# Catastrophic Success: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Goes Wrong Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2021

# Supplementary Materials for Chapter 4, Part 3 Alexander B. Downes downes@gwu.edu

January 21, 2022

One of the most important sources I use for building my dataset of foreign-imposed regime changes is the Archigos Dataset on Leaders, assembled by Giacomo Chiozza, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and H.E. Goemans. As I note in Chapter 4 (see p. 340, n. 14), in many instances my coding of leaders who enter office through foreign intervention diverges from theirs. The reason is that we use different definitions for foreign imposition. According to Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, for a leader to be coded as coming to power through foreign imposition in Archigos, "we need direct imposition. It is not sufficient that another state supports a particular choice of leader or tries to influence leader selection indirectly."<sup>2</sup> These criteria result in a list of only forty foreign-imposed leaders. In Catastrophic Success, by contrast, I define foreign-imposed regime change as "the forcible or coerced removal of the effective, or de facto, leader of one state which remains formally sovereign afterward—by the government of another state." My definition requires only that "an external actor must by primarily responsible for deposing the targeted leader—or at least play a substantial role in his removal." My definition emphasizes the manner of leader removal, but the same criteria can be applied for how leaders enter office. In the vast majority of cases, as explained in the book, the external power removes both the sitting leader and empowers the new one. Interveners can accomplish this by invasion, coercion, or working with local partners. In other words, direct imposition by the foreign power is not required for a leader to be considered foreign-imposed according to my definition. My list of foreign-imposed leaders thus comes to about one hundred.

## The Leader-Spell Dataset

Table 4.1A below lists cases of foreign impositions of leaders included in version 2.9 of the *leader-spell* version of the *Archigos* dataset and my dataset. This version of the dataset covers the years from 1875 to 2004. The final column in the table indicates which cases are included in the dataset that produced the results in the analyses using the leader-spell as the unit of analysis in Chapter 4 of the book. There are two things to note. First, as described above, I code far more cases of foreign imposition than are contained in the *Archigos* dataset. Second, seven cases not included in my case universe of foreign-imposed leaders nevertheless appear in the dataset used for statistical analysis: Transvaal 1877 and 1902, Orange Free State 1902, Vietnam 1885, China 1937, and Kuwait 1990 and 1991 (an eighth case, Austria in 1938, is also included based on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2016.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Downes 2021, 20.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Downes 2021, 25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This version of the dataset has one observation per leader-term in office and records the length of tenure and means of entry into and exit from office, among other things.

Todd Sechser's Militarized Compellent Threat Dataset). I decided to include these cases, even though my research either did not identify them—Transvaal and Orange Free State—or considered them not to be cases of regime change—Vietnam, Austria, and Kuwait I coded as conquest and annexation (the first two cases) and liberation from annexation (the third); and China I considered not to be regime change because Chiang Kai-shek remained leader of China throughout the Sino-Japanese War. The reason I included them is because they were plausible cases and I thought casting a broader net made sense. Including these cases also creates a harder test for my theory because while all of these leaders came to power in leadership regime changes, only three of them were removed through "irregular" means. Including them thus cuts against my hypothesis that leadership regime change increases the likelihood of violent leader removal. The results in the book thus understate the effects of regime change/leadership regime change on the likelihood of irregular removal. Indeed, when I exclude these cases in Table 4.4A below, the strength of my findings increases.

On the flip side, I excluded six cases of foreign imposition as coded by *Archigos*: Albania 1918, Jordan 1921, Mongolia 1921, Czechoslovakia 1938 and 1945, and Liberia 1990. Of these cases, I could find no evidence of foreign imposition in two (Albania and Liberia). In the other four, two (Jordan and Mongolia) were not independent prior to foreign imposition (the former was part of the Ottoman Empire and then became a League of Nations mandate controlled by Britain whereas the latter was part of China); one consisted of conquest and dismemberment by Nazi Germany (Czechoslovakia 1938); and two consisted of resurrection from conquest (Czechoslovakia 1938 and Kuwait 1991). Again, excluding these cases does not create a bias in favor of my theory as four of these leaders were removed irregularly and only three lost power by regular means. Adding these six cases to the dataset does little to change the results, as shown in Table 4.4B below.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Sechser 2011. The imposition of Arthur Seyss-Inquart is coded as a successful compellent threat for leadership change. See also Downes 2018. Seyss-Inquart was placed in power at Hitler's insistence and a day later requested Austria's annexation into the Third Reich. Austria thus ceased to exist as an independent state.

Table 4.1A. Comparison of Foreign-Imposed Leaders Contained in the Leader-Spell Version of the *Archigos* Data Set on Leaders (Version 2.9) and in *Catastrophic Success*, 1875-2004

Country	Leader	Year of Entry	Archigos Foreign Imposition	Downes Foreign Imposition	Included in the Analysis
Honduras	Leiva	1874	No	Yes	Yes
Honduras	Soto	1874	No	Yes	Yes
El Salvador	Zaldivar	1876	No	Yes	Yes
Transvaal	Shepstone	1877	Yes	No	Yes
Afghanistan	Jan	1879	Yes	Yes	Yes
Afghanistan	A.R. Khan	1880	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peru	Calderon	1881	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peru	Montero	1881	No	Yes	Yes
Peru	Iglesias	1882	Yes	Yes	Yes
Guatemala	Barillas	1885	No	Yes	Yes
Vietnam	Dong Khanh	1885	Yes	No	Yes
Honduras	P. Bonilla	1894	No	Yes	Yes
Orange Free State	Milner	1902	Yes	No	Yes
Transvaal	Milner	1902	Yes	No	Yes
Honduras	Davila	1907	No	Yes	Yes
Korea	Yi Ch'ok	1907	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	Madriz	1909	No	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	J.D. Estrada	1910	No	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	J.J. Estrada	1910	No	Yes	Yes
Honduras	Bertrand	1911	No	Yes	Yes
Dominican Republic	Nouel y Bobadilla	1912	No	Yes	Yes
Belgium	Von der Golt	1914	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dominican Republic	Baez	1914	No	Yes	Yes
Mexico	Carranza	1915	No	Yes	Yes
Albania	Von Kral	1916	No	Yes	Yes
Greece	Venizelos	1917	Yes	Yes	Yes
Belgium	Cooreman	1918	No	Yes	Yes
Albania	Turkhan Pasha	1918	Yes	No	No
Costa Rica	Quiros Segura	1919	No	Yes	Yes
Costa Rica	Barquero	1919	No	Yes	Yes
Hungary	Peidl	1919	No	Yes	Yes
Latvia	Borkovskis	1919	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latvia	Niedra	1919	Yes	Yes	Yes
Jordan	Abdullah Al-Hussein	1921	Yes	No	No
Mongolia	Chagdarjav	1921	Yes	No	No
Mongolia	Dambadorji	1925	No	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	Adolfo Diaz	1926	No	Yes	Yes
China	Chiang Kai-shek	1928	No	Yes	Yes
Ethiopia	King of Italy	1936	Yes	Yes	Yes

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China Wang Kemin 1937 Yes M	No Yes
	No Yes
Czechoslovakia Hacha 1938 Yes M	No No
Albania Verlaci 1939 No Y	Yes Yes
Spain Franco 1939 No Y	Yes Yes
•	Yes Yes
	Yes Yes
Latvia Kirhensteins 1940 No Y	Yes Yes
	Yes Yes
J Company of the Comp	Yes Yes
	Yes Yes
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Romania Groza 1945 No Y	Yes Yes
	Yes Yes
	Yes Yes
	Yes Yes
Indonesia A.H.J. Lovink 1949 Yes Y	Yes Yes
	Yes Yes
·	Yes Yes
1	Yes Yes
	Yes Yes
Guatemala Monzon 1954 No Y	Yes Yes
Guatemala Castillo Armas 1954 No Y	Yes Yes
Hungary Kadar 1956 Yes Y	Yes Yes
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Gabon	Mba	1964	Yes	Yes	Yes
Czechoslovakia	Svoboda	1968	No	Yes	Yes
Czechoslovakia	Husak	1968	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chile	Pinochet	1973	No	Yes	Yes
Cyprus	Sampson	1974	No	Yes	Yes
Cyprus	Clerides	1974	No	Yes	Yes
Afghanistan	Karmal	1979	No	Yes	Yes
Cambodia	Samrin	1979	No	Yes	Yes
Cent. African Repub.	Dacko	1979	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uganda	Lule	1979	No	Yes	Yes
Chad	Habre	1982	No	Yes	Yes
Mongolia	Batmonh	1984	No	Yes	Yes
Afghanistan	Najibullah	1986	No	Yes	Yes
Comoros	Djohar	1989	No	Yes	Yes
Kuwait	Hussein	1990	Yes	No	Yes
Panama	Endara	1990	Yes	Yes	Yes
Liberia	Sawyer	1990	Yes	No	No
Kuwait	As-Sabah	1991	Yes	No	Yes
Haiti	Aristide	1994	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lesotho	Mokhehle	1994	No	Yes	Yes
Comoros	El-Yachroutu	1995	No	Yes	Yes
DRC	L. Kabila	1997	No	Yes	Yes
Republic of Congo	Sassou-Nguesso	1997	No	Yes	Yes
Sierra Leone	Kabbah	1998	Yes	Yes	Yes
Afghanistan	Karzai	2001	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cent. African Repub.	Bozize	2003	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iraq	Franks	2003	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iraq	Garner	2003	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iraq	Bremer	2003	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iraq	Allawi	2003	No	Yes	Yes

Note: My analysis of leader survival is limited to the years after 1875 because that is the year in which *Archigos* begins.

Table 4.4A. Competing Risks Analysis of Irregular Removal from Office, 1875-2004, Leader-Spell Data, Seven Cases of Foreign Imposition from *Archigos* (and Austria 1938) Removed

	1	2	3	4
Foreign entry into office	2.888***	-	2.135***	-
	(0.513)		(0.406)	
Leadership regime change	-	4.774***	-	4.274***
		(0.910)		(0.973)
Institutional regime change	-	1.700	-	1.333
		(0.795)		(0.702)
Restoration regime change	-	0.449	-	0.630
		(0.301)		(0.363)
Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	3,057	3,057	2,876	2,876
Number failed	664	664	612	612
Number competing	2,222	2,222	2,102	2,102
Number censored	171	171	162	162
Log pseudo-LL	-5186.659	-5174.036	-4484.586	-4596.342
Wald Chi2	35.60***	71.61***	282.40***	261.29***

Note: The results in this table exclude the seven cases of foreign imposition from *Archigos* that I included in my analysis in the book—Transvaal 1877 and 1902, Orange Free State 1902, Vietnam 1885, China 1937, Kuwait 1990 and 1991—as well as Austria 1938, which I added based on Todd Sechser's Militarized Compellent Threat Dataset (Sechser 2011). These results are very similar to those reported in Table 4.4 in the book (p. 226). The coefficients for leadership regime change, however, are larger, indicating that including these cases as I did in the book understates the effect of this type of regime change on irregular leader removal.

Table 4.4B. Competing Risks Analysis of Irregular Removal from Office, 1875-2004, Leader-Spell Data, Six Excluded *Archigos* Cases Added

	1	2	3	4
Foreign entry into office	2.750***	-	2.064***	-
	(0.480)		(0.400)	
Leadership regime change	-	4.142***	-	3.835***
		(0.801)		(0.900)
Institutional regime change	-	1.706	-	1.297
		(0.797)		(0.683)
Restoration regime change	-	0.429	-	0.607
		(0.288)		(0.350)
Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	3,057	3,057	2,876	2,876
Number failed	664	664	612	612
Number competing	2,222	2,222	2,102	2,102
Number censored	171	171	162	162
Log pseudo-LL	-5186.451	-5175.109	-4484.272	-4595.881
Wald Chi2	33.54***	57.23 ***	285.95 ***	266.36***

Note: The results in this table include all thirteen additional cases of foreign imposition from *Archigos* listed in Table 4.1A: the seven included in my analysis in the book (plus Austria 1938) supplemented by the six *Archigos* cases I excluded: Albania 1918, Jordan 1921, Mongolia 1921, Czechoslovakia 1938 and 1945, and Liberia 1990. These results differ little from those reported in Table 4.4 in the book (p. 226).

Table 4.6A. Competing Risks Analysis of *Regular* Removal from Office, 1875-2004, Leader-Spell Data, Seven Cases of Foreign Imposition from *Archigos* (and Austria 1938) Removed

	1	2	3	4
Foreign entry into office	0.471***	-	0.602**	-
	(0.086)		(0.115)	
Leadership regime change	-	0.241***	-	0.311***
		(0.068)		(0.094)
Institutional regime change	-	0.846	-	1.009
		(0.268)		(0.378)
Restoration regime change	-	1.038	-	1.053
		(0.315)		(0.364)
Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	3,057	3,057	2,876	2,876
Number failed	2,037	2,037	1,944	1,944
Number competing	849	849	770	770
Number censored	171	171	162	162
Log pseudo-LL	-15321.941	-15312.799	-14173.257	-14167.392
Wald Chi2	17.00***	25.63***	271.27***	270.62***

Note: The results in this table exclude the seven cases of foreign imposition from *Archigos* that I included in my analysis in the book—Transvaal 1877 and 1902, Orange Free State 1902, Vietnam 1885, China 1937, Kuwait 1990 and 1991—as well as Austria 1938, which I added based on Todd Sechser's Militarized Compellent Threat Dataset (Sechser 2011). These results are very similar to those reported in Table 4.6 in the book (p. 231).

Table 4.6B. Competing Risks Analysis of Regular Removal from Office, 1875-2004, Leader-Spell Data, Six Excluded *Archigos* Cases Added

	1	2	3	4
Foreign entry into office	0.487***	-	0.581**	-
	(0.087)		(0.120)	
Leadership regime change	-	0.307***	-	0.345**
		(0.080)		(0.108)
Institutional regime change	-	0.844	-	1.002
		(0.268)		(0.377)
Restoration regime change	-	0.950	-	0.995
		(0.289)		(0.340)
Controls?	No	No	Yes	Yes
N	3,057	3,057	2,876	2,876
Number failed	2,037	2,037	1,944	1,944
Number competing	849	849	770	770
Number censored	171	171	162	162
Log pseudo-LL	-15321.208	-15314.465	-14171.841	-14166.507
Wald Chi2	16.30***	20.72***	268.20 ***	265.62***

Note: The results in this table include all thirteen additional cases of foreign imposition from *Archigos* listed in Table 4.1A: the seven included in my analysis in the book (plus Austria 1938) supplemented by the six *Archigos* cases I excluded: Albania 1918, Jordan 1921, Mongolia 1921, Czechoslovakia 1938 and 1945, and Liberia 1990. These results are very similar to those reported in Table 4.6 in the book (p. 231).

### The Leader-Year Dataset

Table 4.2A shows the cases of foreign-imposed leaders in the leader-year version of the *Archigos* dataset compared to mine, plus the cases included in the analysis that produced the leader-year results in the book. Because the *Archigos* leader-year dataset begins in 1919, some of the cases from *Archigos* that I included in my leader-spell analysis cannot be included here: Transvaal 1877 and 1902, Orange Free State 1902, and Vietnam 1885. In addition, because the dataset is coded on an annual basis and lists the leader who held office for the majority of the year, it misses Saddam Hussein's brief rule over Kuwait from August 1990 to March 1991 (but includes the reimposition of Jabir As-Sabah after the war in 1991). China 1937 is also missing from the leader-year version of *Archigos* (Chiang Kai-Shek is coded as the continuous leader of China from 1928 to 1949). Thus, of the seven cases from *Archigos* included in the leader-spell dataset, only one (Kuwait 1991) is also in the *Archigos* leader-year dataset. I exclude it from this analysis. The six *Archigos* cases that I excluded from the leader-spell data (Albania 1918, Jordan 1921, Mongolia 1921, Czechoslovakia 1938 and 1945, and Liberia 1990) are similarly excluded here (as is Austria 1938).

Two things are worth noting. First, I hewed more closely to my own coding of regime change/leader imposition in the leader-year dataset than I did in the leader-spell data. Again, however, this choice exerts virtually no effect on the statistical findings. As shown in Table 4.3A below, adding the eight excluded cases has little effect on the results for regular or irregular removal. Second, slightly less than half of the cases of foreign imposition appear in the leader-year *Archigos* dataset as used by Goemans in his 2008 article as appeared in the leader-spell version. This loss of cases is partially attributable to the reduced time period covered by the data, but also to various other reasons described above.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> It is important to recall that I am using the version of the *Archigos* leader-year data prepared by Goemans for his 2008 article "Which Way Out?" The reason for doing this is that his version includes a large number of control variables not included in my own dataset. Thus, employing his version provides a better test than using the leader-spell version alone. The drawback is that in some instances the availability of control variables results in the loss of some cases of foreign imposition.

Table 4.2A. Comparison of Foreign-Imposed Leaders Contained in the Leader-Year Version of the *Archigos* Data Set on Leaders (Version 2.9 as Used in Goemans 2008) and in *Catastrophic Success*, 1919-2004

Country	Leader	Year of Entry	Archigos Foreign Imposition	Downes Foreign Imposition	Included in the Analysis
Mexico	Carranza	1915	No	Yes	Yes
Greece	Venizelos	1917	Yes	Yes	Yes
Albania	Turkhan Pasha	1918	Yes	No	No
Belgium	Delacroix	1919	No	Yes	Yes
Costa Rica	Quiros Segura	1919	No	Yes	Yes
Costa Rica	Barquero	1919	No	Yes	Yes
Hungary	Peidl	1919	No	Yes	Yes
Latvia	Borkovskis	1919	No	Yes	Yes
Latvia	Niedra	1919	No	Yes	Yes
Jordan	Abdullah Al-Hussein	1921	Yes	No	No
Mongolia	Chagdarjav	1921	No	No	No
Mongolia	Dambadorji	1925	No	Yes	Yes
Nicaragua	Adolfo Diaz	1926	No	Yes	Yes
China	Chiang Kai-shek	1928	No	Yes	Yes
Czechoslovakia	Hacha	1938	Yes	No	No
Albania	Verlaci	1939	No	Yes	Yes
Spain	Franco	1939	No	Yes	Yes
Belgium	Von Falkenhausen	1940	No	Yes	Yes
Estonia	Vares	1940	Yes	Yes	Yes
Latvia	Kirhensteins	1940	No	Yes	Yes
Lithuania	Merkys	1940	No	Yes	Yes
Lithuania	Paleckis	1940	No	Yes	Yes
The Netherlands	Seyss-Inquart	1940	No	Yes	Yes
Norway	Quisling	1940	No	Yes	Yes
Ethiopia	Selassie	1941	Yes	Yes	Yes
Greece	Tsolakoglou	1941	No	Yes	Yes
Iran	Mohammad Reza	1941	No	Yes	Yes
Iraq	Abdul-Ilah	1941	No	Yes	Yes
Yugoslavia	Nedic	1941	No	Yes	Yes
Denmark	Best	1943	No	Yes	Yes
Belgium	Pierlot	1944	No	Yes	Yes
Bulgaria	Georgiev	1944	No	Yes	Yes
France	De Gaulle	1944	No	Yes	Yes
Hungary	Szalasi	1944	No	Yes	Yes
Denmark	Buhl	1945	No	Yes	Yes
Czechoslovakia	Benes	1945	Yes	No	No
Hungary	Rakoski	1945	No	Yes	Yes
Norway	Nygaardsvold	1945	No	Yes	Yes
The Netherlands	Schermerhorn	1945	No	Yes	Yes

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Romania	Groza	1945	No	Yes	Yes
East Germany	Pieck	1946	No	Yes	Yes
Czechoslovakia	Gottwald	1948	No	Yes	Yes
Indonesia	Beel	1948	Yes	Yes	Yes
Indonesia	A.H.J. Lovink	1949	Yes	Yes	Yes
West Germany	Adenauer	1949	No	Yes	Yes
Japan	Yoshida	1952	No	Yes	Yes
Iran	Mohammad Reza	1953	No	Yes	Yes
Guatemala	Diaz	1954	No	Yes	Yes
Guatemala	Monzon	1954	No	Yes	Yes
Guatemala	Castillo Armas	1954	No	Yes	Yes
Hungary	Kadar	1956	Yes	Yes	Yes
DRC	Mobutu	1960	No	Yes	Yes
Dominican Republic	Ramfis Trujillo	1961	No	Yes	Yes
Dominican Republic	Balaguer	1961	No	Yes	Yes
Repub. of Vietnam	Minh	1963	No	Yes	Yes
Gabon	Mba	1964	Yes	Yes	Yes
Czechoslovakia	Svoboda	1968	No	Yes	Yes
Czechoslovakia	Husak	1968	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chile	Pinochet	1973	No	Yes	Yes
Cyprus	Sampson	1974	No	Yes	Yes
Cyprus	Clerides	1974	No	Yes	Yes
Afghanistan	Karmal	1979	No	Yes	Yes
Cambodia	Samrin	1979	No	Yes	Yes
Cent. African Repub.	Dacko	1979	Yes	Yes	Yes
Uganda	Lule	1979	No	Yes	Yes
Chad	Habre	1982	No	Yes	Yes
Mongolia	Batmonh	1984	No	Yes	Yes
Afghanistan	Najibullah	1986	No	Yes	Yes
Comoros	Djohar	1989	No	Yes	Yes
Panama	Endara	1990	Yes	Yes	Yes
Liberia	Sawyer	1990	Yes	No	No
Kuwait	As-Sabah	1991	Yes	No	No
Haiti	Aristide	1994	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lesotho	Mokhehle	1994	No	Yes	Yes
Comoros	El-Yachroutu	1995	No	Yes	Yes
DRC	L. Kabila	1997	No	Yes	Yes
Republic of Congo	Sassou-Nguesso	1997	No	Yes	Yes
Sierra Leone	Kabbah	1998	Yes	Yes	Yes
Afghanistan	Karzai	2001	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cent. African Repub.	Bozize	2003	No	Yes	Yes

Leader-Year Data, Irregular and Regular Removal

Table 4.3A. Competing Risks Analysis of Irregular and Regular Removal from Office, 1919-2004, Leader-Year Data, All *Archigos* Cases Added

	Irregular Removal		Regular	Removal
	1	2	3	4
Foreign entry into office	2.290***	-	0.474**	-
- '	(0.417)		(0.115)	
Foreign entry into office * ln(t)	-	-	1.000†	-
			(0.000)	
Leadership regime change	-	3.575***	-	0.364**
		(0.786)		(0.114)
Institutional regime change	-	2.151	-	0.473**
		(1.073)		(0.702)
Institutional regime change * ln(t)	-	-	-	1.000**
				(0.000)
Restoration regime change	-	0.013**	-	0.870
		(0.017)		(0.381)
Restoration regime change * ln(t)	-	1.001***	-	1.000**
		(0.000)		(0.000)
Controls?	No	No	No	No
N	10,989	10,989	10,989	10,989
Number failed	493	493	1,321	1,321
Number competing	1,498	1,498	670	670
Number censored	161	161	161	161
Log pseudo-LL	-3671.928	-3658.195	-9508.679	-9502.653
Wald Chi2	20.72***	58.10***	10.24***	23.52***

Note: The results in this table are produced by a dataset that adds the excluded *Archigos* cases that occurred within the time frame of the analysis (Kuwait 1991, Albania 1918, Jordan 1921, Mongolia 1921, Czechoslovakia 1938 and 1945, and Liberia 1990) plus Austria 1938. These results in this table differ little from those reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.5 in the book (pp. 224 and 229, respectively).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See the discussion above in the section on leader-year/irregular and regular removal for further explanation.

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