (Fall 2015): 87-118.
- Sebastian Rosato, “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” *IS* 39/3 (Winter 2014/15): 48-88.
- Ahsan Butt, “Anarchy and Hierarchy in International Relations: Examining South America’s War-Prone Decade, 1932-1941,” *IO* 67/3 (July 2013): 575-607.
- Eric J. Hamilton and Brian C. Rathbun, “Scarce Differences: Toward a Material and Systemic Foundation for Offensive and Defensive Realism,” *SS* 22/3 (2013): 436-65.
- Daniel H. Nexon, “The Balance of Power in the Balance,” *WP* 61/2 (2009): 330-59.
- Keir Lieber, “The New History of World War I and what it Means for International Relations Theory,” *IS* 32/2 (Fall 2007): 155-91.
- Deborah Boucoyannis, “The International Wanderings of a Liberal Idea, or Why Liberals Can Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Balance of Power,” *POP* 5/4 (December 2007): 703-27.
- Evan Braden Montgomery, “Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty,” *IS* 31/2 (Fall 2006): 151-85.
- Stacie Goddard and Daniel H. Nexon, “Paradigm Lost? Reassessing Theory of International Politics,” *EJIR* 11/1 (2005): 9-61.
- Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z. Haftel, and Kevin Sweeney, “Offense-Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment,” *JCR* 49/1 (February 2005): 67-89.
- Keir Lieber, *War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology* (Cornell, 2005).
- Stephen Biddle, “Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory,” *JOP* 63/3 (August 2001): 741-74.
- Keir Lieber, “Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security,” *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 71-104.
- Peter D. Feaver, et al., “Correspondence: Brother Can You Spare a Paradigm? (Or Was Anybody Ever a Realist?),” *IS* 25/1 (Summer 2000): 165-93.
- Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” *IS* 24/2 (Fall 1999): 5-55.\*
- Richard K. Betts, “Must War Find a Way? A Review Essay,” *IS* 24/2 (Fall 1999): 166-98 (review of Van Evera, *Causes of War*).\*
- Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, 1999).\*
- John A. Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” *APSR* 91/4 (December 1997): 899-912, and responses by Waltz, Christensen and Snyder, Elman and Elman, Schweller, and Walt.\*
- Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” *IO* 51/3 (Summer 1997): 445-77.\*
- James D. Fearon, “The Offense-Defense Balance and War Since 1648” (unpub. ms., April 1997, available at <http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon>).
- Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why *Not* Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” *SS* 6/1 (Autumn 1996): 7-53.\*
- Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” *SS* 5/3 (Spring 1996): 90-121.
- Dan Reiter, “Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen,” *IS* 20/2 (Fall 1995): 5-34.
- Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and its Critics,” *SS* 4/4 (Summer 1995): 660-94.\*
- Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” *IS* 19/3 (Winter 1994/95): 50-90.\*
- Jonathan Shimshoni, “Technology, Military Advantage, and World War I: A Case for Military Entrepreneurship,” *IS* 15/3 (Winter 1990/91): 187-215.

- Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (Columbia, 1986).
- Jack S. Levy, “The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis,” *ISQ* 28/2 (June 1984): 219-38.\*

### “Neoclassical” Realism

- Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Oxford, 2016).
- Thomas Juneau, *Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy* (Stanford UP, 2015).
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## IR Perspectives on Civil War, Ethnic Conflict, Intervention, Occupation, and Peacekeeping

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## APPENDIX B: SELECTED ADDITIONAL TOPICS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

### Unipolarity, Hierarchy, Status, and Power Transitions

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